Here’s the text of the former Forest Service Chief’s Letter. I have a great deal of respect for all the Forest Service Chiefs, and I don’t always agree with them. I am not a fan of the One Fire Service idea, but I also think it’s important to understand different perspectives and question claims, if only to make the case for not doing it stronger. And I have heard concerns that I think could be addressed without the combo, so I think it would be best to address those directly, rather than combo and hope for the best. Still, that’s not where the combo convo seems to be going.
The Honorable Brooke Rollins
Secretary United States Department of Agriculture
1400 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20250Subject: Strengthening Wildland Fire Management
Dear Madam Secretary:
As former firefighters, U.S. Forest Service Chiefs, we represent over 250 years of collective experience dealing with fire on America’s public lands.
We write to offer our strong support for improving wildland fire management—but to express clear opposition to creating a new federal fire agency.
Wildland fire response is just one part of an integrated wildland fire management system that includes:
- Suppressing wildfires,
- Creating fire-adapted communities, and
- Building resilient landscapes through fuels management and prescribed fire.
At present, Federal wildland fire personnel integrate all three of these functions into one job designed to save lives and livelihoods of the American public.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but I’m not sure that federal wildfire folks “create fire-adapted communities.” What it doesn’t mention is how integrated the FS is with local and state fire efforts. And certainly FS folks work with nearby communities, so a geographic qualifier might have been helpful.
Separating fire response from land management agencies creates three major problems. It: 1) dramatically escalates the cost of fixing the problems forest face,
This is a claim. We can accept it as is, or wonder why that would be the case. Suppose they are the same people, located on the same units, doing the same kinds of work, but reporting differently, as in the interview with the Angeles Fire Chief and having different color trucks and uniforms. It seems to me that the costs would depend greatly on details that haven’t been worked out, at least not publicly.
2) leaves firefighters without access to critical local knowledge needed for rapid fire decision-making under increasingly extreme fire conditions,
I think we all agree that local knowledge is key. However, we already have teams that may not be local based on the ICS. It’s possible, again, that the work would be done locally by the same people, with a different reporting structure.
and 3) redirects already strained capacity of our wildland fire workforce away from effective response and towards rebuilding systems that already exist.
Again, it seems to me that the new organization would have to use the same (dedicated) workforce. Perhaps removing hiring from ASC would have benefits? Point being, we don’t really know what they have in mind. I understand that the Chiefs probably feel that they can’t wait, and I think that’s true. At the same time there is a fuzziness that is real about how it would actually work.
Creating a new federal fire agency would be inefficient and costly. The current system allows federal land management agencies to shift staff between fire response and land stewardship as needed. During severe fire seasons, non-fire personnel who are trained and certified (“red-carded”) support suppression efforts. In low fire-risk periods, fire personnel contribute to land management projects. This integrated workforce model is both cost-effective and responsive.
I don’t see why red-carded people couldn’t still be called up by a new organization, the same way that National Guard employees are called out for training or other work. Of all these, I think the idea that fire folks work on other projects (beyond what might become “fire projects) and their level of integration probably differs depending on various factors. I think this one is the best argument so far.
Attempting to fully staff two separate federal agencies—one for fire, one for land—would eliminate this operational flexibility and increase costs without improving outcomes. In fact, detaching fire from land management would likely increase catastrophic fires and firefighter risk by undermining local planning, fuels management, and the essential connection between suppression and prevention.
Again, I’m not sure that’s what they are talking about. We have a workforce, and it seems to me that the question is “to whom would they report?”. Also it seems to me that these individuals might not want to do NEPA for fuel treatment (MT or PF) and where MT is involved, there might be timber sale contracts. Who would want to learn about how to do them if they didn’t have to? Further, lots of MT and PF work is done by stewardship contracting, grants with NGOs, and Good Neighbor agreements, in some places, whereas in others perhaps federal wildfire folks do the work.
The Forest Service currently suppresses 98% of all fires during initial attack. The remaining 2% that escape are largely driven by extreme weather events—conditions under which no agency, new or existing, could guarantee better results.
