Here is the text (part 2) to my current article on this topic that was just published in Oregon Fish & Wildlife Journal. Because it is pretty long, I have posted the illustrations, captions, tables, and a map separately, as “part 1.” Here is the complete published version of the text: http://nwmapsco.com/ZybachB/Articles/Magazines/Oregon_Fish_&_Wildlife_Journal/20250401_Burned_Out/Zybach_20250425.pdf
Burned Out: Deadly National Forest Fires Now Entering Towns
The 2025 Los Angeles wildfires caught everyone’s attention because of their size and affected population: 29 people died, more than 18,000 homes and structures were destroyed, and 57,800 acres burned. The location, politics, litigation, and insurance claims associated with this catastrophic event will likely be in the news for many years to follow for those reasons.
Compare this with the 25+ towns, 124 fatalities, 31,000+ homes and structures lost, and 4,327,600 acres burned from 2018 through 2024 in northern California and western Oregon within the bounds of the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). And consider these were not the only acres and structures burned during those years in NWFP lands — just the ones that burned into towns.
More towns have burned in National Forest wildfires in the last seven years — and mostly in NWFP territory — than had taken place in the entire US over the previous 100 years — a lot more. How did this happen? And how to fix?
This article is not intended to be a memoriam for these towns and affected residents; rather, it is a much hoped-for action plan to help repair these communities and to resume active management of our public roads and forests to reduce wildfire damage for their benefit and for the benefit of all US citizens.
1897 Organic Act: In The Beginning
In 1897 Congress passed the “Organic Act” to manage and protect the recently created US Forest Reserves. The bill was signed into law by President William McKinley and has never been repealed. The guiding principal of the Act remains fairly well-known to this time, and has been the stated theoretical basis to all subsequent US Forest Service (USFS) planning:
“No public forest reservation shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.”
A lesser-recognized portion of the Act also states it was “for the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and promoting the younger growth on forest reservations” — and, in that regard, authority was given to “designate and appraise so much of the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found upon such forest reservations” for sale at “not less” than the appraised value, under the sole condition it couldn’t be “exported” to another State or Territory.
In a nutshell, “living and growing timber” was intended to be “preserved,” “younger growth” was to be “promoted,” and a “continuous supply” of “dead, matured, or large” trees were to be sold at market value: “For the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.”
In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt created the USFS by transferring 56 million acres in 60 Forest Reserves from the US Department of the Interior (USDI) to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). His good friend and collaborator, Gifford Pinchot, was put in charge of the new agency as its first “Chief.”
Roosevelt signed HR Act 460 on February 1, 1905. On the same day James Wilson, the Secretary of Agriculture, sent Pinchot a letter outlining the basic principles and public-service policy the new “Forest Service” was to follow. Key excerpts included:
“In the administration of the Forest Reserves, it must be clearly borne in mind that all land is to be devoted to the most productive use for the permanent good of the whole people and not for the temporary benefit of individuals or companies . . . You will see to it that the water, wood, and forage of the Reserves are conserved and wisely used under business-like regulations enforced with promptness, effectiveness and common sense.”
And, “. . . Where conflicting interest must be reconciled, the question will always be decided from the standpoint of the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run.” By 1910, Pinchot had been able to expand the agency to 150 National Forests covering 172 million acres when everything changed.
1910 Fires: Course Change
The year 1910 was when the mission, focus, and budget of the USFS was dramatically changed. An estimated 1700 spot fires were driven together with unexpected hurricane-force winds for six hours and burned and uprooted 3 million acres of forestland, destroyed several railroad towns from Montana, through Idaho, and into Washington, and killed 86 people — mostly firefighters under the direction of the new US Forest Service.
The 1910 Fires galvanized the new agency into action and its mission became “fire prevention” above all else. Funding, research, and a great expansion in personnel took place. In 1915 the first fire lookout tower was built on Mt. Hood, and by the 1930s nearly 8000 were in operation across the US, connected by a functional network of roads, pack trails, and telephone lines.
The mission and focus became to spot and extinguish wildfires in USFS lands as quickly and completely as possible. By 1935 the “10 a.m. policy” was firmly in place, with the “rule” that all fires were to be extinguished by 10 a.m. the following day. With the advent of WW II, airplanes and smokejumpers were added to the firefighting effort.
This system became remarkably effective over time. From 1952 until 1987, only one forest fire in all western Oregon was greater than 10,000 acres; the 1966 Oxbow fire was 42,000 acres in size, and it took place on USDI Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Land, not USDA Forest Service.
