This is my prep paragraph to Eric Horne’s post below of context for MegaFire Action’s paper on One Department for Wildfire Management (1) which includes (2) moving the Forest Service to Interior (what we might call “the whole enchilada” of moves).
If I recall correctly, Michael Rains mentioned that there was a Carter-era initiative to bring the agencies together. Larry Kurtz often mentions this as a good idea from his perspective, and we’ve discussed it here at TSW several times.
Then there was Service First, which many of us remember as successful but foundering on the shoals of individual agency budget accountability (or personal preference by State Directors or RFs? has a good history been written? Here’s a link to to GAO Report from 2000 called “Ongoing Initiative to Share Activities and Facilities Needs Management Attention. Well, I guess it got management attention.. but not in a good way. Like disappearing it.
So given those historic undercurrents that come to the surface from time to time (as included in the Megafire Action report, as far back as Reagan-er Interchange), it is not surprising that folks new to this space (Megafire Action) have surfaced the idea. Be sure to check out their “One Department for Wildfire Management” report in its entirety. Please remember to be hospitable and kind to new folks. As Eric says, we can expect much more discussion around this topic, so hopefully we can set a productive tone for further discussions.
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Thoughts on the Administration’s proposed Federal Wildland Fire Service
By Eric Horne, National Policy Director, Megafire Action
The Trump Administration’s newly released “skinny budget” proposes a wholesale restructuring of wildfire management. Acknowledging that the “dispersed nature of the Federal mission creates significant coordination and cost inefficiencies that result in sub-optimal performance”, the budget calls for “consolidating and unifying the Federal wildland fire responsibilities into a single new Federal Wildland Fire Service at DOI, including transferring USDA’s current wildland fire management responsibilities.” Coming on the heels of Senators Padilla and Sheehy’s “Fit for Purpose Wildfire Readiness Act of 2025” and the widely circulated draft executive order, this concept is clearly gaining momentum.
Back in February, Megafire Action laid out the extensive history and potential merits of this proposal—“One Department for Wildfire Management”. We found that unifying wildland fire management and land management under one department would greatly streamline preparedness and mitigation, enhance transparency, strengthen tribal partnerships, and improve resource allocation by leveraging DOI’s centralized budget structure and departmental leadership that has a strong history of managing wildland fire across its agencies.
The Administration’s proposal is currently light on details, though we expect the forthcoming Congressional Budget Justification to shed more light on how and when this consolidation will take place, what programs and functions will be moved from USDA to DOI, and what will be left behind at USDA. While we await further details, we want to be clear about one thing: improved wildfire outcomes and cost synergies will only materialize if land management responsibilities are consolidated into the Department of the Interior alongside wildfire suppression capabilities. Fragmentation between emergency response, prevention and mitigation has too often resulted in year-round disaster management, minimizing long-term risk reduction.
The Administration’s skinny budget references “risk mitigation efforts” for consolidation, potentially including fuels management currently under the Forest Service’s Wildfire Suppression Operations appropriations account, though its inclusion remains unclear. On the other hand, key Forest Service land management accounts appear to be left behind at USDA, with significant budget cuts: $392 million in cuts to National Forest System Management, including “vegetation and watershed management”; and $994 million in cuts to other programs. Moving wildfire suppression to DOI while leaving these critical functions underfunded at USDA would forgo cost synergies with DOI land management agencies, missing an opportunity to save taxpayer dollars while improving performance. Severing wildfire suppression from the Forest Service while underfunding land management agencies which are already in the throes of a workforce crisis would likely result in a significantly worse fire environment.
Kelly Martin, retired Chief of Fire and Aviation at Yosemite National Park, explains that “taking a unified approach to all aspects of fire management is intended to help eliminate duplication and overlap between the two main departments—Agriculture and Interior—over the next 50 years. However, without sustained public and political support for communities and individuals doing wildland fire and land management work, we risk perpetuating the wildfire crisis and facing even more severe fire seasons well into the future.”
Structural reform on this scale comes with real risks and potential opportunities. Success will require that the entire land management and wildfire community engage Congress and the Administration to ensure any reform strengthens responsible land management alongside suppression. Stay tuned.
