Western Govs in Dire Need of Federal Resources: from Wildfire Today

Air resources on the Cedar Creek Fire Washington July 29, 2021 InciWeb

This being summer, I’ve built up a few fire stories for posting… but they should lead to different conversations, so I’m going to post them separately. Thanks to Bill Gabbert of Wildfire Today for two of these!

First off is this one.. governors’ wildfire requests from the Biden Administration.   I don’t know why this convo only had three of the Western Govs.  The general feeling was a need for more federal resources of all kinds.

I. Initial Attack Policies

Governor Greg Gianforte of Montana was called on first. He spoke briefly, saying that aggressive initial attack was important. “Without that commitment,”Governor Gianforte said,  “we would have had many more large scale fires. And we ask that our federal partners join us in applying this operating principle. Whether it’s a fire that starts on private, state, or federal land — fires are easier to manage when they’re smaller.”

and Governor Gavin Newsome

But here’s the final thing, and it’s the elephant in the room.  I was with Governor Sisolak two days ago in his state of Nevada.  The reason why is we had a fire that was on federal property.  Fifty-seven percent of the forest property in California is federal, just three percent under California jurisdiction.  Three percent.  Fifty-seven percent under U.S. Forest Service.  U.S. Forest Service is spectacular.  We have deep admiration and respect, but there’s a culture that, too often, is, “Wait and see.”  We can’t afford that any longer.  This was a federal fire.  They waited.  And what we saw is the fire took off because we didn’t put enough initial assets.

Greg was making an oblique point here.  I want to be a little bit more explicit: We need your help to change the culture, in terms of the suppression strategies, in this climate, literally and figuratively, to be more aggressive on these federal fires. That fire bled into Nevada and, obviously, impacted not just our two states, but deeply impacted the redundancy of this concern that comes out every year around jurisdictions and incident command and the imperative that we’re all on the same page, in terms of those initial attack strategies.

To TSW readers, especially those on fires, how real is this? Last year the Chief said to be more aggressive due to Covid-induced difficulty with suppression forces.  Is it philosophy, culture, or availability of resources, or ???.  Or are these observations of Governors not widely shared in the fire community?

 

II.  Airplane Fuel

Governor Inslee

We do have an emerging concern about our fuel supply for our aerial assets.

Governor Newsome

Please pay attention to this fuels issue.  We had to get our National Guard to get some emergency fuel supplies for our aerial fleet a week ago.  This is a major issue, and it’s not just impacting our aerial suppression strategies on the West Coast.  It’s increasingly, as you may know, impacting commercial aviation.  It is a major issue.

I wonder what the supply chain problem is for airplane fuel?

Grist story: Good wildfire news? Evidence from the Bootleg Fire supports thinning forests.

This is an interesting story because it’s in Grist, and there are some great photos. It’s interesting to reflect on different researchers and what they use as evidence to support their conclusions, and how broadly they think they apply

“We have overwhelming evidence that when we treat forests by removing fuels, it generally — not always, you can never say always, but generally — moderates fire behavior,” said Maureen Kennedy, a professor who studies forest fires at the University of Washington, Tacoma.

Kennedy studied a similar situation as the one unfolding in the Sycan Marsh, following the 2011 Wallow Fire in Arizona. She looked closely at the places where people had thinned the forest around two small towns, Alpine and Greer, preparation that probably saved them. Forest treatments like this work by spacing out fuel, Kennedy said. When there is a continuous ladder of branches and small trees from the ground to the canopy, it allows fire to rise up into the treetops. And when trees are close together, fires move from one to the next, growing hotter and hotter. Trees that are farther apart, however,  encourage fires to fall to the ground. It makes sense, intuitively, but it’s still surprising when a wall of flame settles down and begins creeping across the forest floor, Kennedy said.

“No matter how many times I study it, no matter how much sense it makes in theory, it’s still amazing,” she said. “When you look at photographs from the Wallow Fire, that landscape was nuked, it was burning so hot that there were only blackened sticks that used to be trees left behind. Then, as you move into the treatment area the trees are brown, and then further in, they are green.”

The fire burned down the hill leaving a black area, as it encountered the treatment unit (brown area) and approached residences (green area). The treatment edge is obvious as is the change in fire behavior.
In this photo, taken after the Wallow Fire, the area treated is the brown swath between the blackened trees and the green trees. Photo courtesy of Timothy Sexton.

You can see the same thing in a photo (below) taken after the 2020 North Complex Fire, near Quincy, California. There, too, the fire mellowed when it reached the area where workers had removed fuels, said Hannah Hepner, program manager for the Plumas County Fire Safe Council.

The burn line from the North Complex fire where trees transition rapidly from black to green.
Photo courtesy of the Sierra Nevada Conservancy

”That aerial photo is pretty incredible, and that is precisely where the fuels treatment took place,” Hepner said. But, she cautioned, these images shouldn’t set expectations too high: Fire behavior is unpredictable, and some areas always burn more severely than others. Just across the street from that photo, she said, the fire continued to blacken trees — though even there, previous forest management allowed firefighters to get down a narrow road and save a wood shingled building.

>>>>>>>>>>>

“Examples abound: Forest management near Paradise, California, preserved the Pine Ridge School — a small island of standing structures amid the devastation of the Camp Fire. For years, other foresters thought John Mount was crazy for purposefully setting fires on the land that he managed for the electric company, Southern California Edison. But last September, the massive Creek Fire surrounded that land, licking up against it from three sides, but then settling to the ground and sparing trees.

