Here it is.
Extremely user friendly page, in my view. Nice work!
Role of science
The Precautionary Principle and Forest Planning
“Better to be safe than sorry.”
“Nothing ventured, nothing gained.”
“First do no harm.”
“Fences are made for those who cannot fly.”
“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
Caution or boldness? What happens if doing nothing is worse? This is one of the debates emerging from the Forest Service planning rule development.
In the 1970s, the Black Forest in Germany was obviously deteriorating. Acid rain associated with sulfur and nitrogen emissions from industrial, commercial, and transportation sources was the suspected culprit, but science could not provide firm evidence of cause and effect. Despite this scientific uncertainty, the German government instituted regulations to reduce power plant emissions. The policy became known as “Vorsorgeprinzip”, which translates into the “principle of advanced caring.” After evolving into a key component of German environmental law, the concept of precautionary action gradually gained wider acceptance across Europe and was incorporated into various international treaties, conventions, and declarations. The concept grew into what is known today as the precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public or to the environment, in the absense of scientific consensus that the action or policy is harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those who advocate taking the action. This principle allows policy makers to make discretionary decisions in situations where there is evidence of potential harm in the absence of complete scientific proof. The principle implies that there is a social responsibility to protect the public from exposure to harm, when scientific investigation has found a plausible risk. These protections can be relaxed only if further scientific findings emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will result.
The principle has become very popular, embraced by governments around the globe. In the European Union, the application of the precautionary principle has been made a statutory requirement. It has been incorporated into many treaties and resolutions, including the Rio Declaration, the Montreal Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1992 Climate Change Convention, the Treaty on European Union, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, and the Helsinki Convention on Marine Protection in the Baltic. In 2005, the city of San Francisco, adopted a precautionary principle purchasing ordinance.
At a 1998 conference convened by the Science and Environmental Health Network at the Wingspread House in Racine, Wisconsin, a group of scientists, philosophers, lawyers, and activitists developed a widely-cited consensus statement about the precautionary principle:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.
The precautionary principle has been proposed by various environmental groups as a central theme of a new Forest Service planning rule. It became one of the discussion questions during the third planning rule national roundtable last week. But there are questions about the appropriateness of the principle in a typically value-laden forest planning process lacking agreement on goals, and when inaction could be as risky as action.
Although it was only briefly mentioned at the planning rule science forum in the question and answer period for the first panel, it was highlighted in Booz Allen’s summary report of that meeting. Tom Sisk from Northern Arizona University observed that when we lack information we still need to make tough decisions. In order to protect the environment, management should be appled according to the ecosystem capabilities. Sisk said that a lack of uncertainty should not be used to adopt environmental protections. Later, there was a follow-up question from the audience about whether we should be using adaptive management instead of the Precautionary Principle. Sisk reminded everyone that the Precautionary Principle cuts both ways: both taking and not taking action. We should not let uncertainty stop us in our tracks.
Alston Chase has argued that the precautionary principle does not always benefit society, could produce more ecological and social harm than good, with consequences not known until it’s too late. He explains that in “game theory” there is no such thing as a “correct decision” under conditions of uncertainty, and that all choices are subjective, reflecting the values of the decision-maker. When applied to natural resource planning, he argues that it presupposes the idea of a self-regulated ecosystem, seeking to protect conditions that never existed, never will exist, or never could exist.
In the middle of the debate over the use of the precautionary principle in Forest Service planning is the set of Forest Plan amendments comprising the Sierra Nevada Framework. The principle played an important role in the 2001 amendments. However, risk and uncertainty assessment teams in 2003 observed the dangers of applying the principle, and a new decision was made in early 2004. (On separate issues the decision was litigated and a Federal Register notice to supplement the analysis was issued earlier this year).
In 2004, Hal Salwasser, School of Forestry Dean at Oregon State, and former director of the Pacific Southwest Experiment Station, wrote about his experiences with the complex and messy forest planning in the Sierra Nevadas, and the problems he saw with the application of the precautionary principle in these types of “wicked problems” .
The precautionary principle has several flaws that make it questionable as a guide to decision making (Beckerman 2000). First, if the future is really all that uncertain, then we cannot be confident that action taken or not taken today will not make the future better rather than worse. Second, what constitutes harm is not always clear and could vary over time and space. When the precautionary principle is applied to dynamic ecosystems to constrain actions, such as fuels thinning needed to restore the system’s resilience to fire, it sets up the potential for major long-term harm: harm from inaction could be greater than harm from proposed action. Inaction creates “opportunity benefits,” that is, benefits foregone because action was not taken (Wildavsky 1995).
