At $5 Million, This is a Deal: Jumpstarting the Restoration of Big Tujunga Canyon by Char Miller

station

Char sent this as a comment on another thread, so I thought I would repost. Kudos to NFF; it is good to hear positive stories about people working together.
Here’s a video.
Excerpt below..

The life-giving watershed is in trouble, however, in part as a consequence of the 2009 Station Fire. Ignited by an arsonist late that August, it blew up into the largest conflagration in the recorded history of Los Angeles. Torching approximately 250 square miles during its two-month-long fiery run, it burned through chaparral shrubland, oak woodlands, and up-elevation mixed pine forests.

Particularly hard hit were riparian and terrestrial ecosystems within the upper reaches of the Los Angeles River, including those in Big Tujunga Canyon. Depending on the location within the 97,000-acre canyon, the Station Fire charred upwards of 95% of the subwatershed’s vegetation.

As every Angeleno knows, or should understand, wildland fire comes with a one-two punch: after flames scorch the earth during the now-extended spring-to-fall fire season, the unstable soil can wash away in a hurry if lashed by winter storms.

That pattern was manifest during the colder, rainy months of late 2009, early 2010. According to the NFF, the post-storm sediment discharge from Big Tujunga Canyon alone “proved to be three to four times higher than normal, and annual sediment yield increased to levels 15-25 times higher than normal during the first year post-fire.”

Those super-heavy debris-and-rock flows, with the battering force of concrete slurry, gouged out creek- and riverbeds, rampaged through sensitive habitat, and damaged regional water quality, jeopardizing the life chances of the Santa Ana speckled dace, Arroyo chub, Santa Ana sucker, and the western pond turtle.

Some of these harms will be repaired through a slow process of natural regeneration, as has occurred over the millennia. Yet so dependent is Los Angeles on this canyon for water, so vital are its recreational offerings — more than one million visitors annually walk its trails, camp, fish, or simply rest beneath the shade of a spreading oak — and so invaluable is the biodiversity that it sustains, that the NFF, the Forest Service, and a host of local partners have agreed to raise $5 million to accelerate the restoration of Big Tujunga.

USFS Fire Lab and Wuerthner: Wind Drives All Large Blazes

Below are excerpts from a couple of articles about the fact that wind and weather conditions drive all large wildfires.

From the Missoulian:

Larry Bradshaw was riding his motorcycle down U.S. Highway 12 on Monday afternoon when he noted the building smoke and stiffening winds.

It was an acute observation for a meteorologist who has worked at the U.S. Forest Service’s Fire Sciences Laboratory in Missoula since 1992, and still maintains the National Fire Danger Rating System.

Bradshaw tuned into the scanner a few hours later and listened as chaos unfolded ahead of the West Fork II fire, the blaze jumping the highway he’d ridden hours earlier before making a run east down the Lolo Creek Canyon.

“The winds were really strong out of the west,” said Bradshaw. “The inversion broke there earlier than it did in Missoula.”….

“It was the same recipe used on every fire – it’s dry and it’s windy,” said Finney. “We have a canyon situation and a couple fires low in the canyon. The fires have topography working in their favor – the canyon topography helping with the winds.”

The tools used by fire managers to predict the interaction of wind, topography, weather and fuel were developed here by the likes of Bradshaw and Finney and dozens of other scientists working up and down these hallways, part of the government’s Rocky Mountain Research Station….

“The thing we have to realize is that fires are inevitable. They’re impossible to completely exclude from the landscape,” Finney said.

“By trying to do that and doing it so successfully, what we’ve done is saved up the fires for the worst conditions. When you get rid of all the fires under moderate conditions, all you have left are the extreme ones.”

The other article is a column by George Wuerthner, which appear at The Wildlife News:

As large fires have spread across the West in recent decades, we hear increasing demands to reduce fuels—typically through logging. But logging won’t reduce the large fires we are experiencing because fuels do not drive large fires….

The ingredients found in all large blazes include low humidity, high temperatures, and drought. Assuming you have these factors, you can get an ignition if lightning strikes. But even an ignition won’t lead to large fires.