GAO has issued a series of reports examining government reorganizations, incluing this one:
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-427
The successful establishment of a wildland fire service will depend on mastery of these complex, challenging, and yes, kind of boring details. The present administration does not, as far I can tell, even remotely possess the capacity to navigate these difficult and tedious bureaucratic shoals. However, there are people still within government, and plenty currently outside of it, who do have this capacity (including people from both parties and people who are unaffiliated). A successful land management agency reorganization, whether focused on fire or anything else, will depend on putting people like this in charge of the effort and giving them a chance to succeed.
Thanks, Rich! The GAO report reminds me of the FS Transformation effort.. which did many of the things GAO suggests, but I would guess that the ideas were thwarted by organizational antibodies to change, without strong backing by politicals.
Allow me to repeat, once again, some of my thoughts.
I do think the Carter Administration’s proposal for a “Department of Natural Resources” was solid and deserves strong consideration again. Having a separate “Wildfire Agency” outside of the “Department of Natural Resources” (or anywhere else) is a notion beyond terrible. Because of so many reasons that I have already stated, “forest management” will go into the ditch if this goofy proposal would somehow be deployed. Please, think this through carefully.
We strive to have healthy, resilient, sustainable forests so wildfires can be reduced and maybe in the very long term, be a tool for forest maintenance; maybe. If you create a separate agency devoted to only wildfires, resources from a wide-range of natural resources management, will be directed away from forest care. I can assure you. Having a cohesive unit within the “Department of Natural Resources” constantly linked to forest health and sustainability makes sense. Even I know this.
The word stewardship means care, protection and effective use. Let this word for America’s landscape scale conservation guide us. A “Wildfire Agency” will be a disaster in terms of effective and efficient land stewardship, including recreation activities.
If your objective is improved landscape scale conservation, reduced overall expenditures and better economic stability along the rural to urban gradient, having one outside wildfire agency is EXACTLY THE WAY NOT TO ACHIEVE THIS. Honestly, it not even a close call. Please think this through. The consequences of a separate wildfire agency will be incredibly severe to a very large population.
Talk to others. We have some amazing conservationists in our country. They will know.
Very respectfully,
Michael, can you tell us more about the downside? Because what I hear from some folks in fire are their frustrations at (apparently needless) bureaucratic differences and coordination problems. Are there other ways to fix those problems? Have they been tried? How did they work?
Sharon, a note: I started this reply and my system went down. I hope I have not caused a logic disruption. And I wish I knew how to make an organizational chart on this blog. Here is my current thinking:
Allow me to “step” this:
1. Using your organizational chart as a guide, remove “Department of Interior” and
replace it with “United States Department of Natural Resources (USDNR).”
2. Now, under the USDNR, you should have three foundational boxes:
USDNR
Lands Sciences Operations
3. Under “Lands”, place four boxes:
Lands
Public State Private Tribal
4. Under the four boxes in No. 3, place three component boxes: Management; Protection; and Use. USDNR
Lands Sciences Operations
Public State Private Tribal
Management Protection Use
This is “stewardship.” The goal under USDNR is the “stewardship” of all lands, through a direct role (i.e., Public) and indirect role (i.e., Tribal, State, Private).
4. Under “USDNR”, under “Lands” (all lands), under “Protection”, place a box entitled, “Wildfire Management.” This is the key. You now have Wildfire Management within the USDNR. Full and dotted lines can illustrate focus. Remember, “Wildfire Management” is a tactic, “Lands is a “program.” So, the levels are different (basic organizational design):
USDNR
Lands Sciences Operations
Public State Private Tribal
Management Protection Uses
Wildfire Management
5. Now, if we were doing it right, we would adjust the “agency names” and place the
predominant action agency under a name. I know we freak out when I say this.
However, indulge me a bit. Combine the “public, state and private” lands under:
“Agency for Lands Management” You combine BLM, NPS, and USFS into one “Agency.”
The BIA would become the “Agency for Tribal Governments” shown as follows:
USDNR
“Agency for Lands Management” “Agency for Tribal Governments”
Lands Sciences Operations
Public State Private Tribal
Management Protection Uses
Wildlife Management Wildfire Management Etc.
6. The F&WS would be eliminated and become a tactical program “Wildlife Management” under “Management, Protection and Use under the “Agency for Lands Management.”
6. I am sure there are appropriate people that can decide on the perfect names. That is
the least of the problems.