It is not possible to have full certainty regarding most of the important things in life, and ecosystems are certainly no exception. The standard for burden of proof about certainty in the precautionary principle is infinitely high. And taking no action precludes the opportunity to learn from trial and error. The upshot of applying the precautionary principle is either nothing will ever get done or the preconditions for action are so time consuming and burdensome that action is excessively costly, too timid, or too late. The consequence will be countless unintended harms as a result of inaction. Care, thoughtfulness, and testing of ideas make sense, but extreme precaution is hardly prudent in a dynamic ecosystem, especially one that is vulnerable to uncharacteristic disturbance events. Thus, in situations such as those that confront Sierra Nevada ecosystems, stakeholders, and managers, the precautionary principle sheds no light on prudent choices.
The precautionary principle appears to have greatly influenced how risk or uncertainty about forest management impacts on certain fish and wildlife entered the decision rationale in the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment. It appears that uncertainty was assumed to have only negative potential outcomes; however, uncertainty means outcomes or future events are uncertain in both directions. The rationale for how tradeoffs were made warrants open critical thinking and review of what uncertainty implies, what harm is, and how it is judged vis-à-vis other objectives. The 2004 revised Record of Decision handles risk with more boldness, yet even it is insufficient to address the magnitude of risk to late successional forests and their ecological values posed by uncharacteristically intense fires”.
Salwasser adovates decision analysis and adaptive management learning processes used in other disciplines for complex problems (things that have been discussed on this blog).
In the planning rule roundtable meetings, some participants have suggested that the Forest Service develop a framework using experimental approaches with a precautionary underpinning to address forest challenges. But others have noted that forest restoration is expensive and suggested that caution (whether enacted actively or passively) is the appropriate framework to reduce costs in the national forests. Both risks and benefits are apparent in the multiple-use mission of the Forest Service, so this is an important debate.
Environmental lawyer Carolyn Raffensberger, one of the leading advocates of the precautionary principle, has said that it’s about setting goals, reversing the burden of proof, looking for the safest alternative, and emphasizing public health and the environment over economics. But she also concludes that the final element of the precautionary principle is democracy:
If we’re faced with scientific uncertainty, we need to set goals, and choose the safest alternative to achieve these goals. These processes involve values and ethics; it is not something that scientists or government bureaucrats can decide alone. We need to bring affected parties to the table. This gives us a chance as a public to set the goals that we want to drive toward; it helps get on the table a much wider array of options for solving problems and looking for alternatives. So democracy is also an essential component of the Precautionary Principle.”
Perhaps a conversation is a good place to start.
Warm Lake Fire Study Excerpts- and Science Policy Situations that Shout Watch Out #6 and #7
The WISE blog here has some interesting excerpts from this paper by Graham, Jain and Loseke on the Warm Lake Fire. It also has a link to the complete paper. This paper was mentioned yesterday in testimony before the House Agriculture Committee at a Wyoming Field Hearing.
Interestingly, in this blog, Ted Zukowski reasserts the knowledge claim that 150 feet is the “science” of protecting homes. Sorry, Ted, people want to protect communities, not homes, and they want firefighters to work around those communities, as I said on this blog here. Perhaps that should be Science-policy Situation that shouts Watch Out #6 – when advocacy groups assert what “the science” says, and number 7- when anyone claims “the science is settled.”
Blue Ribbon Coalition Wonders About Mix of Scientific Disciplines
In this piece, the BRC talks about the process of rulemaking thus far:
At the same time, after attending both the National Science Forums and participating in the first National Roundtable in Washington, DC, Mumm did have concerns that some segments of science may be missing from the analysis.
“I came away from the Science Forums feeling it was top-heavy with biological/ecological science and lacking data from the social/economic science side of the issue.”
Mumm concluded,
“In the end, this Planning Rule will have a dramatic affect on a great many communities across this country and I would encourage the Forest Service to broaden the science they are looking to ‘underpin’ the making of it with. ‘Science’ is a method of inquiry-not a static body of knowledge. Human communities are an undeniable part of the natural environment and more than just narrow perspectives on ‘hard’ science need to be part of this equation.”