The final ingredient in all large blazes is wind.

Wind’s effect is not linear. In other words, increasing wind speed from 10 mph to 20 mph does not double fire spread, rather it leads to exponential fire growth and increases the burn intensity….

Most large fires have wind speeds of 30-50 mph or more. Wind makes fire fighting difficult since embers are blown miles ahead of the burning fire front. It is also the reason why wind makes fuel reduction projects ineffective.

Wind drives flames through and over fuel treatments. Even clearcuts with little or no fuel will not halt a wind driven fire. The wind driven fire just dances around and over any fuel breaks.

The biggest problem with fuel reductions is that one can’t predict where and when fires will occur. The likelihood of a wildfire will encounter a treated forest in the time scale when fuel reduction are effective is incredibly low.

The vast majority of acreage burning around the West are occurring in higher elevation forests like lodgepole pine and various fir species that naturally burn at infrequent intervals, often hundreds of years apart. As a consequence, a fuel treatment in such forests is a waste of time because the probability of a fire occurring at all in the time when fuel reductions are effectiveness is extremely low.

Even in drier forests like ponderosa pine that burn more frequently the chances that a fire will encounter a fuel treatment while it’s most effective is around 1-2%.

There is a role for fuel reduction projects. The best ones are targeted near communities and other areas of interest. The idea being one cannot predict where a fire may start, but one can predict what you don’t want to burn up in a fire. So focus fuels reductions adjacent to those places.

The most important fuel reduction projects should occur in the communities themselves. Removal of wood piles from adjacent to homes. Clearing pine needles from roofs. Getting rid of flammable building materials like cedar shake roofs.

Reducing the flammability of homes are the kinds of “fuel reductions” that work and should be encouraged. If these fuel reductions were implemented religiously, we wouldn’t have to worry about wildfires in the hinterlands, and we could permit these blazes to do the important ecological work they perform without continual interference from humans, yet feel secure in the knowledge that our communities were safe from wildfires.

Climate Change and Fire Management Implications

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I realized that many readers might be interested in this research synthesis and not be following comments (I found this in response to a comment by John Persell) so here it is.

I think folks are pretty aware of current climate thinking and its impacts on fire. There is even a handy synthesis for managers here on the Wildland Fire and Climate Change part of the Climate Change Resource Center. Like many things about climate change, what you should do is generally sort of common-sensical to practitioners (although we might disagree about details and priorities)

When I worked in Climate Change in the Forest Service, I used to say if it’s not in CCRC, you probably don’t need to know.

Options for Management

In some western dry forests, particularly those affected by 20th-century fire exclusion, thinning and surface fuel treatment (including prescribed burning) can reduce fire severity and fire hazard [36], although maintenance treatments may be required every 20 to 40 years. Strategic placement of treatments can greatly increase the effective area treated [37]. In unmanaged forests, especially in areas in which fire suppression is difficult, expensive, or counterproductive to resource objectives, managers can take advantage of the self-limiting nature of wildfire. Fire spread rates and severity are reduced when a fire reaches a recently burned area [38].

Fuel treatments will be challenging to implement at spatial scales large enough to have much impact, especially if wildfire increases greatly in the future, but can enhance resilience on specific landscapes with high resource, economic, or political values (e.g., the wildland-urban interface). In the Southeast, undergrowth may grow even faster in warmer temperatures. Management practices may need to respond to an increase in available fuels, while anticipating a shortening of the prescribed burning “season”, particularly in Florida [39].