7. The really good news is now we have one USDNR in charge of America’s natural
resources and one “Wildfire Management” tactical program to help protect the lands.
8. This will take some time. Stop DOGE, for example, from jumping from “pillar to post”
and wasting time and money. If this was done correctly, about $3.23 billion would be
saved starting about 2028 and maybe as high as $4 billion by 2030, annually, same
basic program emphasis, not inflated.
9. Someplace I just read that conservation “management” funds will be reduced by a
bunch so we can have a wildfire emphasis with a separate agency. Are we dead? This is
exactly the opposite of what we should be doing. If I know this, the leaders of a USDNR
will know better. What are we thinking?
9. If our goal is to be sound land stewardship; healthy forests; abundant wildlife; efficient
recreation opportunities; economic development along a complex rural to urban land
gradient for the next century, and save at least 50,000 lives in 2025, some good solid
choices will do this. A separate “wildfire agency” is clearly not part of this solution.
10. I know most of you understand all of this. And nothing I have said will slow a decision
that I believe has already been made. Pardon the words, but we are playing with fire
and the consequence in lives lost and property destroyed will be horrific. I am terribly
saddened that we won’t do the right thing.
11. Lastly, this was a gut-wrenching time for me. recently. Go to NEFLIX, “The Turning
Point.” There are several series about high-level decision-making that had terrible
consequences that we knew beforehand would happen. Oh my gosh it was shameful
to watch. Please, let’s not make landscape scale conservation a terrible “turning point.”
We know better.
Very respectfully,
Michael, it wasn’t my chart, it was Megafire Action’s.
Sorry about my error. And I am sorry that my reply got all messed up in formatting. I was trying to produce an organization chart. In summary, I was attempting to say:
1. Form a USDNR (1 US Department of Natural Resources)
2. Form an “Agency for Lands Management” and an “Agency for Tribal Governments” (2 Primary Agencies).
3. Think Lands, Sciences, and Operations (3 Major Programs)
4, Think Public, State, Private, and Tribal lands to be cared for (4 Lands Components)
5. Think “stewardship”: Management, Protection, and Uses (3 stewardship tactics)
6. Focus. For example, “Wildlife Management”; “Wildfire Management”; Etc. (various stewardship sub-tactics, including the big issue at hand; “Wildfire Management.”
The bottom line: Under the USDNR, we place the “Agency for Lands Management”, and under this “Wildfire Management.” This way, one can ensure that protecting landscapes from wildfires in within the goals of the agency and the Department’s vision for stewardship across all ownerships. The major fears of disconnected forest management and excessive funding shifts due to inherent duplication is largely eliminated.
I am usually not a fan of Presidential Commissions (I have been on three), but this (“Wildfire Management”) is Presidential Commission material. That is, “…with a new United States Department of Natural Resources and the “Agency for Lands Management”, design an efficient and effective program to protect landscapes in America, along a complex rural to urban land gradient, from wildfires.”
While this is being done, have an inter-Departmental Team, just like we did with the “National Fire Plan”, “form a more optimal organization for the stewardship of America’s natural resources” (i.e., this leads to the guiding principles of the USDNR. These emphasis areas (Presidential Commission and Departmental Team) shall be congruent will begin to logically merge. Yes, they will logically merge. Those with experiences in land stewardship will understand this instinctively.
In my view, this full action will save lots of money and much more effectively serve the American people. For now, stop the foolishness of eliminating people and programs before you have any idea what the desired outcome is. Think about it. When you do not know, it is not uncommon to not care.
This is my bias: efficient and effective land stewardship along a rural to urban gradient is complex. Almost no one that I have seen in the new Administration and certainly not in Congress, understands Landscape Scale Conservation (LSC) and its interconnections; respectively in both lanes. A wrong move in LSC is lasting. Most of the time one cannot say “oops, I change my mind.” Think of the multi-million acres of lands that did not have to burn in 2024 because someone thought “monitoring” was a solid idea. Think of the thousands of people that died due to unnecessary smoke inhalation because someone thought that “managing” a wildfire was a smart tactic.
I will always treasure what a former Forest Chief said to me one day: “the only thing that really scares me is that I don’t know what I don’t know.” And this was a brilliant and very effective Chief.