I really don’t like using percentages, like “only x of prescribed fires escape” or “only y of managed fires escape.” It seems to me that that discounts the views of impacted people (and acreages), and doesn’t mean to, but kind of implies that everything is really fine as is- so leave us alone. I think it might be more honest to say ” this work is extremely difficult and the wildfire community has a culture of being a learning organization. We worry that that culture might be disrupted in any new organization.”
We would encourage you to have Forest Service work with the Interior Agencies to expand on the following parts of the Executive Order:
- Strengthening federal, state, Tribal, and local fire cooperation;
- Streamlining fire contracting and standardize intelligence systems;
I wonder why hiring is not included. Seems important. But maybe everything is fine.
- Accelerating fuels reduction, forest thinning, and prescribed fire;
- Implementing proven risk management strategies through application of science and technology to best implement safe, effective suppression actions;
I would think they are already being implemented.
- Investing in fire-adapted communities and the “Firewise” program to reduce hazardous fuels and thin forests in the wildland-urban interface;
- Expanding public education and prevention efforts like the Smokey Bear campaign, especially to reduce human-caused ignitions (now 85% of all wildfires);
- Reducing risk of wildfire ignition from power systems by requiring/incentivizing maintenance, clearing and expansion of right- of-ways. There is a need to adjust right-of-ways to reflect today’s wildfire risk;
- Continuing to advance interagency fire science, training, and technologies to assist firefighters on how and when to engage suppression actions.
- Performance metrics for wildfire response should be driven by taking only safe and effective actions and assigning aviation assets when safe and effective operations can be performed. Weather, terrain and other factors influence go/no go decisions, and it is essential that decisions are communicated to the public.
Maybe there is a need to communicate better to the public? It’s hard to tell with the passive voice.
- Increasing investment in wildfire mitigation through sale of excess aircraft and increased appropriations.
All of those bullets are good things.
The science is clear. The solutions are known. What’s needed is the political will and support to scale what works.
I’m always skeptical when someone tells me “the science is clear.” What I’m not hearing are ideas for things working better within the current system, other than increasing funding.
We urge you to invest in our current interagency fire management system rather than create a costly and redundant new agency. Let’s work together to reduce hazardous fuels, protect communities, support our wildland firefighters, and ensure our nation is prepared to face a future of more intense fire seasons. If there is any way we can help, please call us.
For me, it all started with the One Fire Agency folks not being clear on what problem they wanted to address. If they had said that clearly (or maybe it is but I haven’t seen it) then the Chiefs (and the rest of us) could have proposed different, less disruptive, ways of going about making those improvements. To have a reasoned discussion, we would need to know details.. of what the Fire Service is designed to improve, and the details of how it would work. We might have had some kind of open discussion with the proponents of the idea.
What concerns me is that we might throw the baby out with the bathwater, in the sense that we will never get to discussing what things could be improved because it will get lost in the larger issue of Fire Service.
Your last two paragraphs are an excellent summary. I want to know what the new organization will improve that can’t be done by tweaking the existing organizations? Are they really that broken that they can’t be improved? I don’t think so. I was always impressed how quickly an IMT can come in and establish order to a chaotic situation. For those that like to run down government, I think that fire management does a lot of things right. Granted, there is room for improvement but as you say, let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water.
Lately, I have been writing a lot about the “USDA Reorganization Plan” (July 24, 2025) and sending my comments to the appropriate designations. Additionally, there have been lots of discussions about a “U.S. Wildfire Department, or Agency, or Service.”
As I have stated before, this is not a wise idea. Candidly, I said it was a ridiculous notion, but my colleagues have asked me to be better. We all know this will form a huge, expensive “wildfire control” organization that will be far less effective than the current approach, and the concept of caring for land to make our forests resilient, healthy, and sustainable will go out the window. Funds will be competed for, and I can promise you that “landscape scale conservation along the rural to urban gradient” will lose out. And “Engine Co. 53” will win.