Some general guidelines for adaptation [40,41,42]

Increase landscape diversity — increase large-scale resilience, size of management units, and connectivity.
Maintain biological diversity — experiment with species and genotype mixes, and identify species, populations, and communities that are sensitive to increased fire and develop conservation plans for them.
Plan for post-disturbance management — treat fire and other ecological disturbances as normal processes and incorporate fire management into planning.
Maintain and improve the resilience of watersheds and aquatic ecosystems by implementing practices that protect, maintain, and restore watershed processes and services.
Implement early detection and rapid response — monitor post-fire conditions, and eliminate or control exotic species early on.
Manage for realistic outcomes — identify key thresholds and prioritize projects with a high probability of success; abandon hopeless causes; consider even alternatives that might be undesirable in an unchanging climate.
Incorporate climate change into restoration — avoid trying to replicate historical conditions, but continue to learn lessons from historical variation.
Develop regulations and policies that take climate change into account — raise awareness with stakeholders, and work with local stakeholders from the onset of projects.
Anticipate big surprises — expect mega droughts, larger fires, species extirpations, loss of resilience and system collapses, and incorporate these events in planning.

Chief orders spending freeze to siphon money toward fighting fires

NCFP is mentioned in this story in E&E News.
Here’s the link.
Below are some excerpts.

The “fire borrowing” has occurred with increasing frequency over the past decade as the cost of fighting wildfires has spiraled out of control.

Fire borrowing has happened six times in the past decade, Tidwell told a Senate panel in June, and has ranged from a low of $100 million in 2007 to a high of $999 million in 2002. Of the total $2.7 billion that was borrowed, about $2.3 billion was eventually restored by Congress but not without disruptions to important agency programs, he said (E&E Daily, June 5).

“Not only do these impacts affect the ability of the Forest Service to conduct stewardship work on national forests, they also affect agency partners, local governments and tribes,” Tidwell said.

As an example, past fire borrowing has forced the agency to halt trail work on the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail in California and repair many other trails and trailheads, wasting the opportunity to leverage thousands of volunteers. Failure to complete the work was expected to cause sedimentation and damage to watersheds.

Lawmakers from both parties have urged the administration to improve implementation of an emergency wildfire reserve known as the FLAME fund that Congress established in 2009. The FLAME fund was designed to prevent the raiding of other agency budgets. But that account is depleted, the agency has indicated.

“It didn’t take a crystal ball to predict that the Forest Service once again would be forced to steal money from hazardous fuels and other fire prevention programs to pay for spiraling costs of fighting fires,” said Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), who yesterday visited the interagency fire center in Boise. “The fires sweeping the West are proof that federal forest and fire policy are broken.”

Absolutely broken. Thank you Senator Wyden! Now what would fix it?

Chris Topik, who directs the Nature Conservancy’s Restoring America’s Forests program and is a former aide on the House subcommittee that funds wildfire suppression, said it was “chilling” that Tidwell had ordered the field to stop spending money.

“This is a mess, as forecast,” Topik said. “It shows that we need to get serious about investing in the restoration work that reduces fire risk. We need to get serious about a new way of funding suppression.”

Topik said he anticipates that the Interior Department within the next 10 days will also have to start borrowing money from other programs to shore up its wildfire budget.

He said the Forest Service already has canceled official trips to Salt Lake City next week for a federal advisory committee meeting on forest planning.

The agency will “just not be doing much,” Topik said. “This is 8 percent of America. It’s not trivial.”

“Will Congress pay it back?” Topik added. “I hope so.”

Thank you, Chris, it’s time folks got fired up (sts) about this. Even if the FS folks manage to get back some of the fire borrowing borrowed money..well it’s next year and a hassle to distribute, and a unit might end up getting nothing depending on who gets their hands on it before it gets to you, and what crises next year brings.

Note that Chris says Interior will start doing the same thing.

Wildfires across the West push spending past $1B: AP story

I found the rolodex factor on this story to be interesting.
Below are some excerpts:

More than 40 uncontained, active and large wildfires dot the western U.S. from Arizona to Washington state and Alaska, taxing national firefighting resources and helping to push spending past $1 billion for the year.

The National Interagency Fire Center in Boise has raised the national wildfire preparedness level to the highest tier for the first time in five years.

The center lists two central Idaho wildfires as the country’s top priorities, helping provide crews and resources for the Beaver Creek Fire, which forced the evacuation of 1,250 homes in the resort area of Ketchum and Sun Valley and has cost nearly $12 million so far.

First we have Steve Gage.. good choice:

Forty-eight fires remain uncontained around the country, the White House said, and about 17,800 people have been dispatched to fight them.