But things began to change in the 1960s and 70s. Forest fires were increasingly seen as past events from earlier times and focus changed to Wilderness areas, endangered species, riparian buffers, critical habitat, and Deep Ecology. In 1964 the Wilderness Act was signed into law and created 54 areas over 13 states, including the Kalmiopsis in southwest Oregon.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1966. On December 22, 1969 Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and a short distance away on the same day, 50 other lawyers were incorporating the Environmental Law Institute (ELI).
In 1973, Congress passed a completely rewritten ESA, revised to “protect critically imperiled species from extinction” and including “the ecosystems upon which they depend.” The new law distinguished”threatened” from “endangered” species; allowed listing threatened species in just part of their range;allowed listing of plants and invertebrates; authorized unlimited funds for species protection; and madeit illegal to kill, harm, or otherwise “take” a listed species. In effect, “the law made endangered species protection the highest priority of government.”
In 1978, the Forest Service officially abandoned the 10 a.m. policy, marking a significant shift in strategy from fire suppression to “fire management.” This approach included “allowing naturally caused fires to burn” and “the use of prescribed fires.” The stated intent was to “return fire to the land.”
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) was enacted in 1980 to authorize the payment of attorney’s fees “and other expenses” to a prevailing party in legal actions against the United States. The Act was initially designed to aid very small businesses and poorer citizens, but an odd loophole allowed wealthy “nonprofit” environmental organizations to hire costly legal teams to sue the government at taxpayer expense. Which they did, in dozens of subsequent “environmental” lawsuits.
NEPA, ELI, the ESA, and EAJA had formed the perfect strategy for environmental organizations to file series of lawsuits to “stop clearcutting” and “preserve old-growth,” and “save spotted owls” by ending logging on public lands. The lawsuits, funded by taxpayers, were generally successful and the “Timber Wars” soon developed between litigious environmentalists and the forest industry, creating bitter feelings between the factions, and widespread unemployment and business failures in affected rural communities.
Then, in 1987, more than 42,000 acres of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness burned in the Silver Complex Fire in the Siskiyou National Forest. More than 96,000 acres burned in all, making it the largest forest fire in western Oregon since WWII and the 1945 Tillamook Fire; fully two generations of residents earlier. Lawsuits followed.
In 1990, the northern spotted owl was listed as “threatened” under the ESA. A federal judge placed an injunction on all timber sales in spotted owl habitat until forest managers could “produce a plan to ensure preservation of the entire ecosystem.” More lawsuits followed.
1993 Clinton Plan: Environmentalism
In the 1980s and 90s there had been a lot of interest in such concepts as “preserving old-growthforests,” “maintaining spotted owl habitat,” and “riparian enhancement.” These concepts were typicallyrationalized by untested “ecological” theories of “steady state ecosystems” and idealistic descriptions of such circumstances as “non-declining, even-flow, naturally functioning” forests and grasslands.
The conflict initially involved commercial sales of old-growth trees on public lands in the Douglas Fir Region. A principal claim was “endangered” spotted owls required old-growth trees to survive. Logging old-growth should therefore be illegal.
In 1993, President Bill Clinton held an all-day public “timber summit” in Portland to address the ongoing “timber wars” between environmental activists and the forest industry. In his opening speech, Clinton told the crowd he wanted to move beyond confrontation and build consensus “on a balanced policy to preserve jobs and to protect our environment.”
Clinton’s summit resulted in the formation of FEMAT, or Forest Ecosystem Management Team: a small group of like-minded scientists from Oregon State University and University of Washington: forest ecologists, wildlife biologists, GIS technicians, and economists — but no foresters, planners, Americans Indians, or affected industries.
Clinton challenged FEMAT to achieve “a balanced and comprehensive policy” that recognized the importance of rural jobs and economies to the region, while preserving “our precious old-growth forests.” The single, regional plan was to protect spotted owls and local economies for “100 years,” and was based on “five principles”:
Clinton’s first principle was to “never forget the human and the economic dimensions of these problems,” that timber sales be based on “sound management policies,” and “where this requirement cannot be met, we need to do our best to offer new economic opportunities for year-round, high-wage, high-skill jobs.”
Second was to protect our forests for future generations; third, use sound science; fourth, a “sustainable level of timber sales”; and fifth, “make the federal government work together and work for you.”
