Fire and Fuels

The Future of the Rim Fire?

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These are 2011 views of the A-Rock/Meadow Fire re-burn, within Yosemite National Park, after 4 years of “recovery”. The actual “recovery” time is now at 24 years, since the original A-Rock Fire raged through majestic old growth. You can barely make out the road into Yosemite Valley. You might also notice a lack of any conifer trees growing back.

Meadow-fire-2001-web

Even fire-adapted oak trees are doing very poorly, and the large snags from the previous stand, before the A-Rock Fire in 1989, are completely gone. Remember, no salvage logging happened away from roadside hazard trees.

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

This is how the Sierra Nevada “recovers” from catastrophic wildfires. It can take hundreds of years to re-grow a forest, without help from humans. Indeed, Yosemite is a living laboratory, and it is clearly showing us some “lessons learned”. It is also clear that any Yellowstone recovery parallel to Sierra Nevada wildfires is not supported by actual results.

 

Aerial view of the 1987 Complex Fire Salvage

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I took this shot while flying with a Forest Service buddy in 1989.

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I am pretty sure that this is Forest Service land, near the Groveland Ranger District office. When I worked there in 1990, the Timber Management Officer was still angry at the less-than-aggressive post-fire salvage efforts that allowed so many “brain dead” trees to die and add to the fuel loading. I’m sure that all those dead trees had some green needles on them as salvage logging was proceeding. As you can clearly see in the photo, there are PLENTY of snags left in this HUGE wildfire zone. This isn’t even where the fire burned hot. The subsequent bark beetle bloom spread northward, chewing up forests more than 100 miles away. On the Eldorado, our Ranger District harvested 300 million board feet, between 1989 and 1992, of dead and dying timber from the severe bark beetle infestation. We were lucky, able to slide our EIS into place before the litigators could gather their case together. The Tahoe National Forest was too slow, and lost 2 years worth of salvage logging opportunities, turning merchantable dead trees into future wildfire fuels.

The Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit was also hard hit, and slow to react. Here is a 1990 view of the north end of the Lake Tahoe Basin. My first two summers in the Forest Service were spent at the top of that mountain as the Martis Peak fire lookout. Of course, there are a LOT more dying trees up there than just the brown trees. So many of those trees became unmerchantable before they could be salvaged, as the public and eco-groups hoped that “nature” would take care of the problem. Since fire suppression in the Tahoe Basin is ensured, most of those dead trees are now horizontal, and perfectly preserved as fuels for the next big, destructive, erosion-causing, lake-polluting disaster.

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Science Policy Forum: Managing Forests and Fire in Changing Climate

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Scientists claim policy focused on fire suppression only delays the inevitable. Read more here. The opening paragraph and names of the authors are below.

With projected climate change, we expect to face much more forest fire in the coming decades. Policymakers are challenged not to categorize all fires as destructive to ecosystems simply because they have long flame lengths and kill most of the trees within the fire boundary. Ecological context matters: In some ecosystems, high-severity regimes are appropriate, but climate change may modify these fire regimes and ecosystems as well. Some undesirable impacts may be avoided or reduced through global strategies, as well as distinct strategies based on a forest’s historical fire regime.

Authors: S. L. Stephens, J. K. Agee, P. Z. Fulé, M. P. North, W. H. Romme, T. W. Swetnam, M. G. Turner

Litigation and Policy, a tangled web

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If anyone’s interested, this post basically carries over a discussion from the “hazard tree lawsuit update” post (https://forestpolicypub.com/2013/09/25/hazard-tree-lawsuit-update-adopt-a-project/comment-page-1/#comment-19429), about the question of whether forest management policy is set by litigation, or not (i.e., Sharon’s phrase “If we currently manage forests by court case . . .”  There, I argued (along with others) that litigation doesn’t set policy, but I think maybe I understand where Sharon was coming from with her statement. Hence, here’s my short attempt to unravel the policy/litigation tangle. A standard definition of “policy” goes something like “A policy is a principle or protocol to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes. A policy is a statement of intent, and is implemented as a procedure or protocol.” If that’s the case, a policy is a relatively formal instrument, not “what you happen to be doing” but rather “what you’re supposed to do and how you’re supposed to do it.”  The NFMA (or a particular Forest Plan derived from it) is as good an example of policy as any, since it lays out intent and the requirement for procedures that range from stringent (i.e., standards) to more precatory (sorry, lawyer term = wishful but not necessarily legally binding) such as guidelines. NEPA, ESA, or CWA are other good examples of federal policy that agencies are required to follow.  Litigation against the USFS generally takes the form of one or more plaintiffs claiming that the FS is not following the requirements laid out by policy. In that sense, litigation is a tool to enforce policy that’s in place, rather than to make new policy.