So, I am begging this Administration and anyone else that will listen, please slow down, become part of a learned conversation, gather some quality information, make some solid choices based on experiences of those that indeed “have been there”, and, then proceed with a Presidential Commission and a Departmental Team that together will form the foundation for stewardship excellence for the next Century. This is the way to make really good legacy choices. Even I know that. Then, so do you.
Very respectfully,
I keep hearing this over and over “We cannot separate Fire from Land Management” I fully agree.
Unfortunately, this is what folks like yourself are reading into it. I think this is a mindset we all need to keep working on…. this is NOT a recommendation for the creation of a stand alone “WILDFIRE Agency”. The work we did on the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission made it clear: “The Commission stresses the need to shift from a reactive posture-focused mainly on suppression-to a proactive strategy that emphasizes pre-fire mitigation, post-fire recovery, and long-term resilience. This includes building sustainable solutions and creating communities and landscapes that are more adaptable to wildfire as an ongoing natural phenomenon”
Kelly:
Yes, I am very familiar with the “Commission” Report. Respectfully, it calls for “beneficial” fire, as you say. And the stand alone “Wildfire Agency” is a function of the new Administration, not the Commission report as you so clearly state.
In theory, “beneficial” fire makes sense, but NOT NOW. Under the current landscape conditions, “beneficial”, “managed”, “monitoring”, “letting burn” for ecosystem enhancement or improved landscape scale health and resiliency is purely an intellectual argument. See, “A Call to Action.” And you might want to check out page 129, of the SAF book of essays on “193 million acres…” I am a fan of “beneficial” fire as per the Commission is. But NOT NOW. It does not work. In my lifetime, it will not work. It could in yours. I hope so. About 2.7 million acres were scorched in 2024 that did not have to be, because we thought “watching” a wildfire was a good tactic. About 50,000 people died last year because we thought “managing a wildfire” made sense and the added smoke was not harmful. NOT NOW, it doesn’t make sense, and the added smoke was deadly and not necessary.
Very respectfully,
Michael,
Respectfully, beneficial fire in all of the senses you laid out does work. I have hiked, skied, and snowshoed through a lot of it in wild and managed lands over the last 42 years. It is not purely an intellectual argument. Not applied near WUI, but in wild or managed lands away from WUI. And such non-WUI-adjacent areas are vast in the Intermountain West.
In fact when you examine the MTBS burn severity maps for the 11 western states from 1984 until now, what we can see is that about half of the area burned even under what are primarily escaped wildfire scenarios is a pretty good or better first entry fire after a long period of fire exclusion. At 70 million acres now burning per decade, that is roughly 35 million acres. From what I can tell, managing the postfire environment after fires would be a great twin goal to thinning and burning treatments. What is more, it is clear that many acres burn at moderate, low, and very low severity during actual wildfire incidents. What we lack today is resolve to keep the good work of wildfires going.
Our published simulation studies bear up the same findings.
Please see Furniss et al 2024, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s42408-024-00339-y and Furniss et al 2023, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/forests-and-global-change/articles/10.3389/ffgc.2023.1269081/full
See also
van Wagtendonk, https://link.springer.com/article/10.4996/fireecology.0302003
Calkin 2015, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40663-015-0033-8
Thompson, https://academic.oup.com/jof/article-abstract/116/4/382/5035163
North et al 2015, https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.aab2356
Please also see Williamson 2006, https://www.publish.csiro.au/WF/WF06019. This one is particularly telling why line officers often do not manage wildfires for resource benefit when they are positive abouts its benefits.
Mounting evidence in the core fire science literature shows that we will not be able to solely thin and burn our way out of this current dilemma. See Prichard et al 2021 for thorough review of the NA literature on this topic, https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/eap.2433
Respectfully, not including managing wildfires as a strong and useful tool in the toolkit is a choice for letting 21st century wildfires run the table.
All respect,
Thanks for your contribution, Paul! I hope you continue to post your comments as I think we need to go into more depth on the “managed fire” discussion.
Since high-intensity wildfires are a certainty, perhaps all management decisions should reflect that knowledge? Of course, no fires will be ‘unmanaged’, and we won’t be able to safely extinguish every new wildfire by 10AM.