Today, Mount’s heretical ideas have become mainstream. The story is different in coastal wet forests or in brushland, which evolved with less frequent fires. But it seems clear that the arid pine forests of the American West are much more resilient to fire when they are not packed with small trees, brush, and a century of dry foliage. “Fires are natural, inevitable, and necessary in these dry forests, and we removed them,” Kennedy said.”

“Mount’s heretical ideas” reminded me of Harold Biswell and his work, discussed in Jan van Wagdentonk’s 1995 article.

In that article it mentions that “A program to improve forage for livestock by burning ranch lands was active in the 1940’s and 1950’s, but gradually declined as concern about the liability for escapes increased. Understory burning, particularly in ponderosa pine, did not become common until the late 1950’s and continues today.”

It seems to me that these same ideas have been around for a long time,  but have continued to founder on the shoals of implementation.

The Role of Qualified Insurance Resources in Protecting Homes/Structures from Wildfire

Qualified Insurance Resources (or QIRs) help homes survive fire by treating right around the homes and is included in homeowners’ insurance.  Here’s an example of Travelers’ Insurance in Colorado and California using Wildfire Defense Systems

Conceivably this hits the sweet spot of structural protection,  and homeowners pay for it through their insurance, so there is less of what economists call “moral hazard.”

Here’s a powerpoint (CGO wildfire conference.pptx)  by Monique Dutkowsky. The slides above are from that powerpoint. The powerpoint also includes some policy recommendations.  She will have a paper out in the next few months that covers this material in greater depth.

“All Hands on Deck”Effort Toward National Forest Fire Planning?

This is from the NOI so I have no idea how current it is.

 

Remember, to many ENGO’s, we’re in a “climate emergency.” Which conveys a sense of urgency to do climate adaptation.  I don’t think we need to agree on what proportion of the current fire problem is caused by the human contribution to climate change to move ahead and realize that what we face today is a changed, and extremely bad, situation that needs serious and urgent attention. Back to the Climate Smart Ag and Forestry letters, here’s an idea from The Wilderness Society [1] :

“The Wilderness Society also encourages the USDA to adopt a multi-zone portfolio approach that guides wildfire management and restoration in large, contiguous areas across the landscape. A good, recent example of this kind of zoning system is the revised forest management plan for the Inyo National Forest in California. The Inyo plan designates four Strategic Fire Management Zones across the forest — Community Wildfire Protection, General Wildfire, Wildfire Restoration, and Wildfire Maintenance – and provides management direction designed to protect communities from wildfire risk while allowing wildfire to play a beneficial role in ecosystem restoration and maintenance.”[2]c.

If we add in the frustration associated with plan revisions by Forest Service employees, stakeholders and even law school professors (!) (Squillace, 2019)[1]:

“The time is long overdue for the multiple-use agencies to admit that the current land use planning scheme is not working, and that it cannot be fixed without fundamental change”.

We’d think that perhaps a fire amendment might work.. and another piece is that most ENGO’s seem to like EISs.. so… what about..

All hands on deck” effort on National Forest fire planning. Put a stand down on plan revisions and other major planning projects until each Wildfire Forest (forests for which wildfire is an important problem) has completed a forest plan amendment that addresses fire management zoning, wildland fire use, specific PODs or other strategic landscape fuel treatments design, and all other relevant fire issues. For example, I think it was WEG who suggested a focus on human-caused ignitions; there might be similarities across forests but also specific areas and approaches to target by Forest.

Such an amendment would require coordination with neighboring Forests, Tribes, state and private landowners and communities on locations of PODs and treatments.  Because many ENGOs prefer large landscape NEPA, these could be done as a plan amendment with an EIS for establishing PODs, as well as their upkeep through time (one and one NEPA). It’s possible that the “safety first” and the “departure first” points of view would iron themselves out during this process.  Some type of stakeholder advisory committee, including at the state level, might oversee and help with implementation, take advantage of state expertise including practitioners, natural resource professionals and state universities, increase alignment between local, state and federal efforts, and lift up problems and issues for resolution.

With the large fires we’ve been having, it would also be important to be able to change priorities and POD designs based on opportunities provided by fires, and keep those up to date. I’m not sure that going through the plan amendment-EIS process each time conditions changed would be realistic. On the other hand, an emergency calls for changes from business as usual.

Of  course, if we look at any Forest’s SOPA, we’ll see other permits and NEPA that need attention, so it’s impossible for employees to drop everything else. Still, we can ask the question “what does a climate emergency call for?” and “How far can we move from BAU to respond to such an emergency?

What do you all think?

 

 

[1] Squillace, M. 2019. Rethinking public land use planning. Harvard Environmental Law Review (43):415-477.

[1] https://www.regulations.gov/comment/USDA-2021-0003-1074

[2] USDA Forest Service. 2018. Land Management Plan for the Inyo National Forest, p. 75-79.

 

The Puzzle of Restoration/Fuels Priorities: Some National ENGO Views

I mentioned that I was working on a project to find areas of agreement between environmental groups of various kinds (ENGOs) and others on a variety of topics related to restoration, fuels management and wildfires. I looked at the Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry public comment letters that USDA requested earlier this year.