But, it’s also clear that litigation can be a motivating factor for subsequent policy changes. The classic example is the so-called “Monongahela Decision” (Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 950-52 (4th Cir. 1975)), where the Court said that the FS was violating policy (Organic Act) prohibiting clearcutting. That was a motivator for congress to implement new policy, in the form of the 1976 National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. 1604, which in part had the effect of restoring clearcutting as a potential management tool.  So, while litigation did not itself make new policy, it did have the effect of encouraging policy-makers to come up with new policy.  While litigation and policy-making are not the same thing, there’s little doubt that they are intertwined. I found a 1975 quote from Hubert Humphrey with language very similar to Sharon’s, he said that NFMA would be a way to “get the practice of forestry out of the courts and back in the forests.”  Hubert Humphrey is long gone, of course, and won’t have a chance to read this post 🙁    And, confounding the issues even more, some plaintiffs might indeed have the long-term goal of prodding an agency or legislature to change a policy (although again, the court itself doesn’t make that change), or of having the court interpret the language of the policy in a way that’s favorable to them (e.g., the recent SCOTUS Decker logging road runoff decision).

One last thing I found online, is a theoretical so-called “policy cycle” that apparently gets a lot of attention from policy people, it has 5 stages:  1. Agenda setting (Problem identification); 2. Policy Formulation; 3. Adoption; 4. Implementation; and, 5. Evaluation.   Looking at a policy example such as the Nez Perce Forest Plan (1987), it’s easy to identify how stages 1 and 2 were done under guidance from NFMA, and presumably also with some opportunity for public/stakeholder input. Stage 3 is the formal signing of the Plan in 1987 (plus subsequent amendments). Stage 4 represents the duty of the FS to put the Plan into action, while focusing on guidelines and adhering to standards within it. Stage 5 is something I know less about, I assume that FS conducts some kind of ongoing formal/informal evaluation, especially since a re-write of the Plan needs to be done soon. But my point is that litigation falls outside of this policy cycle. It is aimed either at the early stages (to the extent that courts allow challenges to forest plans, but they don’t always, contending a plan isn’t “ripe” for litigation), but primarily at step 4 (Implementation): the lawsuit claims that the FS is not appropriately implementing the policy, and to the extent that policy components are legally binding, it’s breaking the law. Thanks for listening. Here’s a really good DOJ website about the origins of NFMA: http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3253.htm

Tour Red Shale Wildfire in the Bob Marshall Wilderness

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RedShaleMap
The Great Falls Tribune and Helena Independent Record recently teamed up (whether they knew it or not) to present a fairly cool multi-media education about the Forest Service’s “let it burn” policy as it applies to the Bob Marshall Wilderness complex and this summer’s Red Shale wildfire.

Not surprisingly, the Forest Service is finding that following nearly 30 years of following such a policy in the Bob Marshall Wilderness complex, fuels have been reduced, wildlife habitat has been created and US taxpayers have enjoyed significant wildfire suppression cost savings (again, whether they know it or not).

First, I highly recommend watching this short video from the Great Falls Tribune. Mike Munoz, Rocky Mountain District Forest Ranger on the Lewis and Clark National Forest is interviewed and gives some of the recent wildfire history in the Bob Marshall, as well as some of the rationale and justifications for the Forest Service’s “let it burn” policy. The video includes some pretty cool GoPro footage from high about the Bob Marshall, so enjoy some of those images.