This piece reminds us that individual disciplines have their own scientific procedures that they determine to be “the best science,” and there is no scientific way of determining which disciplines to include, nor how many, nor a metascientific discipline with agreed upon rules of inquiry. And of course, there is scientist to scientist variation within discipline. And interpersonal dynamics in committees of scientists. It’s a bountiful, diverse and wonderful community of scientific communities out there.
Interim Report of the Science Forum Now Available
An interim report of the Science Forum is now available on the Forest Service planning rule website. The 12 pages of bullet statements were prepared by the consultant Booz Allen Hamilton. The planning rule website also says that powerpoint presentations of panelists will soon be posted, and an official full summary report from the consultant will be posted in the coming weeks. Video clips of the forum will also be available.
Stickin’ to the Science- Models and More
John has done a fantastic job of summarizing the panelists’ presentations at the Science Forum. However, I think we need to carefully watch what is claimed as scientific information, especially when that information tends to be uniquely privileged and thus can remove debate from the democratic, public sphere if it becomes a “science” issue. “Science” at its extreme, can become an ever-broadening mantle that can run to personal experiences of scientists, pontification by scientists, and so on.
But what is scientific information, given the variety of fields involved in a complicated field like natural resource management? “Science” can be models, field measurements, interviews with people, GIS exercises, and so on.
Scientific information gets its privileged status from claims of objectivity and physical and biological reality.
So here are some of my impressions, as a scientist and an observer of the science enterprise. First of all, I think modelers cannot be objective about models. No more than botanists can be objective about plants, or wildlife biologists about wildlife. There is an inherent connection between love of a thing and choosing it as a vocation. A good scientist, like a good manager, has a fire in her/his belly for the work. One ecologist notably said “ecosystems are more complex than we think, they are more complex than we can think.” I actually think that that is a paraphrase of J.B.S. Haldane, who said “the universe is queerer than we think, it is queerer than we can think.” How can we believe that they are more complex than we can think, and yet expect managers and the public to put energy into consideration of model outputs without independent empirical evidence that predictions are somewhat accurate?
Role of modeling in forest planning
Nevertheless, the scientists involved in modeling focused on models. Dr. Williams, who runs monitoring programs but is probably not one of the modeling community, focused on monitoring and real world observations, due to uncertainty and the complexity and potential unmodelability of complex systems. I agree with his emphasis on observations. Is that related to the fact we don’t work in models? Does the fire in the belly come as a precursor, or an effect, of working on something like models?
It is the essential conundrum of science – those who know the most have the most inherent conflict of interest in the importance and utility of their work. As the expression goes, if all you have is a hammer…everything looks like a nail.
I think we need to have more serious discussions about the appropriate role of models when there is as much uncertainty as there is about the future. From the science perspective, no doubt, models can synthesize existing information and they are useful to inform scientific understanding. But to then say that they need to be used in planning is a leap. Are they good enough to be better than talking to the public about “we don’t really know, this could happen or that, let’s think through some scenarios?” Are quantitative computer models necessarily better than explaining to the public what scientists currently think about interactions?
If interactions are too complex to predict, then they are too complex to predict- and let’s admit it and use adaptive management. Or use simple, explainable heuristic models. If we are going to use them, then we should wait for 10 years and select the ones with the most predictive value. Weather models were discussed at the Science Forum as a potential approach for the use of models. The problem seems to be that no one in natural resources wants to wait to get the data points. I think we can honor the role of models in increasing scientific understanding without determining that they are predictive enough to be useful in planning.
Sticking to Science
When we invite scientists to speak, we have to be careful about their knowledge claims. Telling stories about their experiences with collaboration isn’t scientific knowledge, it is practitioner experience. In another example, the Precautionary Principle is a human value about how to make decisions under uncertainty. Decision science is, need I say, a separate discipline from biology and ecology. When scientists or scientific organizations advocate for a position like that, in my view, they should separate their science claims from their personal values. Roger Pielke in his book “The Honest Broker” calls these “stealth advocates.” It takes just a minute to add “this isn’t a scientific point of view, it is a value judgment” when you make such a statement , but the power of trust in science and scientists is, indeed, priceless. Ask the climate scientists.
Synchronistically, Roger Pielkei recirculated a quote today in his blog
from the book Breakthrough by Norhaus and Shellenberger which may be as relevant to the planning rule as to climate policy.