Thanks, Paul. We can and we must use wildfire to meet all kinds of objectives, and as you say, we will never rx burn or thin our way out of this situation. Too many times wildland firefighters find themselves on remote fires, myself included, saying “this fire is doing nothing but good, why are we trying to put it out?” Not to mention putting folks at unnecessary risk when doing so. When I was Fire Staff on the Umpqua NF in Oregon, we had wonderful candidate fires for reaching ecological and hazardous fuel reduction objectives but were told by the Regional Forester that he wasn’t willing to take the risk. We need decision-makers who understand and accept the risks when their experienced and thoughtful fire managers are saying the benefits outweigh them.
Thanks to you and the many other researchers using your voices AND data to prove that we can, and should, use wildfires in the right place at the right time.
Riva Duncan
You’re welcome, Riva. Thank you for your efforts and your long and distinguished career in fire.
Our recent paper here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s42408-024-00339-y shows strong evidence of this need in a broad multitool kit.
The postfire environment is another motherload not yet tapped. See these two papers by Andrew Larson (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378112721007702) and Derek Churchill (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378112721008872) too.
–Paul
I think it’s important to note that arguments that “we need to do it” should go with “here’s how to do it right and reduce the risk, and increase trust.” Because maybe people are talking past each other, and the ones who bear the risk (communities) are not the ones making the decisions. Certainly, “it’s important and we should have all the organizational, technological, certification, and public involvement tools to ensure that we are doing it as best as we can” is also a way of thinking. To my mind, that’s different from “we need to do it” and “everything’s fine.”
Agree Sharon. There is much written about how to do it. That is not the obstacle as the refs show in my first reply.
So I think that’s another way people may talk past each other.
When I say “know how to do it, ” I mean something different than what you mean., I would think that some form of fire amendment (public process) would be part of that. There would also be a place for local people to voice their specific concerns and local knowledge. And managed fires would almost always burn within prescription- and when that doesn’t happen the lessons learned and recommendations would be transparent to all. Perhaps we need to get better at dealing with managed fire when it goes out of prescription. I guess my point is that processes and technologies for escaped managed fires can still be improved and that will help develop social license. If it’s that critical, as your paper says, then we should be working on every aspect.
1. Talk to the public about where and why FWB can be used. Do an EIS and a plan amendment.
2. Follow those guidelines
3. When it goes outside prescription, jump on it and stop it.
I don’t know that “we know how” to execute 1, 2 and 3 successfully and I’m not sure that we share the same criteria for success.
We actually mean the same thing, Sharon. We have the know-how, but our social process needs rehab in the ways you state.
I agree with much of what Michael says here. A major downside to creating a separate fire agency would be the death of the militia firefighters. If you had people within the Forest Service after the departure of fire, who wanted to get qualified and engaged in firefighting, who would train them and organize them? The FS would no longer have FMO’s or AFMO’s to work with these people. How would they get experience? I would predict that the militia would just fade away. Maybe very quickly. Another downside is that the fire organization would no longer be involved in land management. Would they just be a fire suppression organization? Who would be writing Rx burn prescriptions? Silviculturists who have no knowledge or experience with fire? Who would conduct prescribed burns? We have a big problem already with Line Officers who have no fire experience but are making serious fire decisions. Down the road, it would be a given that Line Officers would not have any fire experience.
Dave, I suppose employees could still be militia even if the Fire Service were located elsewhere. For example, I had employees in the National Guard who were gone for those duties and training.
I could see each Ranger District having a qualified militia crew to respond to fires, especially in the early morning hours. I guess we’ll have to see how many USFS people will even want to go on fires, given their increased (and changed) workloads.
Well said Dave. I’m tired of the expectation that local militia will step up while we continue to receive none of the benefits of primary firefighters and have regular duties to manage as well. On the flip side, district fire staff help out with rec projects, roadwork, mowing, property line painting, timber marking – who is going to fill that void after they are stovepiped into this new organization?
From my perspective, the only way to prevent failure of local land management would be to explicitly tie fire/fuels and silviculture together. Train foresters to plan and implement local prescribed fire, expect us to respond to IA fires, and give us firefighter benefits. Some timber managers are heavily involved in fire and some are not at all, but if there is no expectation to have fire experience then like you said it will soon become a given that those outside this national fire organization will have no fire experience and there will be no militia to rely on.