Next, Eve Byron of the Helena Independent Record has a more extensive story, parts of which are highlighted below.

Twenty-five years ago this month, the Canyon Creek fire roared out of the Scapegoat Wilderness after slowly burning unfettered for more than three months, deep within the mountains, under part of the so-called “let it burn” U.S. Forest Service policy.

Eventually, the Canyon Creek fire burned across more than one-quarter of a million acres, forced the deployment of shelters by more than 100 firefighters and threatened the town of Augusta.

The local firestorm of criticism over the Forest Service’s handling of the Canyon Creek fire lasted even longer than the conflagration. But valuable lessons were learned, and this summer, as the Red Shale fire was allowed to burn relatively unchecked through the wilderness, it did so with little fanfare.

Brad McBratney, the fire staff officer for the Helena and Lewis and Clark national forests, and Rocky Mountain District Ranger Mike Munoz smile at questions about various firefighting tactics used by the Forest Service, well aware that the public typically has a limited understanding of how decisions are made as to whether to try to extinguish wildfires in wilderness areas or let them burn. They pull out two yellowed documents from the early 1980s, which foresters have used in the ensuing decades to put policies into practice on the ground, and half a dozen maps showing how fires have shaped the 1.5 million-acre Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex landscape since then.

“In 32 years, we have seen some significant fire activity on the landscape,” Munoz said….

McBratney and Munoz point toward this summer’s Red Shale fire as a textbook example of fire management, even though it is still burning after being started by lightning on July 18, about 35 miles west of Choteau. The fire has spread over 12,380 acres in a typical mosaic pattern, burning trees in one area but leaving others standing. Most of the burned area is within the footprint of the Gates Park fire, which ended up totaling about 52,000 acres.

They do more up-front planning, which includes examining various long-term scenarios. They get daily briefings on weather. More resources are in place — both people and equipment — if it’s needed. They map using satellites and infra-red radars. The develop models on where the fire is expected to burn and revisit those models regularly to tweak them.

Public information officers posted daily updates on a fire’s size, location and the number of resources assigned to it in Choteau and Augusta. There’s even an “app” that allows cell phones to scan it and go directly to the online “InciWeb,” a national incident management website that posts fire information, to learn more about the Red Shale fire.

Even if they’re not actively trying to extinguish the flames, they still use helicopters to drop water to cool the blaze and try to direct it away from some areas. They’ve wrapped historic cabins with fire-resistant materials and installed sprinklers as protective measures.

At the height of the Red Shale fire, about 25 people were assigned to it, including about 10 people on the ground. Today, four people are watching the fire, which is mainly smoldering after recent rains and cooler fall temperatures.

Today, after 100-plus fires in the Bob Marshall Complex have burned hundreds of thousands of acres since 1980, there’s less fuel to add to the fires. Munoz points to the Red Shale fire map, which shows how it burned to the edge of the 2001 Biggs Flat fire, then stopped without human intervention.

In addition to the natural fires within the wilderness area, forest officials have used prescribed burns to remove fuels outside the boundaries, with the hope that will make it easier to catch a fire that makes a run toward private property.

They’ve also worked on building relationships with local and state firefighters. McBratney is a member of the Augusta volunteer fire department, and Stiger said that during the recent fire season local volunteers meet weekly with state and federal representatives to talk about potential issues.

RedShaleBurn

Hazard Tree Lawsuit Update- Volunteers Needed for “Adopt a Project”

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I spoke to Ms. Boggs, the Executive Director of the Conservation Congress. She said that she does not post or make available the 990’s and Board of Director information but that that can be found in the State of California records since the organization is incorporated in California.

I asked if she had a plain English version of what the issues are, but she said that if people were “too lazy” to read the complaint it was too bad. She also said that the things written on our blog about the project were not true (as to me, I just looked at the project map and the ESD). What was interesting to me about this conversation is that most people I speak with are interesting in explaining their point of view, so as to get public support. One of the things I don’t like about managing forests from the courtroom, as Tony articulated in a comment in the last week or so, is that it’s a confrontational kind of win/lose world. Sometimes it’s hard to be civil in that kind of atmosphere.