Most, but not all, of the ENGOs agreed on the general concept of increasing the pace and scale of “ecological restoration.” This is a striking level of agreement, given the extensive history of disagreements around federal land management that we see here regularly on TSW.  There are also those groups whose letters said thing like “it’s a ruse to continue logging,” but it seemed more difficult or impossible to incorporate those views into an area of agreement.

To restore historic conditions in ponderosa pine and mixed conifer forests, thinning and prescribed burning are generally accepted tools. Conveniently, these same treatments provide opportunities for changing wildfire behavior.  Strategically placing restoration treatments on the landscape as described in the POD (Potential Operational Delineation)[1] process that combines local expertise and modeling to specifically support incident management can blend concern for appropriate suppression and the perceived need for restoration in these systems.

There seemed to be a difference between the Environmental Defense Fund, The Nature Conservancy and Defenders of Wildlife, all powerful political actors on the national scene.

Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders) state in their letter[2]Rather than characterizing wildfire management as a matter solely of risk reduction, we recommend that a USDA climate-smart policy be based upon the bedrock principles of the Cohesive Strategy and seek to maintain and restore the ecological integrity of fire adapted landscapes; develop fire adapted human communities; and improve effective wildfire response.”

The Cohesive Strategy (2014)[3] never uses those words; the actual wording is: “Landscapes across all jurisdictions are resilient to fire-related disturbances in accordance with management objectives.” (p.3.) A search of the document did not yield the term “integrity.”

Now as you all know, I am a fan of using the term “resilience,” and not so much “integrity”, so I won’t further belabor the point.

Defenders later recommend (p. 17): “Develop planning and decision-making structures and processes that ensure that the highest priority areas within mixed ownership landscapes are addressed first; this would include areas around communities as well as areas that are most degraded and departed from desired reference conditions. “

It’s not clear but it sounds like they would prioritize areas most “departed from reference conditions” before PODs (these might not be “around” communities).  We could call this the “departure first” view.

On the other hand, the Environmental Defense Fund has a detailed prescription[4], with perhaps different priorities than  Defenders.  We might call this one “safety first.”

“Our national wildfire strategy should have two priorities: 1) Protect communities in the line of fire; and 2) Reestablish natural fire patterns to protect ecosystem values and sustainably manage fuel loads. Reestablishing natural fire regimes can only be realized when fuel loads, particularly in the West, are greatly reduced using both mechanical treatments and prescribed and managed fire. Implementation will require an updated wildfire triage approach to ensure that we address the most pressing threats to communities and human lives, first.”

Similarly, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)[5] (p. 13) supports “highest priority fuels management.”

“Like the Forest Service, the Department of the Interior investments focused on highest-priority fuels management would result in boots on the ground, restored landscapes and safer communities and water supplies while providing substantial rural and tribal jobs. There are both climate mitigation and adaptation benefits to all this work.”

Perhaps they are all saying the same thing, and the different staff authors just use different words.

To me,  the key question would be what exactly would need to be done, and how far away, to protect communities? Would that look like PODs? Who would be involved in prioritizing and designing the treatments, and what would be the role of “restoration” driven by historic vegetation ecologists and desired reference conditions, compared to “treatments designed to help manage fire” driven by fuels and suppression practitioners? One of the criticisms that led to PODs on the Arapaho Roosevelt, at least in the story I heard, was that the they seemed to be “random acts of restoration”.  But with landscape fuels and fire knowledge, these same treatments might have been placed in a pattern to also have landscape fire management benefits. There’s also the issue of what if a community wants some fuel breaks, and they’re surrounded by tree species that aren’t adapted to fire, or are adapted to stand-replacing fire, so the whole “restoration to reference conditions” may not work for them.

And maybe this (safety first vs. departure first) doesn’t matter, as the collaborative groups whose “zones of agreement” I’ve viewed either don’t seem to see this as a dichotomy or have resolved it. That’s why I’d like to hear from others, especially those from collaborative groups, on how these two maybe different sets of priorities are worked out in practice, or if it’s even an issue on the ground.

 

[1] https://forestpolicypub.com/2021/05/13/changing-the-game-using-potential-wildfire-operational-delineation-pods-for-a-better-future-with-fire/; https://cfri.colostate.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/06/CameronPeakFirePODsReport.pdf

[2] https://www.regulations.gov/comment/USDA-2021-0003-1246

[3] https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/

[4] https://www.regulations.gov/comment/USDA-2021-0003-0949

[5] https://www.regulations.gov/comment/USDA-2021-0003-1303

 

Colorado Utilities Protecting Infrastructure from Wildfires

Electric utility workers try to protect a transmission line on Aug. 23, 2020, after a pole burned in the Grizzly Creek fire in Glenwood Canyon. (Handout)

When Matthew raised the question about how Colorado utilities deal with wildfire risk, I found this piece in the Colorado Sun:

Wildfire risks will almost certainly worsen. The Fourth National Climate Assessment published in 2018 projected the annual area burned in the contiguous western United States will increase 200% to 300% by mid-century. In a sense, this year’s fires are merely a warm-up act. And this year’s hot summer will, in the future, be considered cool.

People have also been rapidly moving into the foothills of Colorado and other areas called the wildland-urban interface, an average increase of 2.5% annually from 1990 to 2010, according to a study conducted by Silvis Lab. As of 2017, half of all Coloradans lived in areas at risk to wildfires, the Colorado State Forest Service reported in 2018.