Steve Gage, assistant director of operations for the fire center, said officials can’t fill all the requests they receive for crews and equipment.

As fire season progresses, Gage said, the center moves crews around to where the greatest assets like houses are threatened, and tries to have crews positioned to catch new fires when they are small.

Then they quote other fire spokespeople (good) and go back to Steve.

Nationally, federal agencies have spent more than $1 billion so far this year, about half last year’s total of $1.9 billion, according to the fire center. There have been 33,000 fires that have burned more than 5,300 square miles—an area nearly the size of Connecticut.

Whether costs top the 10-year average of $1.4 billion or the $1.9 billion spent in 2012 and 2006 will depend on the rest of the wildfire season, which traditionally gets very active in Southern California as late as October, Gage said

Now we go to.. Norm Christiansen (?). Who knew that Duke was such a center of knowledge on western fires?

“Certainly drought in some areas has contributed to the number and intensity of fire events,” he said in an email. “But many of the fires have been in highly populated, wilderness-urban interface areas such as Colorado Springs, Sun Valley, Idaho, and the west slope of the Sierra Nevada. That adds greatly to costs since so many more resources are required to protect built structures.”

As a Coloradan, I would have to say that while the Black Forest 14200 fire this year got much press, a lot more acres were burned in the West Fork complex 109,000 as of July 16 (couldn’t find a total). Of course, Waldo Canyon was last year. I’m suspicioning that Christiansen’s view was gleaned from the press, perhaps, which tends to focus on fires burning in communities (not that there weren’t communities around the West Fork Complex) and not reviewing figures at NIFC. But West Fork is not highly populated. Then you get into what is “many of the fires”.. but as in my Golden example, if you’re really in the WUI, fires tend to get attacked strongly by local forces and may not end up as large fires.

Next rolodex pick..

Jason Sibold, assistant professor of biogeography at Colorado State University, said since the 1990s, the climate has been changing, producing hotter, drier and longer summers in the West. That combined with more people building vacation homes in the woods pushes up costs.

“The societal demand to try to control and fight these fires is escalating at the same pace as the climate’s warming,” he said.

Here’s a link..he seems to be a fire history professor and is in the school of anthropology, but not necessarily an expert on suppression or suppression costs.

And oddly, the homes in the Black Forest are not “vacation homes” and neither are most front- range WUI homes. AS we can tell by listening to folks on the blog, it’s a complex situation as to fire costs and once again we get the narrative of “people building homes” and “climate change.”

We don’t get the narrative of “old trees that are beetle bait” or “fire suppression has led to high fuel loadings” and “it is just a matter of time regardless of weather or climate”…

Or even, “communities that do good fire planning cost less to protect”. Where does the narrative “climate plus building (vacation homes?) in the WUI” come from, and why does it keep recurring in the press to the exclusion of other factors?

Fall is in the Air and So is Smoke: Fire Transfer Begins

Well, it’s that time of the year.. when FS folks’ thoughts turn to finding pots of money for fire, and not doing other things. Attached is a copy of the Chief’s letter. I am curious, does this happen to BLM, FWS, the Park Service, who also are federal agencies who work on fires? If not, why not?

I know the FLAME act was intended to fix this.. I wonder why it didn’t work and what suggestions people have to make it work.

Here’s the letter. Of course, it’s not as bad as it could be..bureaucrats are very adaptive, so that folks strategize how not to leave bucks around where they could be transferred.

Year after year, though, this has to be one of the silliest and least productive bureaucratic exercises in government.

B.C.’s fire-reduction strategy misses mark

Wildfires cost British Columbia more that just the suppression expenses; studies show that total costs including home and business losses and human health can be two to 60 times the sums of fighting the fires. Photograph by: Bruce Edward
Wildfires cost British Columbia more that just the suppression expenses; studies show that total costs including home and business losses and human health can be two to 60 times the sums of fighting the fires.
Photograph by: Bruce Edward

Gil found this post and was looking for the thread on fire costs, but I thought it was worthy of a separate post. I think it’s interesting because they have more industry and management, and the policy barriers they see are completely different from ours. Yet, they face the same problem of it taking money to treat landscapes and fight fires.