The questions before us are centrally about how we will survive, who will survive, and how we will live. These are questions that climatologists and other scientists can inform but not decide. For their important work, scientists deserve our gratitude, not special political authority. What’s needed today is a politics that seeks authority not from Nature or Science but from a compelling vision of the future that is appropriate for the world we live in and the crises we face.
All’s Well on the Planning Front — Or is it?
The year was 1995 (or thereabouts). I attended a Forest Service sponsored meeting on Strategic Planning at Grey Towers. I carried my brand new copy of Henry Mintzberg’s Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning to the meeting, referring to Mintzberg’s death-knell for planning whenever I could. (Here is a six-page summary pdf) A few souls agreed that Strategic Planning as envisioned by the NFMA regulation ought to have died even before Mintzberg penned his classic. But most in attendance were true soldiers from the Forest Service and a few other government agencies — looking only to do better at their assigned/accepted tasks.
Now it is 2010 and the Forest Service is once-again playing the Frame Game to make sure that the status quo planning frame is not upset too much. Or so it seems to me. As always, I hope I’m wrong. The game is to rewrite the regulatory “rule” for NFMA. If he Forest Service believes it to be a “planning rule” my guess it that the game is lost before it begins. To set a stage the Forest Service is hosting a bunch of so-called collaboration meetings. First out the chute, a Science Forum — a two-day gathering of “scientists” early this week. The outcome of the meeting will likely prove up my 1995 observation-warning that the Forest Service hadn’t (and hasn’t yet) learned its science lesson:
It is folly to assume that, “Science will find the answer,” as if science alone were the key to resolving social problems. Such thinking hasn’t been helpful to medical practitioners, engineers, even scientists when challenged to help explain the cultural mess we’ve gotten ourselves into relative to sustainability.
A framing question lingers: Why is the Forest Service once-again leading with science if the intent is to reframe policy and/or management?
On the heels of the Science Forum, the Forest Service will host three two-day sessions in Washington DC, and a series of one-day sessions in the hinterlands. Not enough time for thoughtful deliberation of what social mess (or wicked problem nest) the Forest Service is in, neither how it got there, neither how it might begin to move forward.
A framing question lingers: Why is the Forest Service once-again hosting a series of meetings to begin reframing the “rule”? Isn’t there any other way? Or is tradition rearing its head once again? Some of us have advocated for Blogs (internet discussion forums) to begin discussing serious policy matters and Wikis to actually write alternative versions of policy. (See, e.g. here.) But all, so far, is to no avail. We’ll see what will happen this time relatively soon. For now, though, let’s step back again in time.
The year was 2002. I began to preach the gospel of Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Buzz Holling’s intro to the Panarchy idea), following on the heels of Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions, The Politics of Ecosystem Management, Managing the Unexpected and a few other key books. (See: Collaboration Readings for Reflective Practitioners). I continued to do so until my retirement in 2007. Nobody, other than a few who blog here, seemed to care. Nobody seemed anxious to seek a different path. At least no one in power circles seemed to care.
Inevitably each new idea that emerged was transformed into “Planning”: assess, plan, act, evaluate, plan, …. Planning swallowed up adaptive management without a hiccup. Planning swallowed up Environmental Management Systems, or almost , again without a hiccup. (my 2005-2007 EMS blog) But it was pretense. Pretend adaptive management. Pretend collaboration. Nothing remotely real about it. Still, it suited the Forest Service bureaucracy well. It could be force-fit into the rigid straitjacket of the Manual/Handbook system. Nothing would change the planning juggernaut that was launched way back in 1979.
All could be pretended to be well. If only the damn enviros would just quit suing. After all the Forest Service was/is no longer rapaciously clearcutting. Never mind the mining/drilling interests, the grazers, the commercial recreation interests, etc. Never mind the suited men behind the curtains. Why can’t the enviros just settle in, kick back and enjoy (by 2009) the stimulus money that is being thrown thither and yon, some of it for so-called ecological restoration. Note: the reason the “rule” is once-again ‘in play’ is because some damn enviros sued and got the last one thrown out. (Personal admission: I am one of those ‘damn enviros’, and was long before retiring from the Forest Service.)
A framing question lingers: Did I fall into the ‘Good Will Hunting’ trap? Here is the trap in a nutshell: Badboy Will said to his psychiatrist, in essence: “You people baffle me. You spend all your money on these fancy books, you surround yourselves with ’em — and they’re the wrong fucking books.” (Great movie, btw)
Did I read the wrong books? If so, assuming that any power brokers in the Forest Service actually read, what books ought I to have been studying and preaching from. And if ideas, visions, and paths forward are not to have come from books, what ought I to have been looking for smoking?