If wildfires keep up the way they are going, at least where trees and brush grow back slowly, I don’t think they’ll be enough unburned places left by 2050 to sustain a 200%-300% increase in acres burned (or they will be grass fires with not exactly the same kinds of suppression strategies nor impacts). It should also be pointed out that some of these seemingly scary WUI numbers are grasslands- which can also burn, but not exactly the same.  In fact, some of the Headwaters maps show desert and grasslands as having the highest amount of undeveloped WUI.

The utility says 2,100 miles of its overhead distribution feeder lines in its service territory and 2,900 miles of transmission lines are within the wildfire risk zone that was developed by the Colorado State Forest Service. Its goal has been to “harden” the electrical delivery system and revise operations to reduce risk by increased use of tools such as infrared inspection to identify thermal “hot spots” with priority in high wildfire risk areas, LIDAR technology and drones to provide detailed pole-top inspections.

By the following June, the company had assembled a wildfire mitigation team to explore what types of additional or accelerated projects could further mitigate the risk of utility-caused ignitions. Xcel spent $10.7 million in 2019 while inspecting 2,900 miles of transmission lines and replacing 2,305 distribution wood poles among the 67,162 it inspected.

In its filings, Xcel identifies $590 million in wildfire mitigation programs from 2019 through 2025. At least some of these costs it seeks to recover through additional revenue via a rider on customer charge. If approved by the Public Utilities Commission, a typical residential electricity customer’s bill would increase by 49 cents a month, to $69.53, Xcel says on its website. The rider would be adjusted during the next four years.

 

It seems to make sense that the folks using the energy would have to pay for hardening the transmission lines.

California can learn from Colorado on protecting homes from wildfire risks: Orange County Register op-ed

IMHO it’s nice when states work as “laboratories of democracy” and no, I don’t want to get into a generic discussion of federalism.

From the Orange County Register..

“For California and Colorado, 2020 has been a record breaking year for wildfires.

In California, an unprecedented 4.2 million acres have burned, and in Colorado, the Cameron Peak fire has become the largest fire in Colorado’s history. California and Colorado rank first and third in the United States for properties at high risk for wildfire damage.

To make matters worse, insurers have been fleeing the California fire insurance market, and in response, California announced Thursday that it would extend its moratorium on barring insurers from dropping coverage.

For homeowners and insurers in these states, the stakes have never been higher.

Although these two states are both experiencing record breaking fire seasons, California and Colorado’s responses to this real and growing danger are quite different. California’s approach of creating price restrictions on insurance premiums has forced hundreds of thousands onto a last resort, bare-bones state plan.

Meanwhile, Colorado’s innovative approach incentivizes homeowner mitigation and allows premiums to fluctuate, keeping homeowners insured. To end this geographical disparity, California should look to Colorado as a model to give its citizens access to quality fire insurance protection at a time when they need it most.

The California Department of Insurance regulates insurance premiums to keep prices artificially low. The result is that in the face of unprecedented losses, claims have overwhelmed what insurers are able to charge in premiums. With wildfire loss predictions increasing, insurers began to pull out of the California market to avoid insolvency, leaving hundreds of thousands scrambling to find coverage.

In response, in December of 2019 the CDI placed a one-year moratorium on fire insurance non-renewals for homes that suffered a total loss during the 2019 California wildfires. Last week, this was extended to include roughly 2.1 million policyholders living within or adjacent to a 2020 wildfire, regardless of loss.

Colorado took a different approach and would be wise to stay the course. Colorado’s Division of Insurance allows for premium adjustments that better reflect differing levels of wildfire risk. Like California homeowners, Colorado homeowners in extreme wildfire risk zones can be denied or lose fire insurance coverage. When this occurs, unlike in California, Colorado homeowners can then opt into local mitigation programs like Boulder’s Wildfire Partners that assist and certify them through a process of modifying their home and their surrounding property to reduce the risk from wildfire. In exchange, many insurers in Colorado have agreed to cover certified homes.

With a robust insurance market and variable premiums, Colorado homeowners may have to invest in home-hardening efforts and may face a higher cost to insure homes in high risk areas, but Colorado has not needed to create a last-resort, state-enforced plan. Instead, it has protected conditions for a healthy and competitive insurance market.

California would be wise to learn from Colorado’s approach. Like Colorado, California should reduce its binding price controls, allowing private insurance companies to use risk-based pricing to insure people willing to pay for the risk they face. Not only will this allow more insurers to reenter the California markets, creating true safety nets when homes burn, but it will also send a price signal to homebuyers about which areas are most dangerous. To avoid premium spikes, the CDI should also look to Colorado’s mitigation certification programs and develop premium discounts for homeowners who adapt to the increased risk.

With homeowners, regulators, and insurers facing a new and catastrophic norm for wildfire seasons, policies that keep homeowners insured and increase private suppression efforts are key to protecting people and their properties. California can start by following Colorado’s model. These changes would keep more Californians on better insurance plans and, like their western neighbors, align incentives for individuals to adapt to better protect themselves for the future.”

Monique Dutkowsky is vice president of operations at PERC, the Property and Environment Research Center. Her work with Wildfire Defense Systems mapping fire risk is used by insurance companies throughout the West to help mitigate the impact of wildfires and quicken response times to vulnerable areas during fires. Holly Fretwell is vice president of outreach and a research fellow at PERC.