I wrote this in another note yesterday:
“Lots of people lobby against forest management. For example, they do not want to see trees harvested or excess fuels removed. It’s “not nature’s way,” they conclude. Hey, forest management takes time and is silent; it’s hard to see or hear trees grow. Sure, they talk to me, but in a whisper. Fires roar and flames whip. Congress typically funds immediate danger they see or hear. Unfortunately, too many tend to avoid adequate resources for land care. We will use $1 million an hour fighting or “monitoring” a wildfire and think nothing of it. Over the last 30+ years, forest maintenance funding has given way to fire control in a huge way. It’s called “reactive” behavior vs. “proactive” behavior. It’s a losing proposition.
I know I am missing something. All of us understand that when a new Administration comes to town, change is common. However, most of the change has some logic to it. Of course, I am biased, having worked for the Forest Service for most of my life. I keep asking myself, with all the “proposed eliminations” and virtually no discussions with conservation leaders, why does USDA seem so angry with its grand agency? Dr. Paul Hersey, an organizational design guru, once said of the Forest Service in 2004, “They respond well to relational behavior, with the most effective leadership style being delegating and participating. They do not require a ‘telling’ leadership style.” If a change to improve effectiveness and cost-efficiency is needed, all the USDA has to do is ask, so changes are contemporary, logic-based, and cost-effective. The formation of a “Wildfire Service” is neither of these. Even I know this.
Accordingly, I think we should:
1. Allow the Forest Service to proceed with its global land-care mission. Enable the agency to focus on inefficiencies with solid USDA direction that is logical and has been vetted with stakeholders.
2. Halt the narrowly defined idea of a stand-alone, “National Wildfire Agency” (or Service). This idea will destroy any focus on forest management and landscape-scale conservation. I doubt the current Administration wants this to happen; of course not, they know better, right?
Very respectfully,
I’m going to mow quite a bit of hay down here but having just returned from a multi-region visit to Public Lands, let’s just say I’m not a happy camper! I saw hundreds of thousands of burned acres, some at least 10 years old, with nary a seedling to be found! Huge areas that were either “managed wildfires, or fires exempt from successful suppression.
I’m also aiming these comments at the West; the East, South and Great Lakes Regions do not have the complexity, but that is no excuse!
So, IMT’s; have you ever seen any actually suppress a fire in initial attack? No, as Dave says, they come in and bring order to chaos after the fire has went over the hill – managed, or flown the coup. So, the IMT discussion to me is neither “Fire Service” related, nor status quo. However, maybe we need another angle to actually suppress fires. Maybe we need a no more than six hour window to declare a managed wildfire from a full suppression, because once these fires reach (choose one or more) slope/bug kill/pathogen kill/heavy fuels/ extreme fire weather, etc, it’s time for that IMT. Make be a prepositioned organization of well trained, aggressive – but safe, strike team that can help knock down these 2%, barn burners before they get started.
Next, why can’t we reforest anything, anymore? Why can’t we develop a system of tree improvement to seedling (i.e. container stock too) that can at least try to reforest these large fires? Nurseries, seed production orchards, tree handling facilities, etc, like we used to have before we folded to the enviros over “natural” conditions. If the general public ever catches on this absolute abandonment of sensible forest management, the USDA FS will be toast!
I’m all in for a new “Fire Service”, but they will need to be former Marines with a grudge against smoke!
With a massive turnover of USFS firefighters, to other Agencies, where are these ‘elite firefighters’ expected to be coming from? Once a fire has escaped initial attack, the safety card comes into play. after that, it’s ‘Big Box City’, with all the risks and uncertainty of weather, topography and fuels. Sometimes it is merely an hour for a fire to go from ‘gettable’, to ‘lost cause’, for initial attack. We cannot depend on inexperienced fire crews to know how to decide, during that critical window. With possibly 2000 fewer firefighters available, I have little faith that fires can currently be fought aggressively, while still providing for safety first.
where did you get the number “2000 fewer firefighters”?
There’s the 1500 that was reported here, plus all of the Temps, who previously held red cards. Some RDs might have had a dozen or more Temps who held red cards. An average RD might have 4 timber folks, an Archaeologist, a wildlife Biologist, some recreation folks maybe a Hydrologist or a Botanist as Temps with red cards. Total those numbers up, across the west, and you might arrive at around 2000 missing firefighters.