The FEMAT scientists sequestered themselves for 90 days and produced 10 reduced-timber-sales management options. The President’s choice then became the “Clinton Plan For Northwest Forests,” and then the NWFP. The selected plan stipulated one billion board-feet of timber sales a year to support rural communities. Today, less that 10% of the amount is, or ever has been, actually sold.
In 2002, the Kalmiopsis burned again, in the 500,000-acre Biscuit Fire, which remains the largest forest fire in Oregon history. Then it burned again in the 190,000-acre 2017 Chetco Bar Fire, and a fourth time in the 175,000-acre 2018 Klondike Fire.
In each instance, salvage logging, site preparation, and reforestation were either severely limited or entirely stopped by litigation from environmental groups, whose lawyers were then well compensated by US taxpayers. And in each instance, the fuels left behind through these actions only made the following fire burn hotter, create more smoke, and kill even more old-growth and wildlife.
2018 California: Paradise Lost
About 15 years ago, retired USFS forester Bruce Courtwright became very concerned about increasing wildfires and wildfire risks to the communities of northern California, so he helped gather a number of other wildfire experts to collectively address the problem. This group eventually became known as the National Wildfire Institute (NWI).
In 2016 NWI wrote a formal letter to incoming President Donald Trump expressing strong concerns regarding the increased wildfire risk, and with expert recommendations on how to fix the problem. The paper was titled, “Our Dying National Forests: A Disaster or Perfect Opportunity for Bold Action by a New President.” The paper was widely distributed, published by Healthy Forests, Healthy Communities, and then ignored and not even acknowledged.
The following year, 2017, California suffered the worst wildfire losses in its history as more than 3,000 homes burned in the city of Santa Rosa, more than 191,000 acres burned in the northern Sacramento Valley vineyards and farmlands, and 42 people were killed.
In 2018 things became worse.
2018 Camp Fire. The 2008 Butte Lightning Complex burned 50 homes in Cancow, but the town had been largely rebuilt. Ten years later, on November 8, a wind-driven wildfire came out of Feather River Canyon and within six hours totally destroyed Cancow and Paradise, killing 85 people and doing heavy damage to Maglia, Pulga, and Butte Creek Canyon. More than 153,000 acres burned, Pacific Gas & Electric was held liable, paid $13.5 billion in damages, pled guilty to 84 counts of involuntary manslaughter, and went bankrupt.
2018 Carr Fire. The Carr Fire started near Whiskeytown Lake on July 23 when a trailer had a flat tire and the wheel’s steel rim began sparking on the asphalt, igniting dry weeds along the highway. Three days later it burned into the town of Redding, causing the evacuation of 38,000 people. The fire caused a 143 mph, 18,000-foot “fire whirl” to develop in town, causing heavy “tornado-like” wind damage and further spreading the fire. The town of Keswick was completely destroyed, Old Shasta State Park heavily damaged, and six people died, including two firefighters.
2020 August Complex. The August Complex began as 38 separate lightning fires on August 17 that combined to burn over a million acres, making it the largest wildfire in California history. The fire primarily burned in the Mendocino National Forest but also burned the small communities of Ruth and Forest Glen. One firefighter was killed and two injured.
2020 North Complex. The North Complex also started as 21 separate fires ignited by the August 17 lightning storm. A USFS “firing operation” backfired on September 8 when strong winds caused the fire to “blow up” and leveled the towns of Berry Creek and Feather Falls. More than 318,000 acres burned, 16 people were killed, and more than 100 injured. Toxic fumes from the fire inundated Quincy and other nearby communities for weeks.
2021 Dixie. The Dixie Fire began in Feather River Canyon on July 13 and eventually burned more than 963,000 acres. It is the first wildfire known to cross the Sierra Nevada and leveled the towns of Greenville on August 4, Canyondam on August 5, and Warner Valley on August 12. An ex-criminal justice professor, Gary Maynard, was arrested and convicted for setting arson fires in conjunction with the Dixie Fire and sentenced to a five-year prison term.
2022 McKinney. The McKinney Fire started on July 29 in the Klamath National Forest, burned 60,000 acres along the Klamath River, and destroyed the town of Klamath River. The fire burned through areas previously burned in the 1955 Haystack Fire and the 2014 Beaver Fire. The fire killed four people and “tens of thousands of fish” in the river and its tributaries.