Does % Attribution to AGW Matter in Adaptive Responses to Wildfire”: And Other “Conversations We Need to Have”

This smoke map comes from Wildfire Today. https://wildfiretoday.com/2021/07/11/smoke-forecast-july-11-2021/

 

There’s a chapter in Priya Parker’s book “The Art of Gathering: Why We Meet and How it Matters.” called “Cause Good Controversy”. In it she talks about helping an architectural firm and she asked “what do you think is the most needed conversation for this group to have now?” If we think about the TSW group as a group, I’d like to ask folks what they think about this in a broader context. What are the conversations we haven’t yet had that might shed light on our ongoing disagreements?  Please comment below if you have a suggestion.

As an example, I’d like to take the idea that “bad  (as defined by human and ecological impacts) fires are caused by climate change.”  We see this statement all the time in news stories.  But perhaps there are two questions (1) “how much of what we see is caused by climate change in the broad sense (the climate is changing), (2) “what part of that specifically is caused by anthropogenic forces (including land use changes, and greenhouse gases of various kinds)?”. For whatever reason,  (1) and (2)  tend to get conflated in various accounts I’ve seen.

My view, based on exploring the models used in attribution studies, and having some idea about all the factors involved in big fires besides weather, is that no one really has a clue and it might not be all that helpful to pursue it because some of the uncertainty would be extraordinarily difficult to reduce, and possibly not worth the investment, when there are other questions that are more likely and more needed to be answered.  But the conversation I would like to have specifically is:  what difference would it make if if were 0%, 10% (caused by some mix of human factors)  30%, 50%, 70% or 100% (that would mean past fire suppression has 0 impact, which seems unlikely, but for the sake of argument..).  Given that today we have what we have, and no one also understands exactly what will  happen, in what timeframe, if we change greenhouse gases or other forcing agents according to what kind of timeline, how would the proportion attributed to AGW change our adaptation response to the situation we’re presented with today?

I don’t know and my thinking is “not much” but I’d like to start the conversation.

 

 

Support Renewable Energy from Forest Restoration: Guest Post by Brad Worsley

 

This is an unusual post for TSW.. there’s only a couple of times I’ve posted something about contacting Congress.  If you live in a state with a Republican Senator and forest thinning for fuel reduction (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah), please consider contacting your Senator. This is a guest post from Brad Worsley of Novo BioPower in Arizona.

Biomass power generation can be a tough business! Unlike other power sources, using a non-homogenous fuel source brings complications when trying to create power. Imagine fuel like solar radiation, or Natural Gas, or pulverized coal…each brings a very constant and steady input of energy. Now imagine ground wood that comes in all different sizes, moisture content, BTU content, etc. If you combine that reality with the risk of being an independent power provider you might ask, why do we do it? The answer…it is personal to us! We felt the heat of catastrophic wildfire as it burned through our properties and changed the forest around our homes for generations. We recognize that we are helping resolve a generational issue and we want to make a difference. Senator John McCain said that fire and water are the two largest natural resource issues Arizona will face in the next 100 years. Novo Power is the keystone in the effort to restore our forests, mitigate high intensity fire, and restore the watershed function of our National Forests in Arizona. The issue that Novo Power faces is the reality that the renewable electron is not worth what it used to be worth. The high cost associated with renewable energy historically allowed forest restoration to piggy back but now with renewable energy at a fraction of what it used to cost, we face the reality that the renewable electron is the 4th or 5th most valuable part of what we do each day. Forest restoration, watershed mitigation, clean air, economic impact,  increasing the safety of firefighters, and communities, water and energy infrastructure may all be more valuable than the renewable credit we produce.  With that being said, we have to be creative about how we fund the cost of restoration. A critical component of that funding ought to be the Federal government. They are the stewards and have been the stewards of this land for over 100 years.

Senator Mark Kelly’s office is currently working on a Biomass PTC bill that would help a biomass facility that focuses on removing high hazard fuels from federal forests to receive a Production Tax Credit (PTC) to help offset the impact of federal taxes. A recap from Senator Kelly’s office is below:

  • Wildfires turn our forests into carbon emitters. Each year, around 8 million acres burn in the United States. The USDA Forest Service estimates about 80 percent of our national forests are at extreme risk of wildfire.
  • The Forest Service is trying to reduce wildfire severity and restore the health of our forests by removing dead, drought stricken, and insect infested trees from forestlands that are at high risk of wildfire.
  • The Forest Service is focusing on removing small hazard trees while avoiding harvesting large old-growth trees. Over the past 20 years, the work has been slow-going because there is no market for timber mills to use low-value timber for lumber.
  • Biomass energy production can provide a market for the Forest Service to accelerate its forest restoration projects. California is a leader in piloting this effort.
  • The bill would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) for open-loop biomass facilities engaged in forest restoration activities
  • The bill would apply the renewable energy PTC (1.5 cents per kW produced) for producers of electricity if their biomass facility is engaged in forest restoration activities authorized by the Forest Service.
  • The credit applies to existing units of open-loop wood biomass electricity production on a monthly basis, regardless of when they were placed into production, for a term up to 10 years
    This tax credit would build upon but is separate from the existing production tax credit for open-loop biomass, which is for non-hazardous agricultural biomass waste and includes the following forest-related resources: mill and harvesting residues, precommercial thinnings, slash, and brush

Currently there is sufficient support from Democrats, we are desperately looking for a Republican Senator to step up and help sponsor this bill. We would encourage citizens to reach out and lobby their Republican Senators to stand up and help on this bi-partisan issue.