Just a few Sunday thoughts to ponder while awaiting the meetings, and the posts that will flow here and in the official FS nonblog.
Science or “Scienciness” Situation 4- When Scientists Speak for Nature
This is Science Policy “Situations that Shout Watch Out” Number 4
Back to the Hanson paper.
Ecologists are apparently saying (either they are saying this, or the statement is so global about ecologists as to be incorrect) that high intensity fire must be “facilitated”
There is strong consensus among ecologists that high-intensity fire, and resulting snag forest habitat, is something that must be preserved and facilitated, not prevented or destroyed
The Hanson goes on to say a lot about wildlife, plant and bird diversity.
But what about these watershed scientists with USGS?
In addition, surface water flowing from burned areas may carry increased levels of sediment, organic debris, and chemicals that may contribute to significant degradation of municipal water supplies and aquatic habitats.
Or this study at PNW.
With less productive soils, Bormann said, a forest will not grow as quickly nor reabsorb as much carbon as before a burn—a process critical to mitigating the accumulation of atmospheric carbon, which traps heat in the atmosphere and can, thus, raise temperatures.
So some scientists say that “high intensity fires are good for some plants and animals”. Other scientists say “bad things can happen to good soil and aquatic habitat from high intensity fires.”(actually we don’t have to read about that, we can observe it directly).
Other scientists measure the differences in soils.
All these different positive and negative impacts happen from the same event- high intensity fire. Given that array of possible impacts, how do we decide how to manage vegetation and fire?
1) Back to the Basics. Work on keeping hydrologic function and soil- no matter what some plants will grow and some animals will eat them. Vegetation is a blanket that will grow if we maintain soil and water. This is a good strategy even under climate change. This empowers hydrologists, soil scientists, fish bios and aquatic ecologists. You could call it restoring and protecting hydrologic function.
2) Natural (pre European or ?) is best for vegetation and animals. First, we would have to figure it out. Then we would have to invest in efforts to manage for that, and live with negative impacts on other resources. Of course, this idea may not even be possible given changed conditions due to climate change. Like the concept of HRV, this empowers various kinds of ecologist. You could call it trying to retain some previous composition and structure.
3) Think about a given situation (which is never only about one thing- it might be about protecting communities AND watersheds) and work with people to figure out the right thing to do- informed by 1 and 2.
My point is that 1, 2 and 3 are not science questions- although 1 and 2 empower different groups of scientists to be the experts. 1, 2 and 3 are ideas about how land should be managed and priorities set. Questions like “who wins and who loses, among people and different components of the environment, what are the best investments in protection and restoration” are ultimately values choices. Even within environmental choices (losing endangered trout habitat versus potentially reduced species richness for plants), it can’t, ultimately, be a science question.
Scientists don’t know “what’s best for Nature” because Nature does not speak about what She wants. Fish here and birds there? Soils where trees can or can’t grow? We have feelings that we want natural conditions (fish in streams, good water quality) and that is wonderful. But when it comes to trade-offs, we can’t punt to scientists but have to work out what we want most, and what we don’t like but can live with.
Next Situation that Shouts Watch Out: redefining English words
Previous Situations that Shout Watch Out 1-3 and 5
Science or “Scienciness” : Sleight of Science
Situations that Shout Watch Out #5 (I am coming back to 4, but this seemed timely)
#5 Sleight of Science
This is a more sophisticated polemic technique than those previously discussed. This tactic sets up what someone (the “victim”) plans to do and then rounds up a set of science to suggest that it won’t work, or that it has undesirable consequences. The beauty of this rhetorical device is that the article does not accurately characterize what the person or agency (“victim”) is doing. Since most people not involved (the “marks”) won’t actually know the difference, it is a neat “sleight of science” approach.
Let’s look at the arguments in this paper, on the previous topic for “Science or Scienciness”, fuels treatments for community wildfire protection as described in the previous entry. So far this seems to be a good topic for deconstructing some of these “sciency” arguments.
Not to pick on this paper, either, and most of the statements made in the paper are generally accepted by scientists and practitioners.
This is from the argument on pages 21 and 22 of the paper.
First statement- within 1.5 miles, treatments are most useful to communities. Generally agreed.