2024 Park. The Park Fire started on July 24, possibly as a result of arson by Chico resident and ex-convict Ronnie Stout II, who set his mother’s car on fire and rolled it over a cliff. The fire burned more than 429,000 acres, more than 700 homes and other structures, and heavily damaged the town of Cohasset.
2020 Oregon: The Labor Day Fires
While California towns have been burning in NWFP wildfires since 2018 at a frequency of every one or two years, all of the Oregon towns damaged or destroyed by National Forest wildfires the past 20+ years took place in just four days. With three days of sustained east winds beginning on the evening of Monday, September 7, 2020, nearly a dozen major wildfires in western Oregon burned through more than a dozen towns, killed 11 people, destroyed more than 4,000 homes, caused 40,000 emergency evacuations, killed millions of wild and domestic animals, and blanketed much of the state with a thick, acrid smoke that obscured the sun for days.
Because September 7 was a Labor Day, these tragedies became known as the Labor Day Fires. The fires also burned more than a million acres of land, much of it in old-growth and merchantable timber, making them the most catastrophic wildfires in Oregon history, by a very wide measure. The destroyed towns were burned in five of the named fires, described below, and located in five different counties within four National Forests: Rogue River/Siskiyou, Siuslaw, Umpqua, and Willamette.
When the towns, counties, fatalities, and NWFP Forests that burned in the 2020 Labor Day Fires are considered in combination with 2020 California’s North Complex and August Complex Fires, the numbers are startling: 28 deaths, at least 16 towns destroyed or severely damaged, and nearly 2 1/2 million acres of burned forestland — in only two months, seven counties, and seven National Forests.
When considered in combination with all of the other fires in the NWFP region and in the rest of the US, 2020 must be considered one of the worst Fire Years in the Nation’s history — on par with the 1910 Fires and 1881.
Santiam Fire. This was the deadly convergence of three fires that had started with August 16 lightning strikes on the Warm Springs Reservation and on the Opal Creek and Mount Jefferson Wildernesses in the Willamette National Forest and blew up with the Labor Day east winds [Note: an Oregon Department of Forestry report on this fire claims there was no indication of lightning for 30 days before thiese fires, yet lightning clearly started major wildfires in California]. The fire devastated the towns of Detroit and Gates, with roughly 80% of homes and businesses burned. More than 1,500 structures in the Santiam Canyon were destroyed, including significant damage to the towns of Idanha, Mill City, and Lyons. A total of 402,000 acres burned and five people were killed.
Archie Creek Fire. Much of the fuel in the 131,500-acre Archie Creek Fire was provided by the standing snags remaining from the 2009 Wiliams Creek, 2015 Cable Crossing, and 2017 Fall Creek Fires. There is evidence the Fire may have actually started in the Williams Creek snags. The resulting fire was so hot that virtually all plants and animals within the fire’s perimeter perished. One person also died and more than 400 homes were destroyed, including several in the towns of Glide and Idleyld Park.
Holiday Farm Fire. This fire started near the Holiday Farm RV Resort in Rainbow on the evening of September 7, ignited by falling powerlines. From there it traveled west down the McKenzie River Valley, destroying or doing great damage to the towns and communities of Blue River, Finn Rock, Nimrod, and Vida. One person was killed, 517 homes destroyed, and 173,000 acres burned.
Almeda Drive. A 41-year old arsonist, Michael Jarrod Bakkela, was arrested for setting fires and possessing meth on September 8, the day the Almeda Drive Fire killed three people, destroyed 2,400 homes, burned 5,700 acres, and did serious damage to the towns of Phoenix and Talent. These were the only two towns burned during the Labor Day Fires that were not associated with a National Forest. Rather, principal fuels were provided with the overgrown “buffer” of Himalayan blackberries along the Bear Creek Greenway, and by aging “trailer parks,” mobile homes, and RVs sandwiched between the I-5 and Highway 99 firebreaks. Bakkela later pleaded guilty and was given 11 years.
Echo Mountain. A large part of the coastal town of Otis burned, along with a portion of the Siuslaw National Forest, but the entire fire was among the smallest of the Labor Day Fires at 2,600 acres. There were no fatalities, but 293 homes were burned, and PacifiCorp settled a lawsuit with 403 plaintiffs for $178 million.