Bradley Worsley, President and CEO of Novo Biopower, LLC.

MBA – Supply Chain Management – Michigan State University

************

Here’s a copy of the proposed bill. It’s only two pages. Check it out, and if you feel inclined, please give your R Senator a call!

Guest Post from Dr. Bob Zybach: Review of Wuerthner’s “Indian Burning Myths and Realities”

 

 

This is a guest post by Dr. Bob Zybach.

https://rewilding.org/indian-burning-myth-and-realities/

 

This is probably more of a rebuttal than review. As I was reading through this essay when it was posted here a few weeks ago, I became struck with how familiar it all seemed. Sure enough, when I checked through my old emails, George and I had debated this exact same topic from the exact same perspectives in a series of detailed emails more than 12 years ago — in January 2009.

 

My first thought was that this was a dated article, but when I checked his post, there was no publication date. That caused me to try for several days to contact him to make certain I wasn’t responding to something he had written long ago, but after no response and noting that a few of his references were from 2020, I decided to continue with my review.

 

The problem is that Wuerthner has written something debatable in nearly every single paragraph, and there are a whole lot of paragraphs. Dozens of uncited opinions and questionable statements are presented as “facts,” supported by cherry-picked references and superficial citations to important materials that he seems unfamiliar with. The exact same problems I was pointing out when we were corresponding in 2009.

 

Wuerthner describes “8 Major Issues” with the “Indian Burning Myth” that he lists at the outset of his essay. In this regard, these do seem to be representative of the general thinking that still pervades his (and others) thinking on these issues today. So, my strategy in addressing these issues is to quote him directly on representative statements (which I put into italics), and then offer my own perspective or criticism on a mostly point-by-point basis. Sorry for the length. It was a long article with lots of misinformation.

 

Wuerthner’s “8 Major Issues”

 

  1. The claim that Indian burning precludes large fires feeds into the “fuels is the problem” narrative, which is increasingly discredited, as large wildfires in fact are driven by extreme climate weather.

 

I am not sure what “climate weather” is, but climate is a mathematical average of weather measurements over time — typically 30 years or more. When I discussed this issue with George in 2009, he said it was a “cheap shot” when I pointed out that wildfires can’t take place in a desert or on a lake, no matter the weather, because of lack of fuels. However, that argument still stands. Fuels are needed. How those fuels burn is determined in large part by the weather, but a large fire can create its own weather — including gale-force winds, “pyronadoes,” cumulus clouds, and even rain.

 

One thing that consistently weakens Wuerthner’s arguments are his uses of phrases such as “in fact,” which he seems to confuse with “in my opinion,” or something of that nature when it comes to qualifying statements. In mitigating wildfire effects, fuels are the main problem that can be addressed, along with human sources of ignition. We can’t control the weather, no matter how many “carbon credits” we might purchase. Topography is a given, and wildfire sources of ignition are mostly caused by people (year-round) or lightning (seasonal in some locations), with volcanoes and spontaneous combustion occasionally contributing to the mix.

 

  1. All large fires are driven by climate and weather conditions which include drought, low humidity, high temperatures, and high winds.

 

This reminds me of the joke that “all absolute statements are false.” This is an absolute statement in which the word “driven” takes on a much more general definition than when the word is usually associated with wildfire. Climate is an average and does not drive wildfires — I can only guess why George and others keep making this statement (“politics” and “potential funding” come to mind).

 

“All large fires” are not “driven” by drought, are usually driven by high winds (depending on fuels), and typically take place during weather conditions that include high temperatures and low humidity. Often, large fires do take place during periods of seasonal or prolonged drought. Heavy spring rains — not drought — can result in increased flash and ladder fuels that readily burn during seasonal dry spells.

 

  1. These conditions have always existed, and large blazes have always occurred despite Indigenous burning. However, they are being exacerbated today by human-caused climate warming.

 

Yes, these weather conditions have existed for a very long time (maybe not “always”), and large fires have likely existed from the time of the first dry land vegetation, volcanoes and lightning, but there is zero scientific evidence that they are being “exacerbated today by human-caused climate warming.” Putting aside the difficulty of warming a climate, it needs to be made clear that climate change modelers have been consistently wrong for the past 30+ years in their prophesies of “climate catastrophe” and its “proof” by increased numbers and sizes of wildfires, Florida underwater, melting glaciers, and widespread famine. Wildfires have been worse, as scientifically predicted since 1986, but those predictions have been based almost entirely on unmanaged fuels on federal lands, not climate.

 

  1. Indigenous burning resulted primarily in localized fuel reductions but seldom affected the larger landscape.

 

This is silly, and possibly even a little racist. George lives, or has lived, in Eugene, Oregon, which is in the southern portion of the Willamette Valley. This Valley is more than 3,000,000 acres in size and was entirely formed and maintained by Indian burning practices for thousands of years. Due south is the Umpqua Valley, with the Bear Creek Valley then extending further south nearly to the California border — and both with similar fire histories as the Willamette Valley. People usually settle in valleys, around lakes, along the coast, and at the mouths of creeks and rivers. Fire travels uphill and on the wind — human-caused fires will often get out of control, even if it is Indians that are setting them, if fuels exist along the hillsides. These fires, whether set purposefully or by accident, invariably “affect the larger landscape,” by definition.