Now, as you all know I have read EA’s, maps, appeal responses, and complaints in the past on various projects, but I would appreciate if others (closer to the project?) would be willing to do that work.

1) Look at the complaint and the project documents (sometimes it’s as simple as comparing the claims in the complaint to the wildlife bios’ report or the FWS letter)

And write.. “this is the claim in the complaint and here is what the FS says in their documents here, plus here’s what common sense tells you (e.g., gravity causes dead trees to fall down)” for posting on the blog and general public information. Media around the area might also be interested in a summary.

2) Take photos of the area when the project documents don’t have them. And or send us a googlemaps link. Note to FS folks- this would generally be handy to include in project documents.

I am willing to help any volunteers, but what I do is not difficult.

Study: Is fire severity increasing in the Sierra Nevada?

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A  new study published in the International Journal of Wildland Fire found that, contrary to what has been claimed in some of the news coverage of recent forest fires, there is not a trend toward increasing fire severity in the Sierra Nevada. Previously, those who claimed that fire severity was increasing relied primarily on two publications by Jay Miller of the Forest Service (Miller et. al 2009, Miller and Stafford 2012).

However, Dr. Chad Hanson and Dr. Dennis Odion found that the Miller studies left out hundreds of thousands of acres of fire data from their analysis. In contrast, Hanson and Odion used all of the available fire severity data for the Sierra Nevada, and that data showed no trend toward increasing fire severity.

Furthermore, they found that rate of high severity fire since 1984 has been lower than it was historically. These results refute some of the main claims we see on this blog and elsewhere.

Abstract
Research in the Sierra Nevada range of California, USA, has provided conflicting results about current trends of high-severity fire. Previous studies have used only a portion of available fire severity data, or considered only a portion of the Sierra Nevada. Our goal was to investigate whether a trend in fire severity is occurring in Sierra Nevada conifer forests currently, using satellite imagery. We analysed all available fire severity data, 1984–2010, over the whole ecoregion and found no trend in proportion, area or patch size of high-severity fire. The rate of high-severity fire has been lower since 1984 than the estimated historical rate. Responses of fire behaviour to climate change and fire suppression may be more complex than assumed. A better understanding of spatiotemporal patterns in fire regimes is needed to predict future fire regimes and their biological effects. Mechanisms underlying the lack of an expected climate- and time since fire-related trend in high-severity fire need to be identified to help calibrate projections of future fire. The effects of climate change on high-severity fire extent may remain small compared with fire suppression. Management could shift from a focus on reducing extent or severity of fire in wildlands to protecting human communities from fire.

Hazard Tree Lawsuit in California

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We had previously discussed how dead and dying hazard trees are considered to be an opportunity for different kinds of uses in Colorado. That’s so we don’t burn them in piles and put more carbon into the atmosphere.. also if we could use them for something, we might get some bucks, which would be good, since the Feds, at least, are in deficit. And we don’t want trees falling on people or blocking roads.

Well, it sounds like they are trying to use dead hazard trees in Northern California. I even hear tell that they developed an “Emergency Situation Determination” that went all the way to the Chief to be approved. Which means OGC lawyers must have weighed in. So THEY must think that they’re obeying the law.

So it turns out that this project is being litigated…someone sent me this email…

Plaintiffs Challenge the Bagley Hazard Tree Project on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest for violations of NEPA, NFMA and the APA in Conservation Congress v. United States Forest Service. On September 156, 2013, the Conservation Congress filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging the Forest Service violated NEPA and the APA for this project approved under an emergency situation determination by failing to prepare an EIS; failing adequately to disclose and analyze cumulative effects of the project along with nearby past, present and reasonably foreseeable timber sales; and, failing to analyze the direct and indirect effects of the project on the northern spotted owl and its critical habitat, late successional reserves and inventoried roadless areas. Plaintiff also alleges the Forest Service violated NFMA and the APA by failing to comply with the Forest Plan standards and guidelines for management consistent with recovery plans (13-01922, E.D. Cal.).