If we eliminate the Land Management aspect from the role from the fed wildfire org, i assume the fire staff would go back to playing hacky-sack in the parking lot during off season and between IA. Although the militia workforce is a shell of what it once was back in the 90’s, it’s a different story in Region 8. Without our militia, which can easily make up 50+% of staff on any given Rx burn, our annual accomplishments would crumple. On the bright side, think of all the new swag the National Wildfire Agency will get to buy. Good luck to my fellow feds. Could get rough for is next week.
An inappropriate snarky swipe, thank you very much…. I guess maybe it’s in your nature to feel resentment towards those who put their lives on the line day-in and day-out, year-after-year, making peanuts, who suffer some of the greatest mental and physical consequences of their profession well into retirement, when you catch them during a break laughing together, building team cohesion, waiting for the next assignment that may-in-fact irrevocably change their lives and their family’s lives forever.
We have been saying this for years “firefighters are not the only firelighters”. Resource Management folks are trained in prescribed fire especially in Region 8 and make up the bulk of the practitioners who implement prescribed burns. We need to double down and enhance and open up the on-the-ground rx fire practitioner pipeline with more NGOs, state agency personnel, prescribed burn associations etc – which is a good thing!. “All Hands – All Lands”
You are misinterpreting my statements and criticism of poor management decisions for how to best leverage available firefighter resources to achieve forest restoration and integrated resource objectives (outside of Rx and suppression), for an attack on the individual firefighters. Over the past 25 years we’ve seen exponential increase in firefighter resources, while at the same time a drastic reduction across all other resource areas (particularly field going personnel), which has resulted in observable impacts to natural resources and recreation resources. To be clear, I’m not claiming this shift in staffing priorities was not required, given the social, political, and financial pressures of the changing wildfire operating environment. That said, if this plan to stovepipe “all” wildfire agencies into a single agency does not include a mandated function to support hazardous fuel reduction and forest restoration, then I’m concerned our land management and park agencies will suffer, but only at a greater degree.
There are so many federal people and programs that have been downsized, I just don’t know how the remaining federal agency employees will have the ability to support the National fire effort. Yes, the remaining federal employees will still be involved as “supplemental” fire support personnel on a unit or adjacent neighboring unit as needed. Which begs the question: Can we expand the pipeline to use more state and local personnel and build up complex incident management teams with more people outside of the federal agencies? The USFS would like to return to their roots of active forest management but as it stands now the agency is so overburden (over half the agency budget goes to fire) with the fire program it can’t see the forest for the trees.
Thanks, Sharon and Eric, for Opening this up.
An opening thought to this post…“People don’t resist change. They resist being changed.” — Peter Senge
Maybe it’s time—because the status quo in federal wildfire management is unsustainable. As someone who’s worked at every national, regional, and forest levels of the U.S. Forest Service—I’ve seen firsthand how fragmentation, underfunding, and outdated models are limiting our ability to meet today’s megafire challenges.
Here are some thoughts to inform the conversation around a potential executive order or legislative reorganization:
If We’re Doing This—What Should the Organizational Model Be?
If we move forward with establishing a National Wildland Fire Agency, the organizational model will determine its success or failure. Two analogies offer insight:
• DHS Post-9/11 shows how consolidating multiple agencies under one mission can increase national focus—but also demonstrates the pitfalls of poor integration, such as clashing agency cultures, unclear roles, and persistent stovepipes.
• The U.S. Space Force, with a workforce similar in size (~10–12K), is a better analogy. It was built with clarity of mission, streamlined command, and intentional structure. A National Wildland Fire Agency should emulate Space Force’s lean, agile design while learning from DHS’s growing pains.
• Any other ones to copy?
Integrating Prescribed Fire and Suppression
Suppression and prescribed fire are typically executed by many of the same people—yet fire “years” make that untenable in the future. Consolidating these functions under the new agency would improve operational alignment and reduce risk. Land management agencies could contract back for prescribed fire work, but the staffing of resources and accountability would rest with the wildfire agency. This shift could finally address chronic under-resourcing and reduce the unacceptable rate of escaped prescribed burns.
Unified and Interoperable Data Systems
Current systems are fractured, especially between USDA and DOI. During my time, I saw how even basic functions—like syncing global address books—failed across agencies DOI and USFS in the same building. All dispatch centers and platforms (like IROC) should be unified under the new agency to ensure full interoperability and operational clarity.