 

And where is George getting the idea that pre-European peoples clustered into “localized” settlements and only had a rudimentary understanding of fire? Obsidian tools that originated in present-day Oregon were recently discovered at an underwater archaeological site in the Great Lakes. Historical Indian trade routes existed the entire length of the Columbia and Mississippi Rivers and numerous foot trails crossed the Rockies, connecting the two great basins. Indians traveled and traded extensively for thousands of years and mostly used fire expertly on a daily basis — same as people everywhere.

 

  1. There is historic, scientific, ecological, and evolutionary evidence that challenges the Indian burning narrative.

 

I’m sure that’s true, but the basic function of science (and probably ecology, too) is to challenge prevailing assumptions and stated hypotheses — so that would be normal and expected. Not too sure of the “historic” information that is being referenced, or what “evolutionary evidence” might exist. Not sure how this statement even qualified as a “Major Issue.”

 

  1. Large high severity fires are not “destructive” but essential to many healthy forest ecosystems.

 

Now we’ve devolved to semantics. Unfortunately, these fires are, indeed, “destructive” by almost any definition. Wildlife are killed, the air is fouled, homes are sometimes burned, and the results are often determined to be ugly and increasingly hazardous for years to follow. Then we have George’s additional opinion that these events are somehow “essential” to whatever he thinks “healthy forest ecosystems” are. Those are known as “value statements” that typically vary from person to person. They are not facts in any sense of the word, just overstated opinions — which, in my experience, many, many people do not agree with, including a significant number of forest scientists and forest managers.

 

  1. Implementation of a significant prescribed burning program has many obstacles.

 

That is true. I’m not sure there is any debate on this point.

 

  1. The way to protect homes is to start from the home outward, not to “treat” forests at the landscape scale.

 

Another of George’s opinions. Flames, sparks, and burning debris can travel hundreds of feet and miles in advance of a forest fire. A well maintained and irrigated homesite should largely be unaffected by these sources of ignition — unless the home is on the edge of a forest, then the formula changes dramatically. One size does not fit all, and all generalities remain false.

 

CHERRY-PICKING

 

After listing these “8 Major Issues,” Wuerthner then goes into lengthy examples and discussions as to why they are so important. Unfortunately, he uses a number of devises to support these assertions that only weaken his conclusions. His writing habits — that include “cherry-picking” the data, superficial references, and stating personal opinions as universal facts — should make the reader suspicious.

 

In 2009 I suggested that Wuerthner could balance his assertions by reading Robert Boyd’s book on the fire history of the Willamette Valley and Kat Anderson’s book, Tending the Wild, in order to become better informed on this issue. He replied that he would do so and thanked me for the suggestion, but neither one is cited in his essay or listed in his Reference section, 12 years later. My PhD dissertation is on the exact same topic and it’s not listed either — not that I expected it to be.

 

There are known experts on the Indian burning history of the US, and George is familiar with who they are. But they are not cited in his work, and further weaken it as a result. If he was serious about this topic, he would become far more familiar with the writings of Stephen Pyne, Robert Boyd, Henry Lewis, Omer Stewart and Kat Anderson. Vale, Knox and Whitlock need to be considered in context to these recognized experts in the field, not as the actual voices of “science” on this issue.

 

Wuerthner also claims that the pollen record is of importance. I agree, but he continues:

 

If Indigenous burning was so widespread as to influence landscape-scale vegetation, we would expect to find abundance pollen from species favored by frequent, low severity fires. For the most part, except in the immediate area around villages, this evidence does not exist.

 

More fiction, possibly based on the research of Whitlock or one of her students. Again, if Wuerthner wants to cite a single source to support his perspective, he should reasonably put that perspective in context to the established experts in the field. In that regard, Henry Hansen’s work has been available online since 2002,

SUPERFICIAL CITATIONS

 

The idea that tribal burning impacted the broad landscape is also asserted by some scholars (e.g. Williams, G.W. 2004), but often with scant evidence to back up these claims except for “oral traditions” of Native people.

 

Gerald Williams is an expert on Indian burning history and has written extensively on the topic. He never claimed to depend on “oral traditions” for his research — Wuerthner is just making that up to trivialize this work. I’m guessing he hasn’t bothered to actually read Williams’ article, or much else of his other writings on this topic.

 

Most “evidence” for the widespread influence of indigenous burning is based on oral tradition which is notoriously subject to variation of interpretation and misinterpretation.

 

This is just bullshit, and Wuerthner must know that. My MAIS degree from Oregon State University was in oral histories. These are not true statements and grossly misrepresent both Williams’ and my own research. My PhD study at OSU study focused on Indian burning and catastrophic wildfire patterns of the Oregon Coast Range, from 1491 to 1951. It has been readily available online for nearly 20 years, yet Wuerthner chooses to ignore this research and simply make things up, or else cite sources of dubious accuracy:

 

Here are a few sentences from my PhD Abstract, which in its entirety only takes a couple of minutes to read:

 

Archival and anthropological research methods were used to obtain early surveys, maps, drawings, photographs, interviews, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) inventories, eyewitness accounts and other sources of evidence that document fire history. Data were tabulated, mapped, and digitized as new GIS layers for purposes of comparative analysis. An abundance of useful historical evidence was found for reconstructing precontact vegetation patterns and human burning practices in western Oregon.