I’m sure there is also a number of employees who simply ‘aged-out’ of firefighting, but still hold regular jobs.
Thomas, firefighters don’t “decide” on the big box containment, Line Officers do, and solely hold that responsibility. If firefighters are making those calls, well, no wonder fire suppression is in such a state of despair! As for experienced firefighters, they are out there and can be trained to be more aggressive while still being safe….
I get your analogy, it’s just not necessarily that linear of a problem….
Hi Jim, it is true that Line Officers make those decisions, but from my experience, they usually rely heavily on FMO or Fire Staff recommendations. Let’s be honest, most Line Officers nowadays don’t know much about large fire management or fire management period. Also, how will this new fire organization address this issue?
The current fire organizations have a success rate of something like 98% on initial attack, so on its face, that seems pretty successful. I understand that the remaining 2% or so are causing a huge percentage of the problems. It’s that 2% that needs to be addressed, but once again, I am wondering how the new fire organization will help with this? Maybe it will, and I just don’t understand it or haven’t seen a good explanation. If the goal is to go back to the old 10:00 a.m. policy (I disagree with that, but I understand how many people advocate for it), then I believe the current organizations can implement it. They need additional training, funding, etc., and for crying out loud, quit getting rid of employees, non-fire or otherwise!
I totally agree with a dramatic increase in planting! It is a crying shame that all of these acres are going unforested. It will involve a major investment in nurseries, etc. We’ll see if there is support for that.
“It’s that 2% that needs to be addressed.” Do we know enough about this 2% to address them? To know what would make a real difference? How much is even possible? Is this point getting lost in the smoke of argument?
That’s a good question. I have wondered myself how the new fire organization would address the 2% of fires that escape initial attack. There are a whole host of reasons why fires go beyond initial attack. Probably one of the more common ones might be lack of resources. An idea to address this could be a number of ready reaction forces around the country, essentially contingency forces ready to respond on quick notice to assist in initial/extended attack when needed. This could be dedicated aircraft, smoke jumpers, helitack, dozers, what have you. The military uses this concept. It’s just an idea but once again, this could happen with the existing organizations.
The most common reason 2% of fires escape is weather, especially wind and low humidity. Extremely low fuel moisture is often a major contributing factor. It is pure hubris and folly to “hope” any fire management organization can suppress wildland fires when fire weather and fuel conditions are extreme.
It’s not that I disagree with you, that is probably a likely cause for many large fires. It’s just that I don’t know if there has ever been any data compiled on the reasons fires go beyond initial attack. Are you aware of any? It would be good to know in this discussion. I agree that during extreme conditions, no fire organization may be successful, however, many fires transition beyond initial attack at less than extreme conditions.
Dave, I think those are great questions, but looking at them, I wonder whether the data exists to find the answer.
Many are caught small.. some aren’t.. why? how large did it get before resources called out? Safety of firefighters? Lack of resources? Strategy (moving toward edges of big box when winds blew up?)? When I think about the 80’s there were lots of us trained folks dealing with what I think we called ABC fires and hitting them while they were small, even though the observational capabilities were much less than today. It’s almost like you’d have to go through all the records for say the last maybe 10 or 20 years and look at all those factors.
In my own ‘dried grass and high winter winds” part of the country, aggressive IA is the strategy. But we have more eyes on the ground and better response times.
Yes, if there is some data on this, I think it could fit into the discussion of a new fire organization and whatever improvements it may provide. You are correct on the ABC fires, it refers to the size of the fire and I forget the breakdown on the sizes, but A, B, and C were the small ones. It has all been a while for me now, but I believe there may be information gathered in the individual fire reports that may contain some information on what happened with a given fire related to transitioning to a Type III fire. Maybe others out there know. I almost kind of think that someone must have gathered up this kind of information at some point.
Sharon, I’m not Dave but there is a rather important consideration into having more (it seems) large fires these days: we don’t fight fire like we used to fight fire! Back up through the 1980’s, fire was an “all hands” effort; suppression folks were in the field, whether timber, range/recreation or fire disciplines, dispatch called them and they engaged.