Conclusions & Solutions
Whether intended or not, the US Forest Service has been systematically destroying our public forests and rural communities with fire the past 35 years on physical, economical, biological, and aesthetic levels. Hundreds of people have been killed, tens of thousands of homes destroyed, businesses have gone bankrupt, schools have gone broke, millions of acres of old-growth and tens of millions of wildlife have been killed, deadly smoke has filled our cities for weeks, and somehow there is no accountability — and all expenses have been covered by taxpayers
This can be fixed. Our parents and grandparents showed us how. Put an end to these catastrophic wildfires so much as possible; salvage the dead trees as quickly as possible and turn them into building materials for new homes and fuels to heat them; maintain the roads and trails; plant new trees for the next generation; and pick up after yourselves. Then with the money you make, pay your taxes, buy a home, build a school, donate a park, and take a vacation. All documented in publications, film, video, memories, and photographs.
For too many years we’ve been fed the political propaganda (“science”) that a “healthy” forest is full of big snags, big logs, and a “multi-layered canopy” of biodiversity connecting the earth to the highest old-growth canopies. Endangered plants and animals everywhere, safe at last. In such an “idealized” environment, man is a pathogen — a transitory visitor who leaves no trace and only visits occasionally.
This is one of the most misleading, deadly, and costly falsehoods imposed by a central government on its rural populations since Russia had Lysenko take over wheat production. Maybe not as deadly for people, but certainly worse for wildlife, and far more costly. And the same “science”-driven process.
Dead and dying trees are signs of a dead and dying forest, as has been clearly observed and documented the past 35 years. For thousands of years before then, the surest sign of a healthy forest was one that was regularly visited and inhabited by healthy human populations.
This can be fixed. We just need to follow the law by returning to the Organic Act of 1897, the Forest Service principles and mission of 1905, the 1935 10 a.m. policy, and the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960. And go from there. Start with a clean slate and fix this mess for future generations.
We can start by returning to active management of our roads, trails, and forests, with a focus on preserving the remaining old-growth, restoring our ruined forests, and carefully monitoring our wildlife populations.
The experts on rebuilding our damaged towns, restoring our dying forests, and maintaining our roads and trails are the people rebuilding the towns, managing the local forests, and keeping our roads and trails in good shape. They’re the experts — not the university professors, government bureaucrats, or even the elected officials that have steered us to this result.
In my world, our schools, roads, forests, and visitors should all be managed at the county or river level, with local businesses and residents. There is a lot of work to be done, it will take thousands of people to do it, and long-term, local contracts could be the start.
Excellent article Bob. I wonder if the Trump administration and Congress will have the willpower to make the necessary reforms to NEPA/ESA/EAJA etc to allow the Forest Service to get back on the right track. Do you have any recommendations on what those “fixes” would be? Appeal bonds? eliminating site-specific NEPA analysis and replacing with broad based programmatic analysis and implementation decisions (i.e. it’s silly to have to conduct analysis on a small parcel of forest when it’s landscape-scales that really matter). Another suggestion would be that once a timber sale area has completed NEPA and implemented a silvicultural prescription for those timber sale harvest units the FS shouldn’t have to conduct further analysis through the rotation period (i.e. post-harvest tree planting, precommercial thinning, commercial thinning and final regeneration harvests all exempt from additional analysis and implementing decisions).
In many National Forests, “final regeneration harvests” are no longer used. If there is a timber volume ‘side effect’ to properly manage forest stands, that’s a good thing.
I disagree that site-specific conditions a not important. We still need people to actually visit the site before making plans. This Administration wants to be able to churn-out profitable timber sales, right from the forester’s computer, without those pesky ‘guardrails’. I doubt that changing the definition of “harm” will be able to marginalize the Endangered Species Act.
That’s part of the current problem. Timber harvests have the side benefits of fuels reduction, wildlife habitat improvement (i.e. providing biodiversity), not the other way around which has been the mantra for the past several decades. Unless the direction has changed, even a plantation that is over 5 acres in size requires a CE #6 to conduct a precommercial thinning operation on sites that already have previous NEPA analysis and a silviculture prescription that schedules the work 10-15 years after planting. That’s silly and a waste of taxpayer funding and personnel time.
Preserving even-aged management is about as “silly” as preserving fire-prone forests.
We’re already to complaining about CEs? Those were supposed to speed things up, compared to how it used to be done. Oh, I do agree that your timeline idea could be useful, in the plantations that are created by wildfires.
Overstory removal is also being phased out, on many National Forests. Canopy cover and species composition have become pretty important, too. Even-aged management doesn’t care much about those things. Neither does “overstory removal”.