Facilities Optimization
Many current agency facilities are obsolete or redundant. In Region 5, it was documented that the USFS had as many facilities as employees, most in poor condition. A BRAC-style review is needed to determine which facilities will transition to the new agency. Some former DOD sites (like March ARB) could be rehabilitated for training and housing, so long as they’re affordable and family-suitable.
National Performance Metrics and Procurement
A unified agency would allow for standardized staffing, equipment, and operational benchmarks. Dare I utter national “standard module configuration”. Right now, the same type of engine or crew is staffed and equipped differently depending on the forest or region. Using Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) procurement processes could streamline purchasing and improve readiness. Finally, just like DOD assigns mission sets, equipment, and training without units worrying about base budget funding.
Permanent Incident Management Teams (IMTs)
Permanent, nationally managed IMTs would ensure consistent training, readiness, and response capacity. Building on the USFS NIMO model, these teams would retain control of operations, finance, and intelligence throughout an incident. Supported agencies (e.g., USFS, NPS, BLM) would no longer pull the response in multiple directions, the new agency would own the mission, data, and accountability. This would also increase suppression cost analytics (why is that fire so expensive?), which is always asked the farther you are from the fireline.
Law Enforcement, Arson Investigators and Lawyers For Cost Recovery
LE personnel in USFS (maybe other agencies) operate using fire-funded systems (dispatch, radios, etc.), but without formal alignment. Under a new model, LE support shouldn’t be expected and should be contracted by an agency to the wildfire agency. Cause/origin investigations will roll to the new agency with a centralized investigative unit, modeled on CAL FIRE’s approach, could recover hundreds of millions annually through arson-related litigation, and ensure those cases hold up in court.
Finally, Arson Investigation Coordination and Information Sharing. Read this and then think about what an agency needs to be to deal with this looming threat. Reference: National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Mitigating the Threat of Terrorist-Initiated Arson Attacks on Wildland-Urban Interface Areas. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/124s_-_Mitigating_the_Threat_of_Terrorist-Initiated_Arson_Attacks_on_Wildland-Urban_Interface_Areas.pdf
We must close the gap between local cause and origin and national arson tracking. The unified Wildland Fire service should participate in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) via the National Network of Fusion Centers to look multi-jurisdictionally at arson. The ATF’s Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) should be the standard platform for all investigative reporting, enabling broader threat analysis and interagency response coordination.
“Change is disturbing when it is done to us, exhilarating when it is done by us.” Rosabeth Moss Kanter (Harvard Business School)
While the change may be hard, a unified National Wildland Fire Agency offers a rare opportunity to reset—this time, with clarity, coordination, and mission alignment.
I was peripherally involved at the district level during the Clinton administration effort to combine FS and BLM. While there was some angst in the agencies, we were working toward creating that vision. My take is that it did not happen because members of Congress and the Senate realized that they would loose offices and employment opportunities for their constituents.
Maybe things have changed since many FS and BLM folks are already co-located at least below the Regional/State level.
Grassroots Wildland Firefighters (GWF) has had a National Wildfire Service as one of our Four Pillars since the organizations establishment in 2019. We released our proposal shortly after the introduction of the Sheehy/Padilla Bill, but it was lost in a lot of the administration’s chaos at that time. Like the discussion about a NWFS in DOI, and several comments here, a separate agency doesn’t automatically divorce fire suppression from mitigation, ecosystem health, or the land management agencies, nor does it discard the collateral duty workforce (always hated the word “militia” to describe our non-primary fire employees). Ours certainly does not. Also, we (GWF) know we don’t have all the answers or necessarily the “right” answers, but we do believe the time is right for a real discussion. GWF exists in order to represent the boots on the ground and those that directly support them, and that will always be our priority — and something that has been absent in all the other discussions. Our argument has always been that the status quo no longer serves the firefighters. The agencies have failed to protect the workforce, and it’s time to not only think about how we must be able to serve our publics AND our public lands, but also how to serve the people doing the work in an ever riskier and more demanding profession. For those who care to read our proposal, you can do so here: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f6ced5b8d33bb20b5c97c0b/t/67a964eb7f17585b0fd3fdf5/1739154668441/GWF+National+Wildland+Fire+Service.pdf
Respectfully,
Riva Duncan
Forest Fire Chief, USFS (retired)
Vice President, Grassroots Wildland Firefighters