This is the second article in a two-part series regarding fire management by the US Forest Service near the towns of Oakridge and Westfir, Oregon. The first article focused on forest restoration and prescribed burning on Jim’s Creek, in the Willamette National Forest, and was linked and discussed here: https://forestpolicypub.com/2024/11/01/jims-creek-restoration-a-burning-opportunity/
This second article is 3500 words, has eight photos. a map, and a detailed table, so I’m going to post in two parts: the timeline and extent — with opinions — on the 2022 Cedar Creek Fire; and the health and economic impacts of the fire on local communities as compared to historical Forest Service responsibilities — with recommendations. Both articles are part of a 13-year series I have been writing for Oregon Fish & Wildlife Journal, and this current article can be found here: http://nwmapsco.com/ZybachB/Articles/Magazines/Oregon_Fish_&_Wildlife_Journal/20250108_Cedar_Creek/Zybach_20250108.pdf
Fig. 1. Cedar Creek Fire Smoke Plume, September 9, 2022. Plume is from the west side of Maiden Peak, viewed from the south end of Davis Lake about 4:00 PM. Foreground snags are mostly ponderosa pine from the 2003 Davis Fire, which burned 23,000 acres. Some salvage logging had taken place but was stopped by litigation. Reproduction is mostly ponderosa and lodgepole pine, with some Douglas fir, which may have been planted among the natural seeding. Plume is blowing toward Bend. Photo by Rob DeHarpport.
The 2022 Cedar Creek Fire in Lane County and the Willamette National Forest in western Oregon, burned 127,311 acres. This number included 11,709 acres of so-called “critical habitat” (which the Forest Service calls “CH”) for spotted owls (“NSO”), as defined by college professors (PhDs), litigation (EAJA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Local towns of Oakridge and Westfir were severely threatened by the wildfire, were blanketed with unhealthy smoke for nearly six weeks, and forced to evacuate entirely for four days while power was shut down.
This didn’t need to happen. The wildfire was said to have been poorly managed by the Forest Service (“USFS”) for an entire month before predictably exploding on an east wind in early September. By the time it was fully extinguished on November 22, taxpayers had spent more than 132 million dollars to employ more than 2500 firefighters that had operated dozens of helicopters and heavy equipment for the previous three months..
I visited the Cedar Creek Burn a few months ago with three friends to view the results of two years of Forest Service projects following the fire. We had to get a special permit to pass a locked gate that was installed to keep the public away from the site. That seemed to be it: approximately two billion-plus feet of standing timber, rotting in place, primed to burn again — only much hotter next time — no apparent response, and the public is locked out.
The November, 2022 USFS BAER (“Burned Area Emergency Response”) report doesn’t mention the obviously increased risk of deadly wildfire, but states instead that: “Threats include additional loss of habitat in the fire area due to blowdown, mass soil movement, flooding, and insects and disease.” But not wildfire?
Further: “A secondary issue includes determination if the proposed BAER stabilization treatments could affect spotted owl nest sites or result in disruption of nesting if conducted during the critical breeding season from March 1-July 15.”
Say what? More than 125,00 acres of trees are dead, nearly 12,000 acres of so-called “CH” has been destroyed, and yet the government can’t do anything about it for half the year because of SWO “critical breeding season?” How can this be written, reviewed, and publicly distributed, much less taken seriously?
Speaking in metrics and acronyms and producing voluminous busy-work reports seems to be the effective strategy. Also, the apparent NSO CH “critical breeding period” has apparently now been extended to the entire year, as there was no evidence at all of either USFS or spotted owl occupation at that time — just a locked gate.
Cedar Creek Fire Timeline
The Cedar Creek Fire started by lightning strikes on August 1, 2022, on the Willamette National Forest, about 15 miles east of the towns of Oakridge and Westfir. According to the BAER report, it couldn’t be extinguished as it “grew rapidly” in “inaccessible terrain,” and then was “held at control features for around one month” until the east winds arrived — as generally expected — in early September.
It is currently unknown why smokejumpers weren’t sent to extinguish the fire, but a helicopter with two “rappelers” flew over at 4:45 PM and reported it was about two acres in size and “burning in heavy timber midway up a 40% slope on a significant cliff with limited options for egress.”
At that point the rappelers turned down the assignment, reporting the terrain was “too hazardous for safe access.” Instead, a plan was developed to hike firefighters into the fire “during the next shift,” while helicopters performed bucket drops to limit its growth. The fire was estimated to be about five acres on August 2 and grew to an estimated 500 acres on August 3.
By August 15, the fire had grown to 4,422 acres with 0% containment. All recreational trailheads and dispersed camping were closed both west and north of Waldo Lake. The following day, August 16, the Forest Service posted this statement, along with a three-minute video on its new Facebook public information page:
“Since it started on August 1st, the Cedar Creek Fire has been slowly getting bigger, moving east into wilderness and roadless areas, and south towards the bottom of Cedar and Black Creeks. Hundreds of firefighters have been deployed around the fire, creating primary and backup firelines. This effort is guided by a strategic planning process that combines the latest fire science with on-the ground observations and years of firefighting experience. To learn more about the strategic planning process and why it is being used at Cedar Creek, watch this short video.”
Fig. 2. “Nature’s Clearcut.” View of increasing risk of wildfire the longer these snags remain in place. What had been large, growing plants filled with water were transformed in minutes by fire into massive amounts of pitchy, air-dried firewood. Unless something is done with these dead trees, the next fire through here — as with all predictable Douglas fir reburns — will be much hotter and cause more widespread damage than this fire. When snags fall before they reburn, they can also cause far more damage to the soil. Mark Cosby and Rob DeHarpport provide scale. Photo by author, October 28, 2024.
