Really? The day after Thanksgiving? DOI releases long-awaited report on oil and gas leasing.
Here’s a link.
Not being an expert, and being in a hurry to get back to post-Thanksgiving cleanup, here is what I found. I bet some TSW folks already know these issues and can add or correct if I got the terminology wrong, and place these changes in context of “what has been talked about for the last 20 years or so”. The recommendations also seem to track 2009 and 2019 GAO reports.
Here we’re interested in onshore.
Aside: one thing mentioned in the public forum that I hadn’t heard before is that offshore production in the Gulf is lower in methane than other sources. Which if true, relates to COP26 and pledges to reduce methane. The virtual public forum was held in March of this year and I posted about it here.
BLM should start rulemakings to:
*adjust royalty rates
* Increase minimum prices at lease sale (bonus bids).
* increase rental rates (what companies pay until the lease in in production)
* increase minimum bond amounts
As to planning:
Onshore
Through the land use planning process, BLM determines what lands may be available for oil and gas leasing, what lease stipulations will be applied to protect other resources and values, and what “conditions of approval” may be necessary on permits to drill for additional protection. The land use planning process requires extensive collaboration with Tribal, State, and local governments and the public regarding how Federal lands will be used and minerals will be extracted at specific locations.
As an overarching policy, BLM should ensure that oil and gas is not prioritized over other land uses, consistent with BLM’s mandate of multiple-use and sustained yield. The BLM should carefully consider what lands make the most sense to lease in terms of expected yields of oil and gas, prospects of earning a fair return for U.S. taxpayers, and conflicts with other uses, such as outdoor recreation and wildlife habitat. The BLM should always ensure it is considering the views of local communities, Tribes, businesses, State and local governments, and other stakeholders.Low Potential Lands
Common practice in BLM land use planning has been to leave the majority of Federal lands open for leasing and allow industry to drive decisions on what areas will be nominated for oil and gas leasing. Since there is no cost to nominate parcels of land for leasing, there is little disincentive for companies to identify large amounts of acreage regardless of the resource potential of that land or how seriously the nominator is considering bidding for the nominated parcels. The burden and expense then fall on BLM to process those parcels, triggering the dedication of BLM staff resources to analyze marginal lands that companies may not be interested in bidding on and that may never be leased, much less developed. At the same time, sales of large amounts of low potential land often ignite local community concerns (particularly since low-potential lands are more likely to be in areas that are not accustomed to local oil and gas development) and result in
protests that are time-consuming and resource-intensive to adjudicate.The BLM should evaluate operational adjustments to its leasing program that will avoid nomination or leasing of low potential lands and instead focus on areas that have moderate or high potential.
I wonder about this..
The BLM should carefully consider what lands make the most sense to lease in terms of expected yields of oil and gas, prospects of earning a fair return for U.S. taxpayers, and conflicts with other uses, such as outdoor recreation and wildlife habitat.
I don’t know for sure, but I expect they already do that, as they do for any other energy permitting.
I also like this
The burden and expense then fall on BLM to process those parcels, triggering the dedication of BLM staff resources to analyze marginal lands that companies may not be interested in bidding on and that may never be leased, much less developed. At the same time, sales of large amounts of low potential land often ignite local community concerns (particularly since low-potential lands are more likely to be in areas that are not accustomed to local oil and gas development) and result in protests that are time-consuming and resource-intensive to adjudicate.
This seems eminently pragmatic.