So we might wonder, who are these people and what is their interest in this project?

I looked up the Conservation Congress and found this…somehow I couldn’t find 990’s or a Board of Directors. I will call the Executive Director in Livingston Montana (?) to see if I can find who is litigating, who is paying for it and what their rationale is..

Their accomplishments seem to be many other litigation efforts here.

I think this is an interesting example, because we all would like NSOs to be successful, yet I wonder how they can use dead trees that are right next to, or fallen on, roads.

Here’s a link to info on the project, and here’s one to the emergency determination letter. Here’s what the ESD letter says about the project..

Now, the Conservation Congress says it’s “Holding the Federal Government Accountable to Environmental Laws and Regulations.” But here we have a D administration with very smart lawyers. So a person’s gotta wonder.. if somehow smart D lawyers think it’s legal, is something else wrong with the system?

Would this be different if mediation and public release of the mediation discussion and results, were required?

Plantation Thinning Success on the Rim Fire

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Derek tipped me off about the new BAER fire severity maps, yesterday, and I was happy to see that the efforts to thin plantations has resulted in lower fire intensities. Here is the link to both high and low resolution maps. It is not surprising that fire intensities outside of this thinning project I worked on were much higher, and I doubt that there was much survival in the unthinned plantations. Those plantations were the within the 1971 Granite Fire, and is yet another example of forest re-burn. This part of the fire has terrain that is relatively gentle, compared to the rest of the burned areas. To me, it is pretty clear that fuels modifications reduced fire intensities.

This photo below shows a boundary between burn intensities. The area east of road 2N89 was thinned and burned much cooler than the untreated areas to the west. The areas in between the plantations had moderate to high burn intensities, due to the thick manzanita and whitethorn. Those areas were left to “recover on their own”. The SPI lands did not fare as well, as they didn’t thin their plantations.

Rim-Fire-plantations

The highest burn intensities occurred in the old growth, near the Clavey River. Activists have long-cherished the areas around this river, and I am assuming that these were protected as spotted owl/goshawk PACs. As you can see, this area has very thick old growth, and it shows on the map as high intensity. This same scenario is one that Wildlife Biologists have been worrying about for many years, now. These wildlife areas have huge fuel-loading issues and choked understories. Prescribed fires cannot be safely accomplished in such areas, without some sort of fuels modifications. Last year, I worked in one unit (within an owl PAC) on the Eldorado where we were cutting trees between 10″ and 15″ dbh, so that it could be safely burned, within prescription.

Clavey-old-growth

Nearly all of the Groveland Ranger District’s old growth is now gone, due to wildfires in the last 50 years. What could we have done differently, in the last 20 years?

Fire Borrowing.. The Beat Goes On With House Approps

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Excerpt from an E&E story here (subscription needed).

House CR provides $600M to restore USDA wildfire shortfall

The House Appropriations Committee yesterday proposed a bill that would restore $600 million to Forest Service programs whose funding was siphoned last month to help pay for wildfire suppression.

The continuing resolution, which would extend government funding through mid-December, would also allow flexibility for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to maintain satellite programs that provide data for weather warnings and forecasts of severe weather events.

The bill would keep government programs funded at post-sequestration levels and is free of riders or policy changes, said Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers (R-Ky.). However, riders contained in currently enacted appropriations legislation would carry forward, he said.

“Our country desperately needs a long-term budget solution that ends the draconian cuts put into place by sequestration and that provides for a responsible, sustainable and attainable federal budget,” Rogers said in a statement. “It is my hope that this stopgap legislation will provide time for all sides to come together to reach this essential goal.”

The overall bill would fund the government at $986.3 billion, slightly below current, post-sequestration levels.

The proposal comes about a month after Forest Service Chief Tom Tidwell ordered his agency to halt spending on restoration programs, employee travel, hiring and overtime in order to scrounge up additional funds to fight wildfires (E&ENews PM Aug. 21).

That move angered lawmakers, conservation groups and timber interests, which warned it would delay important forest restoration activities that reduce the risk — and cost — of future catastrophic wildfires.