Here is the link and below is an excerpt:

Other jurisdictions in North America are going through similar exercises in cost-cutting of prevention activities in an attempt to rein in public spending. Not surprisingly, this short-sighted approach has the opposite effect of the one intended when it comes to the cost of wildfires.

First of all, wildfires cost much more than we have long thought. British Columbia taxpayers spend, on average, approximately $140 million on fire suppression (even though the province only budgets $65 million every year). Researchers throughout North America have looked at all the other costs associated with an individual wildfire, such as home and business losses, erosion mitigation, human health and damage to natural resources, and found that actual costs can range from two to 60 times the suppression cost.

On one particular wildfire in California the fire suppression bill was only $48 million while the total bill, which can often take a decade or more to realize, was $1.2 billion.

Secondly, when it comes to spending money on hazard reduction activities, an ounce of prevention really is worth a pound of cure. A recent study published by Northern Arizona University concluded that investments in hazard reduction activities had a significant impact on fire behaviour and total cost.

The authors contend that hazard reduction treatments applied at the broader, landscape-scale were more desirable than treatments that are only applied in the WUI.

Researchers found that WUI-only treatments leave the landscape around communities vulnerable to large, severe, and expensive mega-fires that often result in significant social, environmental, and economic impacts.

This last point is worth discussing in the context of B.C.’s approach to reducing wildfire threat to communities.

The approach advocated by the province is to focus attention on only a narrow two-kilometre buffer around communities and within that narrow buffer on only those stands rated as high to extreme hazard of crowning (fire spreading through the tops of trees as well as along the forest surface), thus resulting in a patchwork of small, dispersed, treated and untreated stands surrounding vulnerable communities.

In contrast, other jurisdictions, such as Alberta, recommend treating the area within 10 kilometres of a community.

Another important point from the NAU study is the importance of linking areas treated versus treating a patchwork of smaller stands; exactly the opposite of the B.C. strategy, which prioritizes funding for the treatment of high- or extreme-hazard stands above all others. The B.C. strategy may be a valid for small fires that start in the WUI, can be hemmed in by a network of roads combined with some small hazard reduction treatments and be quickly attacked and suppressed by local and provincial firefighting resources.

Unfortunately, the reality is that fire behaviour and effects of large, landscape fires that make a run at communities, such as Barrier-McClure, Okanagan Mountain Park, Slave Lake, and Waldo Canyon, are little affected by small, dispersed treatments.

In fire management, we are dealing with dynamic ecological systems and a stand classified as low or moderate hazard today will eventually be classified as high or extreme hazard in the not too distant future. In other words, better to treat the whole landscape instead of just parts of it.

It’s not clear why the province’s limited approach to wildfire hazard reduction is being employed when research points to broader treatments as ultimately more effective at protecting communities and community interests on the larger landscape.

Perhaps the province is simply trying to avoid having to address two very significant policy and political issues: the province’s traditional approach to Annual Allowable Cut determination and tenure system administration.

Living With Western Wildfire: Some Possible Principles

idaho power fire

UPDATE: I removed #7 after a comment by John Persell reminded me it was more of a pet peeve than a principle.

I’d be interested in what you think of these principles.

(Warning: I am going to use “we” here to stand for “people” or “the joint efforts of levels of government”)

1) Fires have bad effects and good effects of various kinds. Management of fire should try to maximize the good and minimize the bad, subject to the safety constraint of carefulness with human lives and knowing that fires are unpredictable and dangerous.

2) Fires are not “needed” by the “ecosystem”. Some plants and animals like post-fire conditions. Some climate folks think that trees won’t even be growing back in some places. It’s more complicated than “things would be fine if we let everything burn because that’s the way things used to be”. This point is really a Virtual Book Club point.

