Bob B. has obviously been doing a great deal of thinking about this.. it was originally a comment, but his ideas are extensive and worthy of discussion on their own.
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An opening thought to this post…“People don’t resist change. They resist being changed.” — Peter Senge
Maybe it’s time—because the status quo in federal wildfire management is unsustainable. As someone who’s worked at every national, regional, and forest levels of the U.S. Forest Service—I’ve seen firsthand how fragmentation, underfunding, and outdated models are limiting our ability to meet today’s megafire challenges.
Here are some thoughts to inform the conversation around a potential executive order or legislative reorganization:
If We’re Doing This—What Should the Organizational Model Be?
If we move forward with establishing a National Wildland Fire Agency, the organizational model will determine its success or failure. Two analogies offer insight:
• DHS Post-9/11 shows how consolidating multiple agencies under one mission can increase national focus—but also demonstrates the pitfalls of poor integration, such as clashing agency cultures, unclear roles, and persistent stovepipes.
• The U.S. Space Force, with a workforce similar in size (~10–12K), is a better analogy. It was built with clarity of mission, streamlined command, and intentional structure. A National Wildland Fire Agency should emulate Space Force’s lean, agile design while learning from DHS’s growing pains.
• Any other ones to copy?
Integrating Prescribed Fire and Suppression
Suppression and prescribed fire are typically executed by many of the same people—yet fire “years” make that untenable in the future. Consolidating these functions under the new agency would improve operational alignment and reduce risk. Land management agencies could contract back for prescribed fire work, but the staffing of resources and accountability would rest with the wildfire agency. This shift could finally address chronic under-resourcing and reduce the unacceptable rate of escaped prescribed burns.
Unified and Interoperable Data Systems
Current systems are fractured, especially between USDA and DOI. During my time, I saw how even basic functions—like syncing global address books—failed across agencies DOI and USFS in the same building. All dispatch centers and platforms (like IROC) should be unified under the new agency to ensure full interoperability and operational clarity.
Facilities Optimization
Many current agency facilities are obsolete or redundant. In Region 5, it was documented that the USFS had as many facilities as employees, most in poor condition. A BRAC-style review is needed to determine which facilities will transition to the new agency. Some former DOD sites (like March AFB) could be rehabilitated for training and housing, so long as they’re affordable and family-suitable.
National Performance Metrics and Procurement
A unified agency would allow for standardized staffing, equipment, and operational benchmarks. Dare I utter national “standard module configuration”. Right now, the same type of engine or crew is staffed and equipped differently depending on the forest or region. Using Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) procurement processes could streamline purchasing and improve readiness. Finally, just like DOD assigns mission sets, equipment, and training without units worrying about base budget funding.
Permanent Incident Management Teams (IMTs)
Permanent, nationally managed IMTs would ensure consistent training, readiness, and response capacity. Building on the USFS NIMO model, these teams would retain control of operations, finance, and intelligence throughout an incident. Supported agencies (e.g., USFS, NPS, BLM) would no longer pull the response in multiple directions, the new agency would own the mission, data, and accountability. This would also increase suppression cost analytics (why is that fire so expensive?), which is always asked the farther you are from the fireline.
Law Enforcement, Arson Investigators and Lawyers For Cost Recovery
LE personnel in USFS (maybe other agencies) operate using fire-funded systems (dispatch, radios, etc.), but without formal alignment. Under a new model, LE support shouldn’t be expected and should be contracted by an agency to the wildfire agency. Cause/origin investigations will roll to the new agency with a centralized investigative unit, modeled on CAL FIRE’s approach, could recover hundreds of millions annually through arson-related litigation, and ensure those cases hold up in court.
Finally, Arson Investigation Coordination and Information Sharing. Read this and then think about what an agency needs to be to deal with this looming threat. Reference: National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Mitigating the Threat of Terrorist-Initiated Arson Attacks on Wildland-Urban Interface Areas. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/124s_-_Mitigating_the_Threat_of_Terrorist-Initiated_Arson_Attacks_on_Wildland-Urban_Interface_Areas.pdf
We must close the gap between local cause and origin and national arson tracking. The unified Wildland Fire service should participate in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) via the National Network of Fusion Centers to look multi-jurisdictionally at arson. The ATF’s Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) should be the standard platform for all investigative reporting, enabling broader threat analysis and interagency response coordination.
“Change is disturbing when it is done to us, exhilarating when it is done by us.” Rosabeth Moss Kanter (Harvard Business School)
While the change may be hard, a unified National Wildland Fire Agency offers a rare opportunity to reset—this time, with clarity, coordination, and mission alignment.
Love It. Sounds like a great start.
Bob B. Certainly done a good job of laying out the issues of something new. I’m a proponent of the fire agency but my emphasis would be on IMT’s, and a cadre of firefighters, mainly crossed with, and housed with FEMA. I don’t see how initial attack will work unless the FS maintains militia status IA, and dispatch, training, etc. I could see a FMO-ish position that also is RxB certified and up to a type 3 IC.
That brings up the next big challenge of fire in silviculture. TBH, I only see a National Organization taking over after the first burning period, concentrating on that 2% that will run.
Interesting discussion, this!
I share your concerns and I don’t believe a national fire agency would benefit anything but large incident management. I work in a typical rural national forest district where intial attack (private, state, and federal lands) is largely handled by militia. I’m sure they will continue to expect me to risk my life with no firefighter pay raise, no firefighter retirement benefits, and no presumptive cancer medical coverage.
I’m skeptical that site prep or maintenance burns would be prioritized which would hinder timber management and make my job less productive. In many places fire is an integral aspect of silviculture and to remove it from local control would be a step in the wrong direction. How about creating a fire retirement eligible crew of veg managers on each district/forest to conduct our own burn operations and continue to assist with local IA? I can get behind that.
The other problem with putting prescribed fire under the fire management agency is that local folks, Tribes and not for profits that want to do PF would have to interact with a large, potentially faceless bureaucratic organization. I like the idea that there would be fewer escapes, but with competing priorities, there could also be less PF work done. How about local for PF and call in the Wildfire Agency if/when it escapes? Which I suppose is more or less the way things work now?
Given Bob B.s suggestions, it seems like all of them would work without moving PF and fuels to the new agency. “you locals do your prescribed work until you call in Suppression-R-Us…” I also think new technologies in wildfire detection and Unpersoned Systems will make “putting out unwanted fires” easier, which will make PF even more important than now.
That’s what makes sense to me (!). I don’t have much fire experience, but it seems like “suppressing” and “managing” fires might take somewhat different approaches and skill sets.
My biggest concern is separating suppression from land management ethic. What happens when suppression forces have no concept or concern about impacts to our natural resources. I am also concerned about the prospect of separating Rx fire from suppression. I’m my experience over the past 25 years, prescribed burning makes better firefighters. It provides valuable experience and repetition but more importantly it provides an incredible knowledge of fire behavior that is hard to replicate in the wildfire environment.
“What happens when suppression forces have no concept or concern about impacts to our natural resources.”
I think you have a good point. But I’m wondering how suppression decisions consider that now. I know in theory they are not excused from complying with the forest plan, but I have a hard time picturing that in practice. I’ve also experienced the use of a “resource advisor” on a fire, but why wouldn’t that also work if suppression personnel were separated from management?
NAFSR’s letter to the Hill on a single fire agency is here:
https://nafsr.org/advocacy/2025/050825-Single%20Wildland%20Firefighting%20Agency%20_Website.pdf
It covers many of the topics addressed in this thread. The tldr version: don’t do it. Apologies if this has already been posted here.
No I didn’t post it yet but will.