The tragic loss of multiple firefighters in the 1990’s caused a centralization of suppression into the new concept of fire organization. The 2000 Fire Plan cemented these moves, and expanded their reach. We no longer jumped out of the truck, grabbed a Pulaski or pulled hose, we met and studied on it a spell before we took action. The “10” and “18” became that, plus LCES, “heads up heads down”, or “head on a swivel”. We loaded our firefighters down with day packs, containing everything but a spare tire, and expected these folks to work their butts off while carrying (usually) 35-40 pounds of mostly useless crap on their backs! Fire shelters came along in the late 1970’s, but those were always standard equipment for uncontained outings.
The “safety card” excuse is generally brought into play (I believe in its concept but we’ve gotten a long ways away from its usefulness) in the 2,000’s. I’ve seen Hotshot crews decline a rather simple task, involving a considerable stroll, while other Hotshots jump at the opportunity.
We love retardant! If you watch the current videos you see large streams of crimson manna being dropped at 2,000 feet, generally on the safer Divisions. I remember John McClain ordering us (US) to use the VLAT, on a mostly inactive section of the line in Wallow – made great newsreel but twas only for show….. I’m told the retardant lobby actually operates in DC year-round for, bigger, better usage, at a merely $50/gallon delivered…..
Thanks, Jim! We were out doing silviculture/tree improvement/refo stuff and put out ABC fires..after the 80s it seems like there were fewer employees in the woods, when these efforts were reduced (not that that was a bad call entirely) but not having as many people out there jumping on small fires seems like a possible factor.
As to retardant, I was in a carpool with a fire guy in DC when I think it was some political wanted retardant used on Long Island.. funny the NYT had a grand article on retardant and didn’t talk much about Andy’s lawsuit…
Dave, most, if not all decisions to mange a fire was due to pressure from other leadership, very few FMOs ever recommended to manage a fire! If I was a DR, the pressure came from the Sup; as a Sup, the pressure came from an RF, the DRF’s were never that, shall we say “comfortable”, in making those calls….
Just my experience.
It might be just a matter of minutes, when a fire goes from small to ‘unsafe to fight directly’. Once that happens, the ‘big box’ is probably inevitable.
Example: Car crash along a road in the bottom of a canyon. In minutes, the fire is rapidly burning uphill, with intensity. No way to catch it.
Hi Jim,
Apologies for ressurrecting an old post, but where are these burned areas that haven’t been re-planted? Is it not USFS policy to rehab burned areas?
The BLM in my region (Oregon) puts up plenty of resources for burned area rehabilitation (BAR), to include re-planting, so I’m surprised that’s not a common practice on other federal land.
Sincerely
MK
Here is a cynical perspective…it is not about “improvement” or addressing the listed issues. It is about creating something new in the name of addressing “known” problems, then claiming a victory for doing something about a decades-old problem. That “something” will either be mildly effective or an outright failure. But, when that is realized, there will be many broken pieces to put back together (reminiscent of the ASC). It pains me to witness another deja vu.
Ah but with ASC it appears that the broken pieces were not put back together.
Hence, my cynicism with this proposed federal fire agency.
Sad but true, no one wants to do continuous improvement, not glamorous enough 🙁
Correct…plus, one does not get promoted for exemplary continuous improvement, only for “big splash” ideas (again, my cynicism in play here).
Well it may be kind of cynical, but if folks could design an agency that does continuous improvement as part of its culture; in fact, I think fire folks are probably best at having a formalized approach. I am always hopeful.
Dave Mertz: “I almost kind of think that someone must have gathered up this kind of information at some point.”
What was the point of gathering this information if not for designing a better approach (including organization)? And not just for the person who wrote the report – where do these reports go?
I believe they are submitted to Inciweb. I really have no idea how user-friendly it is with regard to running queries. Someone who is familiar with the database could maybe tell us what is possible with it.
https://www.fs.usda.gov/science-technology/fire/information
It seems like there should be a visible monitoring/evaluation/improvement feedback loop for fire activities just like anything else.