 

In addition to apparently being unfamiliar with Williams actual writing and misrepresenting his research, Wuerthner does the same thing with another expert on the topic, John Leiberg, and his USFS report on SW Oregon forests in 1899. Here is Wuerthner’s entire reference and citation for Leiberg:

 

Early timber surveys also record large high severity fires (Leiberg, J. B. 1903).

 

I am actually very familiar with Leiberg’s work (I don’t think he was ever aware of the term “high severity fire”) and developed an unfinished report on his detailed 1899 report in which I transcribed and organized his statements on old-growth, wildfires, logging, forest history, reforestation and Indian burning, with minor commentary, and put it online as a draft report in 2006. http://www.orww.org/History/SW_Oregon/References/Leiberg_1899/

 

Here are some direct quotes:

 

(p. 249) The forest floor in the [“yellow-pine”] type is covered with a thin layer of humus consisting entirely of decaying pine needles, or it is entirely bare.  The latter condition is very prevalent east of the Cascades, where large areas are annually overrun by fire.  But even on the western side of the range, where the humus covering is most conspicuous, it is never more than a fraction of an inch in thickness, just enough to supply the requisite material for the spread of forest fires.

 

(p. 277) The largest burns directly chargeable to the Indian occupancy are in Ts. 30 and 31 S., Rs. 8 and 9 E.  In addition to being the largest, they are likewise the most ancient.  The burns cover upward of 60,000 acres, all but 1,000 or 1,100 acres being in a solid block.  This tract appears to have been systematically burned by the Indians during the past three centuries [ca. 1600 to 1855].  Remains of three forests are distinctly traceable in the charred fragments of timber which here and there litter the ground.

 

FACTS & OPINIONS

 

Finally, although Wuerthner’s cherry-picking and misrepresentations make his conclusions suspect, his habit of stating his personal opinions as if they are actually facts only serves to further erode his credibility. Here are some examples, with occasional commentary:

 

The second highest biodiversity, after old-growth forests, is found in the snag forests with down wood that results from these blazes. These high severity habitats would not exist if such Indigenous burning were as widespread as advocates suggest.

 

Not sure where George is getting his “biodiversity” measures from (or why they are important to him), but he is apparently unfamiliar with tropical forests, the ocean, and deciduous woodlands.

 

Most cultural burning, like the prescribed fires set today by state and federal agencies, was practiced in the spring and fall when fire spread was limited by moist fuels, high humidity, cool temperatures, and when winds are calm.

 

Actually, at least in western Oregon, most Indian burning took place in late summer or fall (“fire season”), as documented by many, many eyewitness accounts. More misinformation, based on personal bias.

 

Native people were wise enough not to purposely set fires in the middle of extreme fire weather. Setting a blaze under conditions with variable high winds and during a drought would be a recipe for disaster because it would lead to uncontrollable fires that would threaten villages and life.

 

Bullshit. Wuerthner’s biases do not equal “Indian wisdom.” More self-serving fiction.

 

For instance, in Oregon’s Willamette Valley most large trees were established after large, high severity fires that occurred long before Euro-American influences on native populations. The 1865 Silverton Fire burned more than a million acres of the western Cascades. The 1853 Yaquina Fire burned nearly a half-million acres. 

 

Jeez. There is zero evidence that the scattered large oak and Douglas fir documented by Euro-American settlers in the Willamette Valley followed a “large, high severity fire.” Not sure where Wuerthner got this nonsense.  The “million-acre” Silverton Fire is one of the “myths” that Wuerthner says he is challenging. This became a popular fiction at some point and seems to be referring to one or more Civil War-era wildfires in the Silverton area of western Oregon that likely totaled no more than 100,000 acres. I have personally completed thousands of acres of reforestation projects in the Yaquina burn. This fire took place in 1849 or 1850 at the latest and was expanded in size with a second (or third) major fire in 1868. I studied this fire on-and-off for 30 years and my research is summarized in my dissertation.

 

Another study found that the mean fire interval in Oregon’s Coast Range was 230 years and the presence of fire-sensitive species like Sitka spruce indicates a lack of frequent fire (Knox and Whitlock 2002).

 

This is another instance where Knox and Whitlock (and Wuerthner) show their lack of understanding of actual western Oregon fire history. The “230-year fire interval” is total nonsense and difficult to determine who made this up. The famous “Six-Year Jinx” of Tillamook Fires took place in 1933, 1939, 1945, and 1951 — following major fires in the 1890s and 1918. The 1868 Coos Fire followed two or three major events in the 1700s, at least one major fire in the 1840s, and was followed by the 1879 “Big Burn.” There are more examples.

 

Even if prescribed burning could reduce large blazes (which would not be good for forest ecosystem health), multiple problems would result if prescribed burning were to ramp up significantly.

 

Apparently, George wants his readers to believe that “large blazes” are “good” for “forest ecosystem health,” whatever that is. His arguments and supposed “evidence” remain unconvincing and unlikely.

 

SUMMARY

 

Perhaps the biggest problem with the “Indigenous burning will preclude large blazes” argument is that it feeds into the narrative that “fuels” are driving the large fires we see around the West. To reiterate, large fires are and have always been primarily climate-weather driven events.

 

Fuels do not drive large blazes. Climate/weather does.

 

I still don’t know what “Climate/weather” is, but I do know an anti-active management agenda when I see one. I would caution students to avoid citing Wuerthner as any kind of authority on fire history, forest management, or wildfire mitigation.