Uneven-aged management still requires for thinning patches of advanced regen to maintain multiple cohorts of age classes. Also, if you consider the reality of a patchwork of even-aged treatments across a large landscape that takes in a majority of forested areas left untreated due to being old growth reserves, rhca’s, roadless and “unloggable” areas you are actually looking at uneven-aged management across that landscape. And finally, given that the Forest Service is directed by laws to provide forest products from our forests for public utilization I don’t need to hear the Forest Service make any other justification for providing me with those products.
There are compromises that allow for maintaining nesting habitats, AND doing beneficial commercial logging. Sure, it’s not lucrative. There are lots of possible thinning projects that generate plenty of board feet, while still being silviculturally sound. An old growth stand with an open understory is much more fire resistant than 30 years of plantation fire risk.
OTOH, Overstory Removal eliminates actual or potential nesting habitat, for the next 100 years, at best. With all the wildfires burning, it is those habitats that are becoming more scarce, every single year.
Here on the 4.3 million acre Salmon-Challis NF less than 20% is designated suitable for timber harvests so I suspect that there is an abundance of old growth, old growth replacement stands and nesting habitat (including lots of snags) for a wide range of birds and T&E species, in spite of the hundreds of thousands of acres that have burned as mixed-severity fires.
Concerns understood! As with all these prescriptions, they weave around other wildlife water and Archy concerns. As for the “restoration prescription” I mentioned, those are specific to WUI, and probably a half mile into the general forest – sometimes, a mile is better. And even in those cases, exemptions exist for other management objectives.
The one piece that will be a major headache in the coming years is the regeneration of intolerant species, as these stands open up! Better have a very good Rx fire program built for that or all those dollars spent will be for naught!!
It’s too bad overstory removal is being phased out, but other than the least expensive, new stand release, it does have a pretty large target on its ….. crown. What I used to do in my prescriptions was a blend of overstory removal and open seed tree cuts, for “overstocked overstory and understocked understory”! That’s a take on a gobbledygook moniker once used in ponderosa stands….🤣. The new methodology would design canopy bulk density to impede all but the most severe running crown fires. Yes, they would thin, but not to the extent of days past…. The “restoration prescription”, GTR-310, makes a pretty good case for managing the whole stand, not just prioritizing large, overstory pine trees to burn later…
Hi Thomas: Even-aged management depends on the species. Douglas fir naturally grows in even-aged stands, but on a landscape-scale a wide range of ages is typically present. Whether a plantation or naturally seeded stand, though, the closed canopy that the trees typically develop make deadly crown fires possible.
Right on point Barry, the evolution of alphabet Laws and Regulations has hamstrung an Agency to its core. What started out as good intent, to allow public participation in Forest Service operations has become an overbearing commitment of my way or not at all by some dogooders of the world. Mainly due to poor FS leadership, Congressional meddling and weaponization of infinite checkboxes of public concern, we now watch our – OUR resources go up in smoke.
About the best thing to come along to continue to antagonize the scientific practices of silviculture and all things, is “climate change”, or whatever you want to call it. That identifier is undefined; maybe it’s natural, maybe it’s manmade, maybe it’s a combination of both but it sure garners lots of assignment of blame. Hard to put your finger on cause/effect when the cause is elusive! We don’t fight fire like we used to. We’ve educated ourselves on how Natives used fire to work wonders for natural conditions; I doubt Natives used as much fire as we portend they did.
We’ve now adopted a more scientific approach to wildland fuels management. We’ve taken the professionals out of Rx fire and to some extent wildlife operations. It’s better to build a separate organization of checklisting those who never wasted all that time earning any degree, and stuff…. We’ve taken a grass roots, locally employed organization and made it centrally located for hiring the best and brightest stick stackers that represent how “we” all look, or other nonsensical targets. Except, the locals are now shut out of managing their back yards, the roads used to access interior forests are closed, gated or (one of my favorite terms) obliterated, keeping those miles of roads in check for species about to be incinerated.
The days of old when locals were hired to take care of Americas gift are gone. It’s much easier to do all that management stuff by computer – never stepping foot on where you plan to manipulate nature. It’s hard, back breaking, sweltering work to do timber/fuels management, and do it successfully!
The shake up of Feds from Trump, Inc. is unlike anything we’ve ever seen. However, it’s is just a stepping stone to realign multiple-use management, and time is ticking!!!
I’m finding it impossible to argue with you Jim. Thanks for the reply.