On August 27, the fire had grown to 7,632 acres with 0% containment. The “strategic planning process” involved possibly the very first use of USFS “PODs”:
“The District identified a contingency line based on a fuels assessment known as PODs (Potential Operational Delineations) well west of the incident. This line would provide a reliable fuel break in the event of a major east wind as well as any future fires that may threaten the communities of Oakridge and Westfir. While fire modeling and seasonality during the early stages of the incident did not indicate a strong likelihood that this line would be utilized, all the teams assigned continued to work on this contingency option.”
On September 4 the fire began burning through the 1996 10,400-acre Charlton Burn in the Wilderness along the north side of Waldo Lake. The fire had never been salvaged or treated and was covered with fallen snags that burned very hot and sterilized the soil in much of the area.
By September 8, the fire had grown from 27,000 acres and reached over 73,000 acres according to news sources — however, the government reported an increase to only 33,000 acres, and growing to 52,000 acres on September 10.
On September 9, the USFS official online information source for wildfires, “InciWeb,” reported the “Current Situation” as: “East winds, low humidities, and high temperatures will cause the fire to be active today. The highest activity will occur where lichen is present in trees and there is a high concentration of down wood. Where winds align with slopes, tree canopy fire and fire spotting are anticipated. E winds 15-20; gusts to 50.”
Given this report, the Lane County Sherriff’s Department made the decision to move Oakridge and Westfir into a “Level 3” evacuation, where residents are asked to leave by a given time and access roads are typically blocked. Powerlines were “de-energized” throughout the wind event and the duration of the evacuations, which were ordered for the following day.
Smoke from the fire moved into southwest Washington on September 10, and Seattle recorded the worst air quality of any major city in the world, with Portland coming in third out of the top 90, and Lahore, Pakistan sandwiched between the two. Seattle’s “AQI” was 170 and Portland’s was 152 (more on this later).
Fig 3. Blair Lake. This was a popular recreation spot for fishing and boating before the Cedar Creek Fire. It is now gated off from the public and surrounded by dead trees. In earlier times the lake would have formed a natural firebreak, and it is unlikely that the large amount of second-growth trees that crowned would have been present in such large numbers. A few trees that survived the fire might be good as a seed source for future reforestation efforts. No information on reopening. Photo by author, October 28, 2024.
Sometime at this point the fire began burning into the infamous 1991 Warner Creek Fire scar, which had made national news for several years due to threatened legal actions and active anti-logging protests by “concerned environmentalists.”
The 8,973-acre fire had cost $10 million to control and killed an estimated 180 million board feet (mmbf) of timber. Of this amount, only 35 mmbf were scheduled for sale, but two years of protests reduced that number to nine mmbf. Five years of protests and litigation later, no salvage had been completed, and the proposed sales number became only two mmbf. Then, 540,000 board feet were finally sold, and then the sale canceled. In September 2022, it all burned up.
By September 11 the fire had grown to 86,000 acres, more than 2,000 homes had been evacuated, and all highway access to the towns was blocked. Two days later the power was restored, and residents were allowed to return to their homes.
On September 12 the wind had shifted to the northwest and smoke began affecting air quality in Sisters and Bend, while clearing the air in Oakridge for a few days.
Fig. 4. Spring Prairie. There are numerous oak trees, huckleberry patches, and beargrass meadows in the Willamette National Forest in the vicinity of Oakridge. These are strong indications the land was regularly occupied and burned by Molalla and Klamath people during early historical time — and likely for many generations before. Several of the surviving trees around the prairie’s perimeter might be good seed sources for future reforestation efforts. Photo by author, October 28, 2024.
On September 16, the Central Oregon Daily News reported the fire had grown to 92,596 acres and videotaped Joan Kluwe, the “Public Information Officer for the Alaska Incident Management Team,” saying: “We have 92 engines, 39 crews, 113 types of heavy equipment, and 19 helicopters working on the fire.”
The total cost to “fight the fire, maintain and operate the machinery and take care of the personnel” to that date was given as $57,946,000.
On September 25, the fire had grown to 114,104 acres with 20% containment.
By October 27, the fire was 127,283 acres with 60% containment. Due to seasonal dropping temperatures and rising humidity, fire progression had nearly stopped, and the workforce had been reduced to two crews, one helicopter, two masticators. and four engines.
The following day, Fall rains and snow began, and finally, on November 22, the Cedar Creek Fire was declared “out.”
Great read; the realization by some that maybe “how we did it in the old days might need to be revisited!” But most likely, we won’t. There is a giant vacuum with leadership in the FS , of folks who have zero on the ground experience. The Agency is rife with “checklisted” do gooders who barely equate smoke with fire.
A cautionary tale for me was closing a Forest to campfires, on the request of an entire fire organization. However, I was not “delegated” that authority to do such a thing, and all the preplanning and notifications were called to a halt, when the boss showed back up. Over a half million incinerated acres later, FS policy had changed to where those pesky delegations were now by position, not name. Would that closure stopped the fire (two abandoned campfires, 70 mph winds), maybe? The fires started two days later, but who knows.
As for the ability to learn how the natural world reacts to stupid mistakes, finding actual on the ground dirt foresters is almost non-existent in the FS! WO leadership, and even some RO RF’s are so constrained by the checklist cavalry, the ascension to senior leadership is when, not if.
How many times has this scenario presented by Dr. Zybach been repeated? Maybe, just maybe, the California conflagration will at least restart the conversation…..
What “how we did it in the old days” are you referring to: more aggressive IA or the way old timers mismanaged the forests to put us in this mess?
What is “SWO”?
That is me and acronyms — or typing skills. I intended to type NSO but the stupid proof-reader missed it. Thanks! Will fix.
Thank you! That makes more sense. It’s a good article.