3) In many cases in the west, some form of fire is more or less inevitable. So we would like it to burn without hurting people or property. Prescribed fires can get out of control and are smoky, and cost many bucks to redo at regular intervals. Plus the “natural” folks say the effects aren’t the same if you burn under relatively safe weather and season conditions, than in the past, when the fires may have been at the height of summer. So if “naturalness” is your goal you are faced with a number of problems- safety, understanding Native American fuel burning patterns, and how “naturalness” fits with climate change. More Book Club stuff.

Here are the costs for one fire.. again, costs as (may be) litigated. Tens of millions.

So prescribed burning is difficult (in the West) and possibly more expensive than we would like to do, especially the magnitude at recurring intervals.

4) Fire management can be facilitated and negative effects to people, watersheds and wildlife can be mitigated to some extent by vegetation treatments. Given that you’re going to do that, it makes sense to sell the trees. However I do not agree that timber harvesting would have prevented the MPB epidemic in lodgepole, nor that it necessarily would help other places. The main decrease in west side Oregon due to spotted owl is notoriously not fire prone. Many places in the west, trees just don’t grow fast enough, they are too far away from roads, the conditions are too steep and soils too fragile. Many parts of the west there are no trees at all, and climate change predictors say that there will be fewer. I would like to think of living with wildfire as a potentially dangerous and expensive business, and selling excess vegetation is a good way to make things less expansive.

5) Sometimes bad things happen which no amount of money can reverse. We should analyze these situations beforehand and see if we can avoid them. (this story is interesting because of the interview with the USGS folks)
Link
Excerpt:

As for some residents’ wish that someone could barricade Manitou Springs, Mau said it simply isn’t feasible to put up barriers against debris flows on this scale for a host of reasons, including daunting logistics, blocking roadways, interfering with water rights and simply diverting flows and problems elsewhere — all at a high cost — when the burn scar will heal in 10 years, or perhaps longer.
Until then, the shadow of the Waldo Canyon fire will continue to loom large.

6) People who live in fire-prone wildlands, especially at low densities, need to be aware of, and respond to, the risks and responsibilities of the situation. More work needs to be done to figure out the best and fairest way to do this; but people and communities are not expected to move out of where they are now.

West Fork 2 Fire, Lolo National Forest

Official image from the federal government's InciWeb site showing the landscape burning as part of the West Fork 2 fire on the Lolo National Forest. The flame on the bottom portion of the image shows the general location of the start of the fire.
Official image from the federal government’s InciWeb site showing the landscape burning as part of the West Fork 2 fire on the Lolo National Forest. The flame on the bottom portion of the image shows the general location of the start of the fire.

Consider this post sort of a companion piece to Larry’s “American Fire, Tahoe National Forest” post below. The West Fork 2 wildfire started via a lightning strike early Sunday morning. Yesterday, was yet another 90+ day in Missoula (adding to the record total number of days over 90 this year). By mid-day humidity bottomed out at 16% and the winds gusted from the west at 40 mph.

As a result the West Fork 2 fire – burning through a heavily fragmented, clearcut, logged, roaded, weeded landscape just west of Lolo, Montana – ripped pretty good, burning some houses and dumping smoke, ash and charred bark into the Missoula Valley.

Here’s another image of the general location of the fire from a wider angle, showing more of the heavily fragmented landscape.

WestFork2_Wide Pan

P.S. And thank goodness the Tar Sands megaloads came through – and blocked all traffic – on US Highway 12 a few days ago…and not during the course of this wildfire incident. One has to wonder how the evacuation of homes, people, pets and belongings and the response of firefighters, sheriffs and emergency personal would have been impacted a few days earlier with the Tar Sands megaloads blocking the highway.

American Fire, Tahoe National Forest

I pilfered this awesome photo off of Facebook. Yet another sobering reason why wildfires aren’t good for humans. Meanwhile, there are an unknown amount of new lightning fires this morning, after a night of intense dry lightning. Also, the same conditions will exist for two more days, with a red flag warning still in effect. Here at home, the morning light is orange, due to other wildfires currently burning. This situation feels really similar to to the 2007 fire season, when many fires burned for more than six weeks. We need forests which survive drought, bark beetles and wildfires.

American-fire