Second statement- building roads and treating fuels far from communities are less useful to communities. Generally agreed.
Third statement- Cohen’s 130 foot band plus Firewise . Generally agreed that this is useful, but for various reasons not sufficient.
Fourth statement- Do it around communities.
Overall, it is going to be much less expensive, more
effective and less damaging to focus fire-hazard reduction
efforts around communities and homes than it
would be to try to make a wholesale modification of
forest structure over large landscapes
Surprise twist. No one is proposing wholesale treatments, or not doing it around communities, in the policy the paper is discussing! We seem to be in violent agreement.
We can have a great discussion (and have had) with scientists specifically about 1/2 mile or 1 mile to 1 and 1/2 mile- I bet the writers of HFRA had the same discussion – as the same numbers are found in HFRA. But “far” would probably not invoke pictures of a mile or half mile.
Some have advocated a system of landscape- scale fuel breaks. Some science supports this concept (Finney’s work). But that is not a part of the policy this paper was intended to refute.
Science or “Scienciness”- Situations that Shout Watch Out 1-3
In this series of posts, I will use as an example a recent paper The Myth of “Catastrophic” Wildfire: A New Ecological Paradigm of Forest Health. An article in New West brought this to my attention. I’ll use it as an example to describe situations that, from a science policy perspective, shout “watch out.” I expect that through the dialogue on the planning rule, there will be opportunities to address specific knowledge claims by scientists, and, for some, to investigate the logic path for the links (as we say in administrative appeals) between facts found and conclusions drawn.
Situation 1. High Hype Factor. In general, traditional scientific papers do not use words like “myth” “new” or “paradigm” in the title, or even words with “quotation marks around them”; if it sounds like it has been lifted from the pages of the scientific equivalent of the National Enquirer, it is probably a sign that the scientists involved are making an argument for some policy choice, not objectively evaluating evidence. Scientists can’t control the press office of their organization or university in terms of hype; but they shouldn’t be adding to the problem by overstating their contributions.
Of course, it is totally OK to make an argument for a policy choice; but you should be clear with the reader what your role is- you are not attempting to do an objective synthesis of science, you as a person with science credentials, are engaging in a polemic.
Situation 2. Lack of Peer Review. The need for and utility of peer review has been stated and restated. Even the problems of peer review have their own body of literature. For a scientific paper, peer review may be necessary but it is not sufficient to guarantee quality, for a variety of reasons. Many of these have been discussed with regard to the climate science literature. Some have argued that posting on the internet with opportunity for comments is an excellent supplement to peer review.
Situation 3. When Scientists Frame the Issue. This is a situation that occurs more frequently than desirable, and is actually the source of unnecessary tension between scientists and managers. Here is the way this dysfunctional cycle operates. First, there is a pot of money, to be distributed through a competitive process with a panel of other scientists. A scientist writes a proposal with a certain framing (e.g., fire protection of people and their communities is the same as protecting houses). Since none of the communities involved are at the table, and the framing sounds plausible to the other scientists, the proposal is funded. Then the scientist does the work. When they hear about the research results, managers then ignore the results, or only partially use them, because the results aren’t relevant to their framing of the issue. The last step of the cycle is that the managers are accused of “not using the best available science.” I have seen this cycle play out many times.
The scientific evidence is clear that the only effective way to protect structures from fire is to reduce the ignitability of the structure itself (e.g., fireproof roofing, leaf gutter guards) and the immediate surroundings within about 100 feet from each home, e.g., through thinning of brush and small trees adjacent to the homes (www.firelab.org–see studies by U.S. Forest Service fire scientist Dr. Jack Cohen)
In this case, the difference in framing is as simple as it’s not about the structures- it’s about the fact that people don’t want fire running through their communities. It is about all kinds of community infrastructure, stop signs and power poles, landscaping, fences, gardens, trees and benches in parks, people and pets and livestock having safe exits from encroaching fires. It is about firefighter safety and about conditions for different suppression tactics. That’s why fire breaks of some kinds around communities (not just structures) will always be popular in the real world. Of course, people don’t actually fireproof their homes either in the real world. “How can we best keep wildfires from damaging communities and endangering people” would be a more complex, but more real framing of the question. Note that one scientific discipline can’t provide the answer to this framing- there are elements of fire science, community design, fire suppression practice, sociology, political science and economics.
Next post: Situation 4. When Scientists Speak For Nature.